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TUCoPS :: Windows :: n-117.txt

Microsoft RPC Interface Buffer Overrun Vulnerability (CIAC N-117)




             __________________________________________________________

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                   Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___
             __________________________________________________________

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

              Microsoft RPC Interface Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
                [Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-026, MS03-039]

July 16, 2003 21:00 GMT                                           Number N-117
[REVISED  1 Aug 2003]
[REVISED 13 Aug 2003]
[REVISED 15 Aug 2003]
[REVISED 22 Aug 2003]
[REVISED 10 SEPT 2003]
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM:       A buffer overrun vulnerability exists in the part of the
               Windows Remote Procedure Call(RPC) that deals with message
               exchange over TCP/IP (Port 135).
PLATFORM:      Windows NT 4.0 
               Windows NT Server 4.0
               Windows NT 4.0 Terminal Services Edition 
               Windows 2000 
               Windows XP 
               Windows Server 2003

               *NOTE--If you have patched your system with MS03-026 you will 
               need to patch your system with MS03-039.  The patch provided 
               in MS03-039 supersedes the one included in MS03-026.*
               If MS03-026 patches have been installed prior to the discover 
               of the Blaster worm, your system is secure from the 
               vulnerability that W32.Blaster is using.
DAMAGE:        A successful attacker would be able to run code with Local
               System privileges, including installing programs, changing or
               deleting data, or creating new accounts with full privileges.
SOLUTION:      Apply the respective Microsoft patches.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY  The risk is HIGH. A successful attacker needs only to be able
ASSESSMENT:    to send an especially crafted packet to port 135 on the target
               machine.  Sites that block port 135 at their incoming firewall
               are only vulnerable to attack by machines inside of the 
               firewall.
______________________________________________________________________________
LINKS:
 CIAC BULLETIN:      http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-117.shtml
 ORIGINAL BULLETINS: Released on 9/10/03 -
                     http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?
                       url=/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-039.asp
                     Released on 7/16/03 -
                     http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?
                       url=/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-026.asp
 ADDITIONAL
 INFORMATION:        9/10/03 - For MS03-039, see CERT's Advisory:
                     http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-23.html
                     7/31/03 - For MS03-026, see CERT's Advisory:
                     http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-19.html
______________________________________________________________________________

REVISION HISTORY:
8/01/2003:  Added link to CERT Advisory CA-2003-19. Contains additional
            information on other vulnerabilities and backdoor port activity.
8/13/2003:  re-posted contents of MS bulletin to reflect revisions-to-date
            in the technical description workaround information, mitigating 
            factors, and Service Pack 2 support information.
8/15/2003:  Added additional information to PLATFORM section. Added 
            Microsoft's scanner tool update information. Updated download 
            links, removed the word "Server" from the NT4 link. 	
8/22/2003:  Updated supercedence information in the Additional Information
            section.
9/10/2003:  Added new bulletin from Microsoft MS03-039 which supersedes 
            MS03-026 and updated PLATFORM section.

[***** Start Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-039 *****]

Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-039  

Buffer Overrun In RPCSS Service Could Allow Code Execution (824146)
Originally posted: September 10, 2003

Summary
Who should read this bulletin: Users running Microsoft ® Windows ® 

Impact of vulnerability: Run code of attacker’s choice 

Maximum Severity Rating: Critical 

Recommendation: System administrators should apply the security patch 
immediately 

End User Bulletin:
An end user version of this bulletin is available at: 

http://www.microsoft.com/security/security_bulletins/ms03-039.asp. 

Protect your PC:
Additional information on how you can help protect your PC is available at the 
following locations: 

End Users can visit http://www.microsoft.com/protect 
IT Professionals can visit http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tips/
pcprotec.asp 

Affected Software: 

* Microsoft Windows NT Workstation 4.0 
* Microsoft Windows NT Server® 4.0 
* Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0, Terminal Server Edition 
* Microsoft Windows 2000 
* Microsoft Windows XP 
* Microsoft Windows Server 2003 
Not Affected Software: 
* Microsoft Windows Millennium Edition 

Technical details
Technical description: 


The fix provided by this patch supersedes the one included in Microsoft Security 
Bulletin MS03-026. 

