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TUCoPS :: Unix :: General :: securit0.txt

Improving Security on UNIX













                                                    Final Report +o April 1990



                    IMPROVING THE SECURITY OF YOUR
		    UNIX SYSTEM


                    David A. Curry, Systems Programmer
                    Information and Telecommunications Sciences and
		    Technology Division

                    ITSTD-721-FR-90-21




















                    Approved:

                    Paul K. Hyder, Manager
                    Computer Facility

                    Boyd C. Fair, General Manager
                    Division Operations Section

                    Michael S. Frankel, Vice President
                    Information and Telecommunications Sciences and
		    Technology Division









          SRI International  333 Ravenswood Avenue +o Menlo Park, CA 94025 +o
               (415) 326-6200 +o FAX: (415) 326-5512 +o Telex: 334486










                                      CONTENTS



          1       INTRODUCTION...........................................  1
          1.1     UNIX Security..........................................  1
          1.2     The Internet Worm......................................  2
          1.3     Spies and Espionage....................................  3
          1.4     Other Break-Ins........................................  4
          1.5     Security is Important..................................  4

          2       IMPROVING SECURITY.....................................  5
          2.1     Account Security.......................................  5
          2.1.1   Passwords..............................................  5
          2.1.1.1 Selecting Passwords....................................  6
          2.1.1.2 Password Policies......................................  8
          2.1.1.3 Checking Password Security.............................  8
          2.1.2   Expiration Dates.......................................  9
          2.1.3   Guest Accounts......................................... 10
          2.1.4   Accounts Without Passwords............................. 10
          2.1.5   Group Accounts and Groups.............................. 10
          2.1.6   Yellow Pages........................................... 11
          2.2     Network Security....................................... 12
          2.2.1   Trusted Hosts.......................................... 13
          2.2.1.1 The hosts.equiv File................................... 13
          2.2.1.2 The .rhosts File....................................... 14
          2.2.2   Secure Terminals....................................... 15
          2.2.3   The Network File System................................ 16
          2.2.3.1 The exports File....................................... 16
          2.2.3.2 The netgroup File...................................... 17
          2.2.3.3 Restricting Super-User Access.......................... 18
          2.2.4   FTP.................................................... 19
          2.2.4.1 Trivial FTP............................................ 20
          2.2.5   Mail................................................... 21
          2.2.6   Finger................................................. 22
          2.2.7   Modems and Terminal Servers............................ 23
          2.2.8   Firewalls.............................................. 23
          2.3     File System Security................................... 24
          2.3.1   Setuid Shell Scripts................................... 25
          2.3.2   The Sticky Bit on Directories.......................... 26
          2.3.3   The Setgid Bit on Directories.......................... 26
          2.3.4   The umask Value........................................ 27
          2.3.5   Encrypting Files....................................... 27
          2.3.6   Devices................................................ 28
          2.4     Security Is Your Responsibility........................ 29

          3       MONITORING SECURITY.................................... 31
          3.1     Account Security....................................... 31
          3.1.1   The lastlog File....................................... 31
          3.1.2   The utmp and wtmp Files................................ 31
          3.1.3   The acct File.......................................... 33
          3.2     Network Security....................................... 34



                                         iii











                                CONTENTS (concluded)



          3.2.1   The syslog Facility.................................... 34
          3.2.2   The showmount Command.................................. 35
          3.3     File System Security................................... 35
          3.3.1   The find Command....................................... 36
          3.3.1.1 Finding Setuid and Setgid Files........................ 36
          3.3.1.2 Finding World-Writable Files........................... 38
          3.3.1.3 Finding Unowned Files.................................. 38
          3.3.1.4 Finding .rhosts Files.................................. 39
          3.3.2   Checklists............................................. 39
          3.3.3   Backups................................................ 40
          3.4     Know Your System....................................... 41
          3.4.1   The ps Command......................................... 41
          3.4.2   The who and w Commands................................. 42
          3.4.3   The ls Command......................................... 42
          3.5     Keep Your Eyes Open.................................... 42

          4       SOFTWARE FOR IMPROVING SECURITY........................ 45
          4.1     Obtaining Fixes and New Versions....................... 45
          4.1.1   Sun Fixes on UUNET..................................... 45
          4.1.2   Berkeley Fixes......................................... 46
          4.1.3   Simtel-20 and UUNET.................................... 47
          4.1.4   Vendors................................................ 47
          4.2     The npasswd Command.................................... 48
          4.3     The COPS Package....................................... 48
          4.4     Sun C2 Security Features............................... 49
          4.5     Kerberos............................................... 50

          5       KEEPING ABREAST OF THE BUGS............................ 51
          5.1     The Computer Emergency Response Team................... 51
          5.2     DDN Management Bulletins............................... 51
          5.3     Security-Related Mailing Lists......................... 52
          5.3.1   Security............................................... 52
          5.3.2   RISKS.................................................. 52
          5.3.3   TCP-IP................................................. 53
          5.3.4   SUN-SPOTS, SUN-NETS, SUN-MANAGERS...................... 53
          5.3.5   VIRUS-L................................................ 53

          6       SUGGESTED READING...................................... 55

          7       CONCLUSIONS............................................ 57

          REFERENCES..................................................... 59

          APPENDIX A - SECURITY CHECKLIST................................ 63






                                         iv










                                       SECTION 1

                                     INTRODUCTION


          1.1   UNIX SECURITY



                 The UNIX operating system, although now in widespread  use
            in  environments  concerned  about  security,  was  not  really
            designed with security in mind [Ritc75].  This  does  not  mean
            that  UNIX  does  not  provide any security mechanisms; indeed,
            several very good ones are available.  However, most  ``out  of
            the  box''  installation  procedures from companies such as Sun
            Microsystems still install the operating  system  in  much  the
            same  way  as it was installed 15 years ago:  with little or no
            security enabled.

                 The reasons for this state of affairs are largely histori-
            cal.   UNIX  was  originally designed by programmers for use by
            other programmers.  The environment in which it  was  used  was
            one of open cooperation, not one of privacy.  Programmers typi-
            cally collaborated with each other on projects, and hence  pre-
            ferred  to be able to share their files with each other without
            having to climb over security hurdles.  Because the first sites
            outside  of  Bell  Laboratories to install UNIX were university
            research laboratories, where a similar environment existed,  no
            real need for greater security was seen until some time later.

                 In the early 1980s, many universities began to move  their
            UNIX systems out of the research laboratories and into the com-
            puter centers, allowing (or forcing) the user population  as  a
            whole  to  use  this new and wonderful system.  Many businesses
            and government sites began to install  UNIX  systems  as  well,
            particularly  as  desktop workstations became more powerful and
            affordable.  Thus, the UNIX operating system is no longer being
            used only in environments where open collaboration is the goal.
            Universities require their students to use the system for class
            assignments,  yet  they  do not want the students to be able to
            copy from each other.  Businesses use their  UNIX  systems  for
            confidential  tasks  such  as bookkeeping and payroll.  And the
            government uses UNIX systems for various unclassified yet  sen-
            sitive purposes.

