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TUCoPS :: Windows Net Apps :: ciacj030.txt

Microsoft Backoffice Vulnerability




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             __________________________________________________________

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                    Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___
             __________________________________________________________

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

                       Microsoft BackOffice Vulnerability

February 16, 1999 19:00 GMT                                       Number J-030
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM:       Microsoft has identified a vulnerability in the installer for
               BackOffice Server (R) 4.0.
PLATFORM:      Microsoft BackOffice Server 4.0
DAMAGE:        Users who can log into the server locally would be able to
               access name and password for the accounts associated with the
               services which are part of a BackOffice 4.0 installation.
SOLUTION:      The fix for this problem is to delete the file \Program
               Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini after each BackOffice 4.0
               installation, whether successful or not.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY  Risk is low. In most cases, the ability to access this file
ASSESSMENT:    would be granted to selected users such as administrators.
______________________________________________________________________________

[  Start Microsoft Advisory  ]


Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-005)
- --------------------------------------

BackOffice Server 4.0 Does Not Delete Installation Setup File

Originally Posted: February 12, 1999

Summary
=======
Microsoft (R) has learned of a potential vulnerability in the installer for
BackOffice Server (R) 4.0. The installer asks the user to provide the
account userid and password for selected services and writes these to a file
in order to automate the installation process. However, the file is not
deleted when the installation process completes. As detailed below,
Microsoft recommends that BackOffice 4.0 customers delete this file.

Microsoft has received no reports of customers being adversely affected by
this problem. However, it is releasing this security bulletin in order to
proactively provide customers with information about the problem in order to
allow them to take steps to ensure their safe computing.

Issue
=====
When a user chooses to install SQL Server (R), Exchange Server (R) or
Microsoft Transaction Server (R) as part of a BackOffice 4.0 installation,
the BackOffice installer program requests the name and password for the
accounts associated with these services. Specifically, it asks for the
account name and password for the SQL Executive Logon account, the Exchange
Services Account, and the MTS Remote Administration Account. These values
are stored in <systemdrive>\Program Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini,
and used to install the associated services.

BackOffice Server does not erase this file when the installation process is
completed. This is true regardless of whether the installation process
completes successfully or unsuccessfully. By default, the Microsoft
BackOffice folder is not shared, so network access to reboot.ini generally
does not pose a risk. Users who can log onto the server locally would be
able to access the file, but in most cases this ability is granted only to
selected users such as administrators.

The fix for this problem is to delete the file <systemdrive>\Program
Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini after each BackOffice 4.0
installation, whether successful or not. The file is created only by the
installer, and, once deleted, will not be re-created unless BackOffice 4.0
is re-installed.

Affected Software Versions
==========================
The following software versions are affected:
 - Microsoft BackOffice Server 4.0

What Microsoft is Doing
=======================
On February 12th, Microsoft sent this security
bulletin to customers subscribing to the Microsoft
Product Security Notification Service
(see http://www.microsoft.com/security/services/bulletin.asp
for more information about this free customer service).

Microsoft has published the following Knowledge Base (KB) article on this
issue:
 - Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q217004,
   BackOffice Installer Tool Does Not Delete Password Cache File.
   http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q217/0/04.asp
   (Note: It might take 24 hours from the original posting of this
   bulletin for the KB article to be visible in the Web-based
   Knowledge Base.)

What customers Should Do
========================
Microsoft recommends that customers ensure that they delete the file
<systemdrive>\Program Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini after the
installation program for BackOffice 4.0 completes

More Information
================
Please see the following references for more information related to this
issue.
 - Microsoft Security Bulletin MS99-005,
   BackOffice 4.0 Does Not Delete Installation Setup File
   (the Web-posted version of this bulletin),
   http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms99-005.asp.
 - Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q217004,
   BackOffice Installer Tool Does Not Delete Password Cache File.
   http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q217/0/04.asp
   (Note: It might take 24 hours from the original posting of this
   bulletin for the KB article to be visible in the Web-based
   Knowledge Base.)

Obtaining Support on this Issue
===============================
If you require technical assistance with this issue, please contact
Microsoft Technical Support. For information on contacting Microsoft
Technical Support, please see
http://support.microsoft.com/support/contact/default.asp.

Revisions
=========
 - February 12, 1999: Bulletin Created


For additional security-related information about Microsoft products, please
visit http://www.microsoft.com/security


- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- ----

THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS PROVIDED "AS IS"
WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS
SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT,
INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN
IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE
FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY.

(C) 1999 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Terms of Use.


[  End Microsoft Advisory  ]
______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________


CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.

CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
    Voice:    +1 925-422-8193
    FAX:      +1 925-423-8002
    STU-III:  +1 925-423-2604
    E-mail:   ciac@llnl.gov

For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message,
or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two
Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC
duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC
Project Leader.

Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.

   World Wide Web:      http://www.ciac.org/
                        (or http://ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine)
   Anonymous FTP:       ftp.ciac.org
                        (or ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine)
   Modem access:        +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
                        +1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)

CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic
publications:
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical
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   availability;
3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the
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Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
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  e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin

You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation
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If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address,
it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe,
get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc.

PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins.  If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.

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