Remote Procedure Call (RPC) is a protocol used by the Windows operating system. 
RPC provides an inter-process communication mechanism that allows a program 
running on one computer to seamlessly access services on another computer. The 
protocol itself is derived from the Open Software Foundation (OSF) RPC protocol, 
but with the addition of some Microsoft specific extensions. 

There are three identified vulnerabilities in the part of RPCSS Service that 
deals with RPC messages for DCOM activation— two that could allow arbitrary 
code execution and one that could result in a denial of service. The flaws 
result from incorrect handling of malformed messages. These particular 
vulnerabilities affect the Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) interface 
within the RPCSS Service. This interface handles DCOM object activation requests 
that are sent from one machine to another. 

An attacker who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities could be able to 
run code with Local System privileges on an affected system, or could cause the 
RPCSS Service to fail. The attacker could then be able to take any action on 
the system, including installing programs, viewing, changing or deleting data, 
or creating new accounts with full privileges. 

To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker could create a program to send a 
malformed RPC message to a vulnerable system targeting the RPCSS Service. 

Microsoft has released a tool that can be used to scan a network for the 
presence of systems which have not had the MS03-039 patch installed. More 
details on this tool are available in Microsoft Knowledge Base article 827363. 
This tool supersedes the one provided in Microsoft Knowledge Base article 
826369. If the tool provided in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 826369 is used 
against a system which has installed the security patch provided with this 
bulletin, the superseded tool will incorrectly report that the system is 
missing the patch provided in MS03-026. Microsoft encourages customers to run 
the latest version of the tool available in Microsoft Knowledge Base article 
827363 to determine if their systems are patched. 

Mitigating factors: 

* Firewall best practices and standard default firewall configurations can help 
  protect networks from remote attacks originating outside of the enterprise 
  perimeter. Best practices recommend blocking all ports that are not actually 
  being used. For this reason, most systems attached to the Internet should 
  have a minimal number of the affected ports exposed.
* For more information about the ports used by RPC, visit the following 
  Microsoft Web site: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/windows2000
  serv/reskit/tcpip/part4/tcpappc.asp 

Severity Rating:  Windows NT 4.0 Server Windows NT 4.0, Terminal Server Edition 
Windows 2000 Windows XP Windows Server 2003 
Buffer Overrun Vulnerabilities Critical Critical Critical Critical Critical 
Denial of Service Vulnerability None None Important None None 
Aggregate Severity of all Vulnerabilities Critical Critical Critical Critical 
Critical 
The above assessment is based on the types of systems affected by the 
vulnerability, their typical deployment patterns, and the effect that 
exploiting the vulnerability would have on them. 

Vulnerability identifier: 
Buffer Overrun: CAN-2003-0715

Buffer Overrun: CAN-2003-0528

Denial of Service: CAN-2003-0605 

Tested Versions:
Microsoft tested Windows Millennium Edition, Windows NT 4.0 Server, Windows NT 
4.0 Terminal Services Edition, Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003 
to assess whether they are affected by this vulnerability. Previous versions 
are no longer supported, and may or may not be affected by these 
vulnerabilities.


Patch availability
Download locations for this patch 
* Windows NT Workstation 
* Windows NT Server 4.0 
* Windows NT Server 4.0, Terminal Server Edition 
* Windows 2000 
* Windows XP 
* Windows XP 64 bit Edition 
* Windows XP 64 bit Edition Version 2003 
* Windows Server 2003 
* Windows Server 2003 64 bit Edition 

Additional information about this patch
Installation platforms: 
* The Windows NT 4.0 patch can be installed on systems running Service Pack 6a. 
  The Windows NT 4.0, Terminal Server Edition patch can be installed on systems 
  running Windows NT 4.0, Terminal Server Edition Service Pack 6. 
* The Windows 2000 patch can be installed on systems running Windows 2000 
  Service Pack 2, Service Pack 3, or Service Pack 4. 
* The patch for Windows XP can be installed on systems running Windows XP Gold 
  or Service Pack 1. 
* The patch for Windows Server 2003 can be installed on systems running Windows 
  Server 2003 Gold. 