                 To complicate matters, new features  have  been  added  to
            UNIX  over  the  years,  making security even more difficult to
            control.  Perhaps  the  most  problematic  features  are  those
          _________________________
          UNIX is a registered trademark of AT&T.  VAX is  a  trademark  of
          Digital  Equipment  Corporation.  Sun-3 and NFS are trademarks of
          Sun Microsystems.  Annex is a trademark of Xylogics, Inc.



                                          1










            relating to networking:  remote login,  remote  command  execu-
            tion,  network  file  systems, diskless workstations, and elec-
            tronic mail.  All of these features have increased the  utility
            and  usability  of UNIX by untold amounts.  However, these same
            features, along with the widespread connection of UNIX  systems
            to  the  Internet  and  other networks, have opened up many new
            areas of vulnerability to unauthorized abuse of the system.


          1.2   THE INTERNET WORM



                 On the evening of November  2,  1988,  a  self-replicating
            program,  called  a _w_o_r_m, was released on the Internet [Seel88,
            Spaf88, Eich89].  Overnight, this  program  had  copied  itself
            from  machine  to  machine, causing the machines it infected to
            labor under huge loads, and denying service  to  the  users  of
            those  machines.   Although the program only infected two types
            of computers,* it spread quickly, as did  the  concern,  confu-
            sion,  and  sometimes  panic  of  system  administrators  whose
            machines were affected.  While many system administrators  were
            aware that something like this could theoretically happen - the
            security holes exploited by the worm  were  well  known  -  the
            scope  of the worm's break-ins came as a great surprise to most
            people.

                 The worm itself did  not  destroy  any  files,  steal  any
            information  (other  than account passwords), intercept private
            mail, or plant other destructive software  [Seel88].   However,
            it did manage to severely disrupt the operation of the network.
            Several sites, including parts of  MIT,  NASA's  Ames  Research
            Center  and  Goddard  Space  Flight  Center, the Jet Propulsion
            Laboratory, and the U. S. Army Ballistic  Research  Laboratory,
            disconnected themselves from the Internet to avoid recontamina-
            tion.  In addition, the Defense Communications  Agency  ordered
            the  connections  between the MILNET and ARPANET shut down, and
            kept them down for nearly 24 hours  [Eich89,  Elme88].   Ironi-
            cally,  this was perhaps the worst thing to do, since the first
            fixes to combat the  worm  were  distributed  via  the  network
            [Eich89].

                 This incident was perhaps the most widely  described  com-
            puter  security  problem  ever.   The  worm was covered in many
            newspapers and magazines around the country including  the  _N_e_w
            _Y_o_r_k  _T_i_m_e_s,  _W_a_l_l  _S_t_r_e_e_t  _J_o_u_r_n_a_l,  _T_i_m_e  and  most computer-
            oriented technical publications, as well as on all three  major
          _________________________
            * Sun-3 systems from Sun  Microsystems  and  VAX  systems  from
          Digital  Equipment  Corp.,  both running variants of 4._x BSD UNIX
          from the University of California at Berkeley.




                                          2










            television networks, the Cable News Network, and National  Pub-
            lic  Radio.   In  January  1990, a United States District Court
            jury found Robert Tappan Morris, the author of the worm, guilty
            of  charges  brought  against him under a 1986 federal computer
            fraud and abuse law.  Morris faces up to five years  in  prison
            and  a $250,000 fine [Schu90].  Sentencing is scheduled for May
            4, 1990.


          1.3   SPIES AND ESPIONAGE



                 In August  1986,  the  Lawrence  Berkeley  Laboratory,  an
            unclassified  research laboratory at the University of Califor-
            nia at Berkeley,  was  attacked  by  an  unauthorized  computer
            intruder  [Stol88, Stol89].  Instead of immediately closing the
            holes the intruder was using, the system  administrator,  Clif-
            ford  Stoll,  elected  to  watch  the intruder and document the
            weaknesses he  exploited.   Over  the  next  10  months,  Stoll
            watched  the  intruder  attack  over  400  computers around the
            world, and successfully enter about 30.  The  computers  broken
            into  were located at universities, military bases, and defense
            contractors [Stol88].

                 Unlike many intruders seen on the Internet, who  typically
            enter  systems  and  browse  around  to see what they can, this
            intruder was looking for something specific.   Files  and  data
            dealing  with the Strategic Defense Initiative, the space shut-
            tle, and other military topics all  seemed  to  be  of  special
            interest.  Although it is unlikely that the intruder would have
            found any truly classified  information  (the  Internet  is  an
            unclassified  network),  it  was  highly probable that he could
            find a wealth of sensitive material [Stol88].

                 After a year of tracking the intruder (eventually  involv-
            ing  the FBI, CIA, National Security Agency, Air Force Intelli-
            gence, and authorities in West Germany), five men in  Hannover,
            West  Germany  were  arrested.   In  March  1989, the five were
            charged with espionage:  they had  been  selling  the  material
            they  found  during their exploits to the KGB.  One of the men,
            Karl Koch (``Hagbard''), was later found burned to death in  an
            isolated  forest  outside  Hannover.  No suicide note was found
            [Stol89].  In February 1990, three  of  the  intruders  (Markus
            Hess,  Dirk  Bresinsky,  and  Peter  Carl)  were  convicted  of
            espionage in a German court  and  sentenced  to  prison  terms,
            fines, and the loss of their rights to participate in elections
            [Risk90].  The last of the intruders, Hans Hu"bner  (``Pengo''),
            still faces trial in Berlin.






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          1.4   OTHER BREAK-INS



                 Numerous other computer security problems have occurred in
            recent  years,  with  varying levels of publicity.  Some of the
            more widely known incidents include break-ins  on  NASA's  SPAN
            network [McLe87], the IBM ``Christmas Virus'' [Risk87], a virus
            at Mitre Corp. that caused the MILNET to  be  temporarily  iso-
            lated from other networks [Risk88], a worm that penetrated DEC-
            NET networks [Risk89a], break-ins on  U.  S.  banking  networks
            [Risk89b], and a multitude of viruses, worms, and trojan horses
            affecting personal computer users.


          1.5   SECURITY IS IMPORTANT



                 As the previous stories demonstrate, computer security  is
            an  important  topic.   This  document  describes  the security
            features provided by the UNIX operating system,  and  how  they
            should  be  used.  The discussion centers around version 4._x of
            SunOS, the version of UNIX sold by Sun Microsystems.   Most  of
            the  information  presented  applies equally well to other UNIX
            systems.  Although there is no way  to  make  a  computer  com-
            pletely  secure against unauthorized use (other than to lock it
            in a room and turn it off), by following  the  instructions  in
            this  document  you  can  make  your  system impregnable to the
            ``casual'' system cracker,* and make it more difficult for  the
            sophisticated cracker to penetrate.











          _________________________
            * The term ``hacker,'' as applied to computer users, originally
          had an honorable connotation:  ``a person who enjoys learning the
          details  of  programming  systems  and  how  to   stretch   their
          capabilities  - as opposed to most users of computers, who prefer
          to  learn  only  the   minimum   amount   necessary''   [Stee88].
          Unfortunately,  the media has distorted this definition and given
          it a dishonorable meaning.  In deference to the true hackers,  we
          will use the term ``cracker'' throughout this document.




