Microsoft - "Spoofed LPC Port Request" Vulnerability
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CIAC INFORMATION BULLETIN
K-019: Microsoft - "Spoofed LPC Port Request" Vulnerability
January 25, 2000 22:00 GMT
PROBLEM: A function which supports LPC (Local Procedure Calls) is
flawed. A malicious user through a series of steps could fool
the validation checking in the function into believing the user
has higher privileges.
PLATFORM: Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Workstation, Microsoft Windows NT 4.0
Server, Microsoft NT 4.0 Server (Enterprise Edition), Microsoft
Windows NT 4.0 Server (Terminal Server Edition)
DAMAGE: A malicious user could logon to a Windows NT 4.0 machine and
run a program posing as another user or the Administrator of
the machine.
SOLUTION: Install the hotfix from Microsoft.
VULNERABILITY The risk is low. A malicious user would need to have local
ASSESSMENT: access to the machine and be able to, through a series of
complicated steps, spoof the validation checking of an LPC
function.
[ Begin Microsoft Security Bulletin ]
Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS00-003)
--------------------------------------
Patch Available for "Spoofed LPC Port Request" Vulnerability
Originally Posted: January 13, 2000
Summary
=======
Microsoft has released a patch that eliminates a security vulnerability in
Microsoft(r) Windows NT(r) 4.0. The vulnerability could allow a user logged
onto a Windows NT 4.0 machine from the keyboard to become an administrator
on the machine.
Frequently asked questions regarding this vulnerability can be found at
http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/MS00-003faq.asp.
Issue
=====
LPC Ports is a facility that allows LPC calls on a machine. One of the
functions in the LPC Ports API set enables, by design, a server thread to
impersonate a client thread on the same machine. However, a flaw in the
validation portion of the function would allow a malicious user to create
both the client and server threads, and manipulate the impersonation request
to allow it to run in the context of any desired user on the local machine,
including the System itself.
The primary risk from this vulnerability is that a malicious user could
exploit this vulnerability to gain additional privileges on the local
machine. However, it also could be used to cause audit logs to indicate that
certain actions were taken by another user. A malicious user would require
the ability to log onto the target machine interactively and run arbitrary
programs in order to exploit this vulnerability, and as a result,
workstations and terminal servers would be at greatest risk.
Affected Software Versions
==========================
- Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Workstation
- Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server
- Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server, Enterprise Edition
- Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server, Terminal Server Edition
Patch Availability
==================
- Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Workstation, Server and Server, Enterprise
Edition:
Intel:
http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/release.asp?ReleaseID=17382
Alpha:
http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/release.asp?ReleaseID=17383
- Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server, Terminal Server Edition:
To be released shortly.
NOTE: Additional security patches are available at the Microsoft Download
Center.
More Information
================
Please see the following references for more information related to this
issue.
- Microsoft Security Bulletin MS00-003: Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/MS00-003faq.asp.
- Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q247869,
Local Procedure Call may Permit Unauthorized Account Usage,
http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q247/8/69.asp.
(Note: It may take 24 hours from the original posting of this bulletin
for the KB article to be visible.)
- Microsoft Security Advisor web site,
http://www.microsoft.com/security/default.asp.
Obtaining Support on this Issue
===============================
This is a fully supported patch. Information on contacting Microsoft
Technical Support is available at
http://support.microsoft.com/support/contact/default.asp.
Acknowledgments
===============
Microsoft thanks Bindview's RAZOR Security Team (www.bindview.com) for
reporting this issue to us and working with us to protect customers.
Revisions
=========
- January 13, 2000: Bulletin Created.
--------------------------------------------------------------
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(c) 2000 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Terms of Use
[ End Microsoft Security Bulletin ]
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft Corporation for the
information contained in this bulletin.
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