Visit our newest sister site!
Hundreds of free aircraft flight manuals
Civilian • Historical • Military • Declassified • FREE!

TUCoPS :: Windows :: krnl14~1.txt

Windows NT/2000 Trojan vulnerabilities




    Windows NT/2000


    'Quimeras' found following.  Local and remote execution of  trojan
    programs in other  user accounts included  Administrator.  As  SDK
    says, when  calling CreateProcess(),  if the  executable file name
    does not  contain a  directory path,  the system  searches for the
    executable file in the following sequence:

        - The directory from which the application loaded
        - The current directory for the parent process
        - Windows NT/2000: The  32-bit Windows system directory.   Use
          the  GetSystemDirectory  function  to  get  the path of this
          directory.  The name of this directory is System32
        - Windows NT/2000: The 16-bit Windows system directory.  There
          is  no  Win32  function  that  obtains  the  path  of   this
          directory, but it is searched.   The name of this  directory
          is System.
        - The Windows directory.  Use the GetWindowsDirectory function
          to get the path of this directory.
        - The  directories  that  are  listed in the PATH  environment

    Let's think about explorer.exe, by default the key


    has the value Explorer.exe.  When a user logons the system  launch
    explorer.exe.  Does the system  look in any directory before  find
    it in C:\Winnt?  YES !!!

    To demonstrate it copy cmd.exe to your system drive root (say C:\)
    and rename it  to be explorer.exe  then logoff and  relogon.  What
    happen?  The system spawns  a command console as the  actual shell
    (cmd.exe  renamed  like  explorer.exe).   (To  delete  the  trojan
    explorer run C:\Winnt\explorer.exe from the command console).

    If an  ordinary user  has write  access on  the system  drive root
    directory (by  default) it  is very  easy to  exploit this  issue,
    simply write a false explorer  program that first launch a  trojan
    program and second launch the real explorer, name it  explorer.exe
    and copy it to the system drive root directory.  Every time a user
    log on interactively, the trojan  program will run with that  user
    rigths, nothing to say if the user is in the Administrator group.

    For a demonstration xploit visit

    Could be this remotely exploitable?   Yes, this could be  remotely
    exploitable by  an ordinary  user at  least in  two ways.   One of
    these is when the system  drive root directory is accesible  via a
    share, allowing a  malicious user to  put a false  explorer.exe in

    The second  way is  more complex  and needs  the MS  Telnet server
    running on the  target computer (for  an explanation of  this case
    and demonstration exploit visit URL mentioned above).

    When  the  system  starts  a  program  that uses load-time dynamic
    linking, it uses the information  in the file to locate  the names
    of the required DLLs.   The system then searches  for the DLLs  in
    the  same  sequence  as  with  executables,  so  some  system   or
    applications especifics dlls could be also affected.

    It is easy to find more executables that could be supplanted,  for
    example rundll32.exe.


    To workaround this vulnerability be sure that all executable  file
    names in the  registry are preceded  by the appropiate  path.  You
    also can move a copy of real explorer.exe to the system drive root
    directory and give special rights on it.

    Allot of vulnerabilities/exploits will appear in the future  based
    on this System behaviour when looking for EXEs and DLLs.

    Patch availability:

        - Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Workstation, Windows NT 4.0 Server,
          and Windows NT 4.0 Server, Enterprise Edition:
        - Microsoft  Windows NT  4.0 Server,  Terminal Server  Edition
          patches will be available soon.
        - Microsoft  Windows 2000  Professional, Server,  and Advanced

TUCoPS is optimized to look best in Firefox® on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2015 AOH