                                          4











                                       SECTION 2

                                  IMPROVING SECURITY



                 UNIX system security can be divided into three main  areas
            of  concern.   Two of these areas, account security and network
            security, are primarily  concerned  with  keeping  unauthorized
            users  from gaining access to the system.  The third area, file
            system security,  is  concerned  with  preventing  unauthorized
            access,  either  by  legitimate  users or crackers, to the data
            stored in the system.  This section describes the UNIX security
            tools  provided to make each of these areas as secure as possi-
            ble.


          2.1   ACCOUNT SECURITY



                 One of the easiest ways for a cracker to get into a system
            is by breaking into someone's account.  This is usually easy to
            do, since many systems have old accounts whose users have  left
            the organization, accounts with easy-to-guess passwords, and so
            on.  This section describes methods that can be used  to  avoid
            these problems.


          2.1.1   Passwords



                 The password is the most vital part of UNIX account  secu-
            rity.  If a cracker can discover a user's password, he can then
            log in to the system and operate with all the  capabilities  of
            that user.  If the password obtained is that of the super-user,
            the problem is more serious:  the cracker will  have  read  and
            write  access  to  every  file on the system.  For this reason,
            choosing secure passwords is extremely important.

                 The UNIX _p_a_s_s_w_d program [Sun88a, 379] places very few res-
            trictions  on  what  may  be used as a password.  Generally, it
            requires that passwords contain five or more lowercase letters,
            or  four  characters  if a nonalphabetic or uppercase letter is
            included.  However, if the  user  ``insists''  that  a  shorter
            password be used (by entering it three times), the program will
            allow it.  No checks  for  obviously  insecure  passwords  (see
            below)  are  performed.   Thus, it is incumbent upon the system
            administrator to ensure that the passwords in use on the system
            are secure.



                                          5










                 In [Morr78], the authors describe experiments conducted to
            determine typical users' habits in the choice of passwords.  In
            a collection of 3,289 passwords, 16% of  them  contained  three
            characters or less, and an astonishing 86% were what could gen-
            erally be described as  insecure.   Additional  experiments  in
            [Gram84]  show  that  by  trying  three  simple guesses on each
            account - the login name, the login name in  reverse,  and  the
            two  concatenated  together  -  a  cracker can expect to obtain
            access to between 8 and 30 percent of the accounts on a typical
            system.   A second experiment showed that by trying the 20 most
            common female first names, followed by a single digit (a  total
            of  200  passwords), at least one password was valid on each of
            several dozen machines surveyed.   Further  experimentation  by
            the  author  has  found  that by trying variations on the login
            name, user's first and last names, and a list  of  nearly  1800
            common  first  names, up to 50  percent of the passwords on any
            given system can be cracked in a matter of two or three days.


          2.1.1.1   Selecting Passwords



                 The object when choosing a password is to make it as  dif-
            ficult as possible for a cracker to make educated guesses about
            what you've chosen.  This  leaves  him  no  alternative  but  a
            brute-force   search,  trying  every  possible  combination  of
            letters, numbers, and punctuation.  A search of this sort, even
            conducted on a machine that could try one million passwords per
            second (most  machines  can  try  less  than  one  hundred  per
            second),  would require, on the average, over one hundred years
            to complete.  With this as our goal, and by using the  informa-
            tion  in  the  preceding text, a set of guidelines for password
            selection can be constructed:

                 +o    _D_o_n'_t  use  your  login  name  in  any  form  (as-is,
                      reversed, capitalized, doubled, etc.).

                 +o    _D_o_n'_t use your first or last name in any form.

                 +o    _D_o_n'_t use your spouse's or child's name.

                 +o    _D_o_n'_t use other  information  easily  obtained  about
                      you.   This includes license plate numbers, telephone
                      numbers, social security numbers, the brand  of  your
                      automobile, the name of the street you live on, etc.

                 +o    _D_o_n'_t use a password of all digits, or all  the  same
                      letter.  This significantly decreases the search time
                      for a cracker.

                 +o    _D_o_n'_t use a word contained  in  (English  or  foreign



                                          6










                      language)  dictionaries,  spelling  lists,  or  other
                      lists of words.

                 +o    _D_o_n'_t use a password shorter than six characters.

                 +o    _D_o use a password with mixed-case alphabetics.

                 +o    _D_o use  a  password  with  nonalphabetic  characters,
                      e.g., digits or punctuation.

                 +o    _D_o use a password that is easy to  remember,  so  you
                      don't have to write it down.

                 +o    _D_o use a password that you can type quickly,  without
                      having to look at the keyboard.  This makes it harder
                      for someone to steal your password by  watching  over
                      your shoulder.

                 Although this list may seem to restrict  passwords  to  an
            extreme,  there  are several methods for choosing secure, easy-
            to-remember passwords that obey the above rules.  Some of these
            include the following:

                 +o    Choose a line or two from a song or poem, and use the
                      first  letter of each word.  For example, ``In Xanadu
                      did Kubla  Kahn  a  stately  pleasure  dome  decree''
                      becomes ``IXdKKaspdd.''

                 +o    Alternate  between  one  consonant  and  one  or  two
                      vowels,  up  to eight characters.  This provides non-
                      sense words that are usually pronounceable, and  thus
                      easily  remembered.   Examples  include  ``routboo,''
                      ``quadpop,'' and so on.

                 +o    Choose two short words and concatenate them  together
                      with  a punctation character between them.  For exam-
                      ple: ``dog;rain,'' ``book+mug,'' ``kid?goat.''

                 The importance of obeying these password  selection  rules
            cannot  be  overemphasized.   The Internet worm, as part of its
            strategy for breaking into new  machines,  attempted  to  crack
            user  passwords.   First, the worm tried simple choices such as
            the login name, user's first and last names, and so on.   Next,
            the  worm  tried each word present in an internal dictionary of
            432 words (presumably  Morris  considered  these  words  to  be
            ``good''  words  to  try).   If all else failed, the worm tried
            going through the system  dictionary,  /_u_s_r/_d_i_c_t/_w_o_r_d_s,  trying
            each  word  [Spaf88].   The password selection rules above suc-
            cessfully guard against all three of these strategies.






                                          7










          2.1.1.2   Password Policies



                 Although asking users to select secure passwords will help
            improve  security,  by  itself  it  is  not enough.  It is also
            important to form a set of password  policies  that  all  users
            must obey, in order to keep the passwords secure.

                 First and foremost, it is important to  impress  on  users
            the  need  to  keep their passwords in their minds only.  Pass-
            words should never be written down on desk blotters, calendars,
            and  the like.  Further, storing passwords in files on the com-
            puter must be prohibited.  In either case, by writing the pass-
            word  down  on  a  piece  of paper or storing it in a file, the
            security of the user's account  is  totally  dependent  on  the
            security  of  the paper or file, which is usually less than the
            security offered by the password encryption software.