Inclusion in future service packs:
The fix for this issue will be included in Windows 2000 Service Pack 5, Windows 
XP Service Pack 2, and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. 

Reboot needed: Yes 

Patch can be uninstalled: Yes 

Superseded patches: 
The fix provided by this patch supersedes the one included in Microsoft 
Security Bulletin MS03-026 as well as MS01-048 

Verifying patch installation: 

* Windows NT 4.0:
  To verify that the patch has been installed on the machine, confirm that all 
  files listed in the file manifest in Knowledge Base article 824146 are present 
  on the system. 
* Windows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition: 
  To verify that the patch has been installed on the machine, confirm that all 
  files listed in the file manifest in Knowledge Base article 824146 are present 
  on the system. 
* Windows 2000: 
  To verify that the patch has been installed on the machine, confirm that the 
  following registry key has been created on the machine: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\
  SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Updates\Windows 2000\SP5\KB824146. 
  To verify the individual files, use the date/time and version information 
  provided in the file manifest in Knowledge Base article 824146 are present on 
  the system. 

* Windows XP: 
  * If installed on Windows XP Gold: To verify that the patch has been installed 
    on the machine, confirm that the following registry key has been created on 
    the machine: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Updates\Windows XP\SP1\
    KB824146 
    To verify the individual files, use the date/time and version information 
    provided in the file manifest in Knowledge Base article 824146 are present 
    on the system. 

* If installed on Windows XP Service Pack 1:
  To verify that the patch has been installed on the machine, confirm that the 
  following registry key has been created on the machine: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\
  SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Updates\Windows XP\SP2\KB824146. 
  To verify the individual files, use the date/time and version information 
  provided in the file manifest in Knowledge Base article 824146 are present on 
  the system. 

* Windows Server 2003: 
  To verify that the patch has been installed on the machine, confirm that the 
  following registry key has been created on the machine: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\
  SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Updates\Window Server 2003\SP1\KB824146. 
  To verify the individual files, use the date/time and version information 
  provided in the file manifest in Knowledge Base article 824146 are present on 
  the system. 

Caveats:
None 

Localization:
Localized versions of this patch are available at the locations discussed in 
“Patch Availability”. 

Obtaining other security patches: 
Patches for other security issues are available from the following locations: 

* Security patches are available from the Microsoft Download Center, and can be 
  most easily found by doing a keyword search for "security_patch". 
* Patches for consumer platforms are available from the Windows Update web site 

Other information: 
Acknowledgments
Microsoft thanks  eEye Digital Security, NSFOCUS Security Team, and Xue Yong 
Zhi and Renaud Deraison from Tenable Network Security for reporting the buffer 
overrun vulnerabilities and working with us to protect customers. 

Support: 

* Microsoft Knowledge Base article 824146 discusses this issue and will be 
  available approximately 24 hours after the release of this bulletin. Knowledge 
  Base articles can be found on the Microsoft Online Support web site. 
* Technical support is available from Microsoft Product Support Services. There 
  is no charge for support calls associated with security patches. 
Security Resources: The Microsoft TechNet Security Web Site provides additional 
information about security in Microsoft products. 

Disclaimer: 
The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" 
without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either 
express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness 
for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its 
suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, 
incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even 
if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility 
of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of 
liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation 
may not apply. 

Revisions: 

V1.0 September 10, 2003: Bulletin Created. 
 
[***** End Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-039 *****]
_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft Corporation for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.

CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
    Voice:    +1 925-422-8193 (7x24)
    FAX:      +1 925-423-8002
    STU-III:  +1 925-423-2604
    E-mail:   ciac@ciac.org

Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.

   World Wide Web:      http://www.ciac.org/
   Anonymous FTP:       ftp.ciac.org

PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins.  If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.

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