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TUCoPS :: Windows Net Apps :: ciacj056.txt

Microsoft Encapsulated Smtp Addresses




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             __________________________________________________________

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                    Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___
             __________________________________________________________

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN
                  Microsoft "Encapsulated SMTP Address" Vulnerability


August 10, 1999 17:00 GMT                                         Number J-056
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM:        Microsoft has released a patch that eliminates a security
                vulnerability in Microsoft(r) Exchange(r) Server.
PLATFORM:       Microsoft Exchange Server 5.5
DAMAGE:         The vulnerability could allow an attacker to perform mail
                relaying via an Exchange server that is configured to act
                as a gateway for other Exchange sites using the Internet
                Messaging Service.
SOLUTION:       Apply patches listed below
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY   Risk is medium.  This vulnerability could allow encapsulated
ASSESSMENT:     SMTP addresses to be used to send mail to any desired e-mail
                Address.
______________________________________________________________________________

[  Start Microsoft Advisory  ]

Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-027)
- --------------------------------------

Patch Available for "Encapsulated SMTP Address" Vulnerability

Originally Posted: August 06, 1999

Summary
=======
Microsoft has released a patch that eliminates a security vulnerability in
Microsoft(r) Exchange(r) Server.  The vulnerability could allow an attacker
to perform mail relaying via an Exchange server that is configured to act
as a gateway for other Exchange sites using the Internet Messaging Service.


Frequently asked questions regarding this vulnerability can be
found at http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/MS99-027faq.asp

Issue
=====
Exchange Server implements features designed to defeat "mail relaying", a
practice in which an attacker causes an e-mail server to forward mail from
the attacker, as though the server were the  sender of the mail.  However, a
vulnerability exists in this feature, and could allow an attacker to
circumvent the anti-relaying features in an Internet-connected Exchange
Server.

The vulnerability lies in the way that site-to-site relaying is performed
via SMTP.  Encapsulated SMTP addresses could be used to send mail to any
desired e-mail address.  The patch eliminates the vulnerability by making
encapsulated SMTP addresses subject to the same anti-relay protections as
non-encapsulated SMTP addresses.

Affected Software Versions
==========================
 - Microsoft Exchange Server 5.5

Patch Availability
==================
 - ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/bussys/exchange/exchange-public
   /fixes/Eng/Exchg5.5/PostSP2/imc-fix

  NOTE: Line breaks have been inserted into the above URL for readability.

More Information
================
Please see the following references for more information related to this
issue.
 - Microsoft Security Bulletin MS99-027: Frequently Asked Questions,
   http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/MS99-027faq.asp.
 - Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q237927,
   XIMS: Messages Sent to Encapsulated SMTP Address Are Rerouted
   Even Though Rerouting Is Disabled,
   http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q237/9/27.asp.
 - Microsoft Security Advisor web site,
   http://www.microsoft.com/security/default.asp.

Obtaining Support on this Issue
===============================
This is a fully supported patch.  Information on contacting Microsoft
Technical Support is available at
http://support.microsoft.com/support/contact/default.asp.

Acknowledgments
===============
Microsoft acknowledges Laurent Frinking of Quark Deutschland GmbH for
bringing this issue to our attention and working with us to alert customers
about it.

Revisions
=========
 - August 06, 1999: Bulletin Created.


- -----------------------------------------------------------------------

THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS PROVIDED "AS IS"
WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS
SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT,
INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES,
EVEN IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE
FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY.

(c) 1999 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

   *******************************************************************
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please visit http://www.microsoft.com/security/services/bulletin.asp. For
security-related information about Microsoft products, please visit the
Microsoft Security Advisor web site at http://www.microsoft.com/security.



[  End Microsoft Advisory  ]

______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge Microsoft for the information contained in this
bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________



CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.

CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
    Voice:    +1 925-422-8193
    FAX:      +1 925-423-8002
    STU-III:  +1 925-423-2604
    E-mail:   ciac@llnl.gov

For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), use one of the following methods to contact CIAC:

    1.  Call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message, or

    2.  Call 888-449-8369 to send a Sky Page to the CIAC duty person or

    3.  Send e-mail to 4498369@skytel.com, or

    4.  Call 800-201-9288 for the CIAC Project Leader.

Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.

   World Wide Web:      http://www.ciac.org/
                        (or http://ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine)
   Anonymous FTP:       ftp.ciac.org
                        (or ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine)
   Modem access:        +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
                        +1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)

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PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
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This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
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