                 A second important policy is that users  must  never  give
            out  their  passwords to others.  Many times, a user feels that
            it is easier to give someone else his password in order to copy
            a  file,  rather  than to set up the permissions on the file so
            that it can be copied.  Unfortunately, by giving out the  pass-
            word  to  another person, the user is placing his trust in this
            other person not to distribute the password further,  write  it
            down, and so on.

                 Finally, it is important to establish a policy that  users
            must  change  their  passwords  from  time to time, say twice a
            year.  This is difficult to enforce  on  UNIX,  since  in  most
            implementations, a password-expiration scheme is not available.
            However, there are ways to implement  this  policy,  either  by
            using  third-party  software  or by sending a memo to the users
            requesting that they change their passwords.

                 This set of policies should be printed and distributed  to
            all  current  users  of the system.  It should also be given to
            all new users when they receive  their  accounts.   The  policy
            usually  carries  more  weight  if you can get it signed by the
            most ``impressive'' person  in  your  organization  (e.g.,  the
            president of the company).


          2.1.1.3   Checking Password Security



                 The procedures and policies described in the previous sec-
            tions,  when  properly  implemented,  will  greatly  reduce the
            chances of a cracker breaking into your  system  via  a  stolen
            account.   However,  as  with all security measures, you as the



                                          8










            system administrator must periodically check to  be  sure  that
            the  policies  and procedures are being adhered to.  One of the
            unfortunate truisms of password security  is  that,  ``left  to
            their own ways, some people will still use cute doggie names as
            passwords'' [Gram84].

                 The best way to check the security  of  the  passwords  on
            your  system  is to use a password-cracking program much like a
            real cracker would use.  If you succeed in cracking  any  pass-
            words,  those  passwords  should be changed immediately.  There
            are a few freely available password cracking  programs  distri-
            buted  via various source archive sites; these are described in
            more detail in Section 4.  A fairly extensive cracking  program
            is  also  available  from  the  author.  Alternatively, you can
            write your own cracking program, and  tailor  it  to  your  own
            site.   For  a  list  of  things  to check for, see the list of
            guidelines above.


          2.1.2   Expiration Dates



                 Many sites, particularly those  with  a  large  number  of
            users,  typically  have several old accounts lying around whose
            owners have since left the organization.  These accounts are  a
            major  security  hole:  not only can they be broken into if the
            password is insecure, but because nobody is using  the  account
            anymore, it is unlikely that a break-in will be noticed.

                 The simplest way to prevent unused accounts  from  accumu-
            lating  is to place an expiration date on every account.  These
            expiration dates should be near enough in the future  that  old
            accounts  will  be  deleted  in a timely manner, yet far enough
            apart that the users will not become annoyed.  A good figure is
            usually one year from the date the account was installed.  This
            tends to spread the expirations out over the year, rather  than
            clustering  them  all  at the beginning or end.  The expiration
            date can easily be stored in the password  file  (in  the  full
            name field).  A simple shell script can be used to periodically
            check that all accounts have expiration dates, and that none of
            the dates has passed.

                 On the first day of each month, any user whose account has
            expired  should be contacted to be sure he is still employed by
            the organization, and that he is actively  using  the  account.
            Any  user  who  cannot  be  contacted,  or who has not used his
            account recently, should be deleted from the system.  If a user
            is  unavailable  for some reason (e.g., on vacation) and cannot
            be contacted, his account should be disabled by  replacing  the
            encrypted  password in the password file entry with an asterisk
            (*).  This makes it impossible to log in to  the  account,  yet



                                          9










            leaves  the  account  available  to be re-enabled on the user's
            return.


          2.1.3   Guest Accounts



                 Guest accounts present still another  security  hole.   By
            their  nature,  these  accounts are rarely used, and are always
            used by people who should only have access to the  machine  for
            the  short period of time they are guests.  The most secure way
            to handle guest accounts is to install  them  on  an  as-needed
            basis,  and delete them as soon as the people using them leave.
            Guest accounts should never be given simple passwords  such  as
            ``guest'' or ``visitor,'' and should never be allowed to remain
            in the password file when they are not being used.


          2.1.4   Accounts Without Passwords



                 Some sites have installed  accounts  with  names  such  as
            ``who,''  ``date,'' ``lpq,'' and so on that execute simple com-
            mands.  These accounts are intended to allow users  to  execute
            these  commands without having to log in to the machine.  Typi-
            cally these accounts have no password associated with them, and
            can  thus  be used by anyone.  Many of the accounts are given a
            user id of zero, so that they execute with  super-user  permis-
            sions.

                 The problem with these accounts is that they  open  poten-
            tial  security  holes.  By not having passwords on them, and by
            having  super-user  permissions,  these  accounts   practically
            invite  crackers  to  try  to  penetrate them.  Usually, if the
            cracker can  gain  access  to  the  system,  penetrating  these
            accounts  is  simple, because each account executes a different
            command.  If the cracker can replace any one of these  commands
            with one of his own, he can then use the unprotected account to
            execute his program with super-user permissions.

                 Simply put,  accounts  without  passwords  should  not  be
            allowed on any UNIX system.


          2.1.5   Group Accounts and Groups



                 Group accounts have become popular at many sites, but  are
            actually  a  break-in  waiting to happen.  A group account is a



                                         10










            single account shared by several people, e.g., by all the  col-
            laborators  on a project.  As mentioned in the section on pass-
            word security, users should not share  passwords  -  the  group
            account  concept directly violates this policy.  The proper way
            to allow users to share information, rather than giving them  a
            group  account  to  use,  is to place these users into a group.
            This is done by editing the  group  file,  /_e_t_c/_g_r_o_u_p  [Sun88a,
            1390;  Sun88b, 66], and creating a new group with the users who
            wish to collaborate listed as members.

                 A line in the group file looks like

                    groupname:password:groupid:user1,user2,user3,...

            The _g_r_o_u_p_n_a_m_e is the name assigned to the group,  much  like  a
            login  name.   It  may  be the same as someone's login name, or
            different.  The maximum length of a group name is eight charac-
            ters.   The password field is unused in BSD-derived versions of
            UNIX, and should contain an asterisk (*).   The  _g_r_o_u_p_i_d  is  a
            number  from 0 to 65535 inclusive.  Generally, numbers below 10
            are reserved for special  purposes,  but  you  may  choose  any
            unused number.  The last field is a comma-separated (no spaces)
            list of the login names of the users in the group.  If no login
            names  are  listed, then the group has no members.  To create a
            group called ``hackers'' with Huey, Duey, and Louie as members,
            you would add a line such as this to the group file:

                    hackers:*:100:huey,duey,louie


                 After the group has been created,  the  files  and  direc-
            tories  the  members  wish to share can then be changed so that
            they are owned by this group, and the group permission bits  on
            the  files  and  directories can be set to allow sharing.  Each
            user retains his own account, with his own password, thus  pro-
            tecting the security of the system.

                 For example, to change Huey's ``programs'' directory to be
            owned  by  the new group and properly set up the permissions so
            that all members of the group may  access  it,  the  _c_h_g_r_p  and
            _c_h_m_o_d commands would be used as follows [Sun88a, 63-66]:

                    # chgrp hackers ~huey/programs
                    # chmod -R g+rw ~huey/programs



          2.1.6   Yellow Pages



                 The Sun Yellow Pages system [Sun88b, 349-374] allows  many



                                         11










            hosts to share password files, group files, and other files via
            the network, while the files are stored on only a single  host.
            Unfortunately, Yellow Pages also contains a few potential secu-
            rity holes.

                 The principal way Yellow Pages works is to have a  special
            line  in  the  password or group file that begins with a ``+''.
            In the password file, this line looks like

                    +::0:0:::

            and in the group file, it looks like

                    +:

            These lines should only be present in the files stored on  Yel-
            low  Pages  client machines.  They should not be present in the
            files on the Yellow Pages master machine(s).   When  a  program
            reads  the  password  or group file and encounters one of these
            lines, it goes through the network and requests the information
            it wants from the Yellow Pages server instead of trying to find
            it in the local file.  In this way, the data does not  have  to
            be  maintained on every host.  Since the master machine already
            has all the information, there is no need for this special line
            to be present there.

                 Generally speaking, the Yellow  Pages  service  itself  is
            reasonably  secure.   There are a few openings that a sophisti-
            cated (and dedicated) cracker could exploit, but Sun is rapidly
            closing  these.   The  biggest problem with Yellow Pages is the
            ``+'' line in the password file.  If the ``+'' is deleted  from
            the  front of the line, then this line loses its special Yellow
            Pages meaning.  It instead becomes a regular password file line
            for an account with a null login name, no password, and user id
            zero (super-user).  Thus, if a  careless  system  administrator
            accidentally  deletes the ``+''.  the whole system is wide open
            to any attack.*

                 Yellow Pages is too useful a service to suggest turning it
            off,  although  turning  it  off  would  make  your system more
            secure.  Instead, it is recommended that you read carefully the
            information  in  the  Sun manuals in order to be fully aware of
            Yellow Pages' abilities and its limitations.


          2.2   NETWORK SECURITY


          _________________________
            * Actually, a line like this without a ``+''  is  dangerous  in
          any password file, regardless of whether Yellow Pages is in use.




                                         12










                 As trends  toward  internetworking  continue,  most  sites
            will, if they haven't already, connect themselves to one of the
            numerous regional networks springing  up  around  the  country.
            Most  of these regional networks are also interconnected, form-
            ing the Internet [Hind83, Quar86].  This means that  the  users
            of  your  machine  can  access other hosts and communicate with
            other users around the world.   Unfortunately,  it  also  means
            that  other  hosts  and  users from around the world can access
            your machine, and attempt to break into it.

                 Before internetworking became  commonplace,  protecting  a
            system  from  unauthorized  access  simply  meant  locking  the
            machine in a room by itself.  Now that machines  are  connected
            by networks, however, security is much more complex.  This sec-
            tion describes the tools and methods  available  to  make  your
            UNIX networks as secure as possible.


          2.2.1   Trusted Hosts



                 One of the most convenient features of the  Berkeley  (and
            Sun)  UNIX  networking  software  is the concept of ``trusted''
            hosts.  The software allows the specification  of  other  hosts
            (and  possibly users) who are to be considered trusted - remote
            logins and remote command executions from these hosts  will  be
            permitted without requiring the user to enter a password.  This
            is very convenient, because users do not  have  to  type  their
            password  every  time they use the network.  Unfortunately, for
            the same  reason,  the  concept  of  a  trusted  host  is  also
            extremely insecure.

                 The Internet worm made extensive use of the  trusted  host
            concept to spread itself throughout the network [Seel88].  Many
            sites that had already disallowed trusted hosts did fairly well
            against  the  worm  compared  with  those  sites that did allow
            trusted hosts.  Even though it is a security  hole,  there  are
            some  valid  uses  for  the trusted host concept.  This section
            describes how to properly implement the trusted hosts  facility
            while preserving as much security as possible.


          2.2.1.1   The hosts.equiv File



                 The file /_e_t_c/_h_o_s_t_s._e_q_u_i_v [Sun88a, 1397] can  be  used  by
            the  system  administrator  to  indicate  trusted  hosts.  Each
            trusted host is listed in the file, one host per  line.   If  a
            user  attempts  to  log  in (using _r_l_o_g_i_n) or execute a command
            (using  _r_s_h)  remotely  from  one  of  the  systems  listed  in



                                         13










            _h_o_s_t_s._e_q_u_i_v,  and  that user has an account on the local system
            with the same login name, access is permitted without requiring
            a password.

                 Provided adequate care is taken to allow only local  hosts
            in  the _h_o_s_t_s._e_q_u_i_v file, a reasonable compromise between secu-
            rity and convenience can be achieved.  Nonlocal hosts  (includ-
            ing  hosts  at  remote  sites  of the same organization) should
            never be trusted.  Also, if there  are  any  machines  at  your
            organization that are installed in ``public'' areas (e.g., ter-
            minal rooms) as opposed to  private  offices,  you  should  not
            trust these hosts.

                 On Sun systems, _h_o_s_t_s._e_q_u_i_v is controlled with the  Yellow
            Pages  software.   As distributed, the default _h_o_s_t_s._e_q_u_i_v file
            distributed by Sun contains a single line:

                    +

            This indicates that _e_v_e_r_y _k_n_o_w_n _h_o_s_t (i.e., the  complete  con-
            tents  of  the  host file) should be considered a trusted host.
            This is totally incorrect and  a  major  security  hole,  since
            hosts  outside  the local organization should never be trusted.
            A  correctly  configured  _h_o_s_t_s._e_q_u_i_v  should  never  list  any
            ``wildcard''  hosts  (such  as  the  ``+''); only specific host
            names should be used.  When installing a new  system  from  Sun
            distribution  tapes,  you  should be sure to either replace the
            Sun default _h_o_s_t_s._e_q_u_i_v with a  correctly  configured  one,  or
            delete the file altogether.


          2.2.1.2   The .rhosts File



                 The ._r_h_o_s_t_s file [Sun88a, 1397] is similar in concept  and
            format  to the _h_o_s_t_s._e_q_u_i_v file, but allows trusted access only
            to specific host-user combinations, rather  than  to  hosts  in
            general.*  Each user may create a  ._r_h_o_s_t_s  file  in  his  home
            directory,  and allow access to her account without a password.
            Most people use this mechanism to allow trusted access  between
            accounts  they have on systems owned by different organizations
            who do not trust each other's  hosts  in  _h_o_s_t_s._e_q_u_i_v.   Unfor-
            tunately,  this  file presents a major security problem:  While
            _h_o_s_t_s._e_q_u_i_v is under the system administrator's control and can
            be  managed  effectively,  any  user  may create a ._r_h_o_s_t_s file
            granting access to whomever  he  chooses,  without  the  system
            administrator's knowledge.
          _________________________
             Actually,  _h_o_s_t_s._e_q_u_i_v  may  be  used  to  specify  host-user
          combinations as well, but this is rarely done.




                                         14










                 The only secure way to manage ._r_h_o_s_t_s  files  is  to  com-
            pletely  disallow them on the system.  The system administrator
            should check the system often for  violations  of  this  policy
            (see  Section 3.3.1.4).  One possible exception to this rule is
            the ``root'' account; a ._r_h_o_s_t_s file may be necessary to  allow
            network backups and the like to be completed.


          2.2.2   Secure Terminals



                 Under newer versions of UNIX, the concept of a  ``secure''
            terminal  has  been  introduced.   Simply  put,  the super-user
            (``root'') may not log in on a nonsecure terminal, even with  a
            password.   (Authorized  users  may still use the _s_u command to
            become super-user, however.)   The  file  /_e_t_c/_t_t_y_t_a_b  [Sun88a,
            1478]  is  used  to  control  which  terminals  are  considered
            secure.|- A short excerpt from this file is shown below.

                    console  "/usr/etc/getty std.9600"  sun      off secure
                    ttya     "/usr/etc/getty std.9600"  unknown  off secure
                    ttyb     "/usr/etc/getty std.9600"  unknown  off secure
                    ttyp0    none                       network  off secure
                    ttyp1    none                       network  off secure
                    ttyp2    none                       network  off secure

            The keyword ``secure'' at the end of each line  indicates  that
            the terminal is considered secure.  To remove this designation,
            simply edit the file and delete the ``secure'' keyword.   After
            saving the file, type the command (as super-user):

                    # kill -HUP 1

            This tells the _i_n_i_t process to reread the _t_t_y_t_a_b file.

                 The Sun default configuration for _t_t_y_t_a_b  is  to  consider
            all  terminals  secure,  including ``pseudo'' terminals used by
            the remote login software.  This means that ``root'' may log in
            remotely  from  any  host on the network.  A more secure confi-
            guration would consider as secure only directly connected  ter-
            minals,  or  perhaps only the console device.  This is how file
            servers and other machines with disks should be set up.

                 The most secure configuration is to remove the  ``secure''
            designation  from  all terminals, including the console device.
            This requires that those users with super-user authority  first
            log in as themselves, and then become the super-user via the _s_u
          _________________________
            |- Under non-Sun versions of Berkeley UNIX, this file is  called
          /_e_t_c/_t_t_y_s.




                                         15










            command.  It also requires the ``root'' password to be  entered
            when  rebooting  in single-user mode, in order to prevent users
            from rebooting their desktop workstations and obtaining  super-
            user  access.   This is how all diskless client machines should
            be set up.


          2.2.3   The Network File System



                 The Network File System  (NFS)  [Sun88d]  is  designed  to
            allow  several  hosts  to share files over the network.  One of
            the most common uses of NFS is to allow  diskless  workstations
            to be installed in offices, while keeping all disk storage in a
            central location.  As distributed by Sun, NFS has  no  security
            features enabled.  This means that any host on the Internet may
            access your files via NFS, regardless of whether you trust them
            or not.

                 Fortunately, there are several easy ways to make NFS  more
            secure.   The  more commonly used methods are described in this
            section, and these can be used to make your files quite  secure
            from  unauthorized  access  via NFS.  Secure NFS, introduced in
            SunOS Release 4.0,  takes  security  one  step  further,  using
            public-key  encryption  techniques to ensure authorized access.
            Discussion of secure NFS is deferred until Section 4.


          2.2.3.1   The exports File



                 The file /_e_t_c/_e_x_p_o_r_t_s [Sun88a, 1377] is perhaps one of the
            most  important  parts  of  NFS configuration.  This file lists
            which file systems are exported (made available  for  mounting)
            to  other  systems.  A typical _e_x_p_o_r_t_s file as installed by the
            Sun installation procedure looks something like this:

                    /usr
                    /home
                    /var/spool/mail
                    #
                    /export/root/client1    -access=client1,root=client1
                    /export/swap/client1    -access=client1,root=client1
                    #
                    /export/root/client2    -access=client2,root=client2
                    /export/swap/client2    -access=client2,root=client2

            The _r_o_o_t= keyword specifies the list of hosts that are  allowed
            to  have  super-user  access  to  the  files  in the named file
            system.   This  keyword  is  discussed  in  detail  in  Section



                                         16










            2.2.3.3.   The  _a_c_c_e_s_s=  keyword  specifies  the  list of hosts
            (separated by colons) that are allowed to mount the named  file
            system.   If no _a_c_c_e_s_s= keyword is specified for a file system,
            any host anywhere on the network may mount that file system via
            NFS.

                 Obviously, this presents a major security  problem,  since
            anyone  who can mount your file systems via NFS can then peruse
            them at her leisure.  Thus, it is important that all file  sys-
            tems  listed in _e_x_p_o_r_t_s have an _a_c_c_e_s_s= keyword associated with
            them.  If you have only a few hosts which  must  mount  a  file
            system, you can list them individually in the file:

                    /usr    -access=host1:host2:host3:host4:host5

            However, because the maximum number of hosts that can be listed
            this  way is ten, the _a_c_c_e_s_s= keyword will also allow netgroups
            to be specified.  Netgroups are described in the next section.

                 After making any changes to the _e_x_p_o_r_t_s file,  you  should
            run the command

                    # exportfs -a

            in order to make the changes take effect.


          2.2.3.2   The netgroup File



                 The file /_e_t_c/_n_e_t_g_r_o_u_p [Sun88a, 1407] is  used  to  define
            netgroups.   This  file is controlled by Yellow Pages, and must
            be rebuilt in the Yellow Pages maps whenever  it  is  modified.
            Consider the following sample _n_e_t_g_r_o_u_p file:

                    A_Group      (servera,,) (clienta1,,) (clienta2,,)

                    B_Group      (serverb,,) (clientb1,,) (clientb2,,)

                    AdminStaff   (clienta1,mary,) (clientb3,joan,)

                    AllSuns      A_Group B_Group

            This file defines  four  netgroups,  called  _A__G_r_o_u_p,  _B__G_r_o_u_p,
            _A_d_m_i_n_S_t_a_f_f,  and  _A_l_l_S_u_n_s.   The _A_l_l_S_u_n_s netgroup is actually a
            ``super group'' containing all the members of the  _A__G_r_o_u_p  and
            _B__G_r_o_u_p netgroups.

                 Each member of a netgroup is defined as a  triple:  (host,
            user,  domain).  Typically, the _d_o_m_a_i_n field is never used, and
            is simply left blank.  If either the _h_o_s_t or _u_s_e_r field is left



                                         17










            blank,  then any host or user is considered to match.  Thus the
            triple (host,,) matches any user on the named host,  while  the
            triple (,user,) matches the named user on any host.

                 Netgroups are useful when restricting access to  NFS  file
            systems via the _e_x_p_o_r_t_s file.  For example, consider this modi-
            fied version of the file from the previous section:

                    /usr                    -access=A_Group
                    /home                   -access=A_Group:B_Group
                    /var/spool/mail         -access=AllSuns
                    #
                    /export/root/client1    -access=client1,root=client1
                    /export/swap/client1    -access=client1,root=client1
                    #
                    /export/root/client2    -access=client2,root=client2
                    /export/swap/client2    -access=client2,root=client2

            The /_u_s_r file system may now only be mounted by  the  hosts  in
            the _A__G_r_o_u_p netgroup, that is, _s_e_r_v_e_r_a, _c_l_i_e_n_t_a_1, and _c_l_i_e_n_t_a_2.
            Any other host that  tries  to  mount  this  file  system  will
            receive  an ``access denied'' error.  The /_h_o_m_e file system may
            be mounted by any of the hosts in either the _A__G_r_o_u_p or _B__G_r_o_u_p
            netgroups.   The /_v_a_r/_s_p_o_o_l/_m_a_i_l file system is also restricted
            to these hosts, but in this example we used the ``super group''
            called _A_l_l_S_u_n_s.

                 Generally, the best way to configure the _n_e_t_g_r_o_u_p file  is
            to make a single netgroup for each file server and its clients,
            and then to make other super groups,  such  as  _A_l_l_S_u_n_s.   This
            allows  you  the  flexibility  to specify the smallest possible
            group of hosts for each file system in /_e_t_c/_e_x_p_o_r_t_s.

                 Netgroups can also be used in the password file  to  allow
            access  to a given host to be restricted to the members of that
            group, and they can be used in the _h_o_s_t_s._e_q_u_i_v file to central-
            ize  maintenance  of the list of trusted hosts.  The procedures
            for doing this are defined in more detail in the Sun manual.


          2.2.3.3   Restricting Super-User Access



                 Normally, NFS translates the super-user id to a special id
            called ``nobody'' in order to prevent a user with ``root'' on a
            remote workstation from accessing other people's  files.   This
            is  good  for  security,  but  sometimes  a nuisance for system
            administration, since you  cannot  make  changes  to  files  as
            ``root'' through NFS.

                 The _e_x_p_o_r_t_s file  also  allows  you  to  grant  super-user



                                         18










            access  to  certain file systems for certain hosts by using the
            _r_o_o_t= keyword.  Following this keyword a  colon-separated  list
            of  up  to  ten  hosts  may  be  specified; these hosts will be
            allowed to access the file system as  ``root''  without  having
            the  user  id  converted  to  ``nobody.''  Netgroups may not be
            specified to the _r_o_o_t= keyword.

                 Granting ``root'' access to a  host  should  not  be  done
            lightly.   If a host has ``root'' access to a file system, then
            the super-user on that host will have complete  access  to  the
            file system, just as if you had given him the ``root'' password
            on the server.  Untrusted hosts should never be given  ``root''
            access to NFS file systems.


          2.2.4   FTP



                 The File Transfer Protocol, implemented  by  the  _f_t_p  and
            _f_t_p_d  programs  [Sun88a,  195-201,  1632-1634], allows users to
            connect to remote systems and transfer files  back  and  forth.
            Unfortunately,  older  versions  of  these  programs  also  had
            several bugs in them that allowed crackers to break into a sys-
            tem.   These bugs have been fixed by Berkeley, and new versions
            are available.  If your  _f_t_p_d*  was  obtained  before  December
            1988, you should get a newer version (see Section 4).

                 One  of  the  more  useful  features   of   FTP   is   the
            ``anonymous''  login.   This  special login allows users who do
            not have an account on your machine to have  restricted  access
            in  order to transfer files from a specific directory.  This is
            useful if you wish to distribute  software  to  the  public  at
            large  without  giving  each  person  who wants the software an
            account on your machine.  In order to securely set up anonymous
            FTP you should follow the specific instructions below:

                 1.   Create  an  account  called  ``ftp.''   Disable   the
                      account  by  placing  an asterisk (*) in the password
                      field.  Give the account a  special  home  directory,
                      such as /_u_s_r/_f_t_p or /_u_s_r/_s_p_o_o_l/_f_t_p.

                 2.   Make the home directory owned by ``ftp'' and  unwrit-
                      able by anyone:

                              # chown ftp ~ftp
                              # chmod 555 ~ftp

          _________________________
            * On Sun systems, _f_t_p_d is stored in the file  /_u_s_r/_e_t_c/_i_n._f_t_p_d.
          On most other systems, it is called /_e_t_c/_f_t_p_d.




                                         19










                 3.   Make the directory ~_f_t_p/_b_i_n, owned by the  super-user
                      and  unwritable  by  anyone.   Place a copy of the _l_s
                      program in this directory:

                              # mkdir ~ftp/bin
                              # chown root ~ftp/bin
                              # chmod 555 ~ftp/bin
                              # cp -p /bin/ls ~ftp/bin
                              # chmod 111 ~ftp/bin/ls


                 4.   Make the directory ~_f_t_p/_e_t_c, owned by the  super-user
                      and  unwritable by anyone.  Place copies of the pass-
                      word and group files in this directory, with all  the
                      password  fields  changed  to asterisks (*).  You may
                      wish to delete all but a  few  of  the  accounts  and
                      groups  from  these files; the only account that must
                      be present is ``ftp.''

                              # mkdir ~ftp/etc
                              # chown root ~ftp/etc
                              # chmod 555 ~ftp/etc
                              # cp -p /etc/passwd /etc/group ~ftp/etc
                              # chmod 444 ~ftp/etc/passwd ~ftp/etc/group


                 5.   Make the directory ~_f_t_p/_p_u_b,  owned  by  ``ftp''  and
                      world-writable.   Users may then place files that are
                      to be accessible via anonymous FTP in this directory:

                              # mkdir ~ftp/pub
                              # chown ftp ~ftp/pub
                              # chmod 777 ~ftp/pub


                 Because the anonymous FTP feature allows anyone to  access
            your  system  (albeit  in a very limited way), it should not be
            made available on every host  on  the  network.   Instead,  you
            should  choose  one  machine (preferably a server or standalone
            host) on which to allow this service.   This  makes  monitoring
            for  security  violations  much easier.  If you allow people to
            transfer files to your machine (using  the  world-writable  _p_u_b
            directory,  described  above),  you should check often the con-
            tents of the directories into which they are allowed to  write.
            Any suspicious files you find should be deleted.


          2.2.4.1   Trivial FTP



                 The Trivial File Transfer Protocol, TFTP, is used  on  Sun



                                         20










            workstations  (and others) to allow diskless hosts to boot from
            the network.  Basically, TFTP is a stripped-down version of FTP
            -  there is no user authentication, and the connection is based
            on the User Datagram Protocol instead of the Transmission  Con-
            trol  Protocol.  Because they are so stripped-down, many imple-
            mentations of TFTP have security holes.  You should check  your
            hosts by executing the command sequence shown below.

                    % tftp
                    tftp> connect _y_o_u_r_h_o_s_t
                    tftp> get /etc/motd tmp
                    _E_r_r_o_r _c_o_d_e _1: _F_i_l_e _n_o_t _f_o_u_n_d
                    _t_f_t_p> _q_u_i_t
                    %

            If your version does not respond with ``_F_i_l_e _n_o_t  _f_o_u_n_d,''  and
            instead  transfers the file, you should replace your version of
            _t_f_t_p_d* with a newer one.   In  particular,  versions  of  SunOS
            prior to release 4.0 are known to have this problem.


          2.2.5   Mail



                 Electronic mail is one of the main reasons for  connecting
            to outside networks.  On most versions of Berkeley-derived UNIX
            systems,  including  those  from  Sun,  the  _s_e_n_d_m_a_i_l   program
            [Sun88a,  1758-1760;  Sun88b,  441-488]  is  used to enable the
            receipt and delivery of mail.  As with the FTP software,  older
            versions of _s_e_n_d_m_a_i_l have several bugs that allow security vio-
            lations.  One of these bugs was used with great success by  the
            Internet  worm  [Seel88, Spaf88].  The current version of _s_e_n_d_-
            _m_a_i_l from Berkeley is version 5.61, of January 1989.   Sun  is,
            as  of  this  writing, still shipping version 5.59, which has a
            known security problem.  They have, however, made a fixed  ver-
            sion  available.   Section  4 details how to obtain these newer
            versions.

                 Generally, with the exception of the security  holes  men-
            tioned  above,  _s_e_n_d_m_a_i_l is reasonably secure when installed by
            most vendors' installation procedures.  There are,  however,  a
            few  precautions  that  should be taken to ensure secure opera-
            tion:

                 1.   Remove the ``decode'' alias  from  the  aliases  file
                      (/_e_t_c/_a_l_i_a_s_e_s or /_u_s_r/_l_i_b/_a_l_i_a_s_e_s).
          _________________________
            * On   Sun   systems,   _t_f_t_p_d   is   stored   in    the    file
          /_u_s_r/_e_t_c/_i_n._t_f_t_p_d.    On   most   other  systems,  it  is  called
          /_e_t_c/_t_f_t_p_d.




                                         21










                 2.   If you create aliases that allow messages to be  sent
                      to  programs, be absolutely sure that there is no way
                      to obtain a shell or send commands to  a  shell  from
                      these programs.

                 3.   Make sure the ``wizard'' password is disabled in  the
                      configuration  file, _s_e_n_d_m_a_i_l._c_f.  (Unless you modify
                      the distributed configuration files,  this  shouldn't
                      be a problem.)

                 4.   Make  sure  your  _s_e_n_d_m_a_i_l  does  not   support   the
                      ``debug'' command.  This can be done with the follow-
                      ing commands:

                      % telnet localhost 25
                      220 yourhost Sendmail 5.61 ready at 9 Mar 90 10:57:36 PST
                      debug
                      500 Command unrecognized
                      quit
                      %


                      If your _s_e_n_d_m_a_i_l responds to  the  ``debug''  command
                      with  ``_2_0_0  _D_e_b_u_g  _s_e_t,'' then you are vulnerable to
                      attack and should replace your _s_e_n_d_m_a_i_l with a  newer
                      version.

            By following the procedures above, you can be  sure  that  your
            mail system is secure.


          2.2.6   Finger



                 The ``finger'' service, provided  by  the  _f_i_n_g_e_r  program
            [Sun88a,  186-187],  allows  you  to obtain information about a
            user such as her full name, home directory,  last  login  time,
            and  in  some cases when she last received mail and/or read her
            mail.  The _f_i_n_g_e_r_d  program  [Sun88a,  1625]  allows  users  on
            remote hosts to obtain this information.

                 A bug in _f_i_n_g_e_r_d was also exercised with  success  by  the
            Internet worm [Seel88, Spaf88].  If your version of _f_i_n_g_e_r_d* is
            older than November 5, 1988, it should be replaced with a newer
            version.  New  versions  are  available  from  several  of  the
            sources described in Section 4.

          _________________________
            * On Sun systems, _f_i_n_g_e_r_d is stored in /_u_s_r/_e_t_c/_i_n._f_i_n_g_e_r_d.  On
          most other systems, it is called /_e_t_c/_f_i_n_g_e_r_d.




                                         22










          2.2.7   Modems and Terminal Servers



                 Modems and  terminal  servers  (terminal  switches,  Annex
            boxes,  etc.) present still another potential security problem.
            The main problem with these devices is one of  configuration  -
            misconfigured hardware can allow security breaches.  Explaining
            how to configure every brand of modem and terminal server would
            require  volumes.   However,  the  following  items  should  be
            checked for on any modems or terminal servers installed at your
            site:

                 1.   If a user dialed up to a modem hangs  up  the  phone,
                      the  system should log him out.  If it doesn't, check
                      the hardware connections and the kernel configuration
                      of the serial ports.

                 2.   If a user logs off, the system should force the modem
                      to hang up.  Again, check the hardware connections if
                      this doesn't work.

                 3.   If the connection from a terminal server to the  sys-
                      tem is broken, the system should log the user off.

                 4.   If the terminal server is connected  to  modems,  and
                      the  user hangs up, the terminal server should inform
                      the system that the user has hung up.

                 Most modem and terminal server manuals cover in detail how
            to  properly connect these devices to your system.  In particu-
            lar you should pay close attention to the  ``Carrier  Detect,''
            ``Clear to Send,'' and ``Request to Send'' connections.


          2.2.8   Firewalls



                 One of the newer ideas in network security is  that  of  a
            _f_i_r_e_w_a_l_l.   Basically,  a  firewall is a special host that sits
            between  your  outside-world  network  connection(s)  and  your
            internal  network(s).   This  host  does  not  send out routing
            information about your internal network, and thus the  internal
            network is ``invisible'' from the outside.  In order to config-
            ure a firewall machine, the following considerations need to be
            taken:

                 1.   The firewall does not advertise routes.   This  means
                      that users on the internal network must log in to the
                      firewall in order to access hosts on remote networks.
                      Likewise,  in  order  to  log  in  to  a  host on the



                                         23










                      internal network from the outside, a user must  first
                      log  in  to  the  firewall  machine.   This is incon-
                      venient, but more secure.

                 2.   All electronic mail sent by your users must  be  for-
                      warded  to  the  firewall  machine  if  it  is  to be
                      delivered  outside  your   internal   network.    The
                      firewall  must  receive all incoming electronic mail,
                      and then redistribute it.  This can  be  done  either
                      with aliases for each user or by using name server MX
                      records.

                 3.   The firewall machine should not mount any  file  sys-
                      tems  via NFS, or make any of its file systems avail-
                      able to be mounted.

                 4.   Password security on the  firewall  must  be  rigidly
                      enforced.

                 5.   The firewall host should not trust  any  other  hosts
                      regardless  of  where  they  are.   Furthermore,  the
                      firewall should not be trusted by any other host.

                 6.   Anonymous FTP and other similar services should  only
                      be  provided  by  the firewall host, if they are pro-
                      vided at all.

                 The purpose of the firewall is to  prevent  crackers  from
            accessing other hosts on your network.  This means, in general,
            that you must maintain strict and rigidly enforced security  on
            the  firewall,  but  the  other  hosts are less vulnerable, and
            hence security may be somewhat lax.  But  it  is  important  to
            remember  that  the  firewall  is  not  a complete cure against
            crackers - if a cracker can break into the firewall machine, he
            can then try to break into any other host on your network.


          2.3   FILE SYSTEM SECURITY



                 The last defense against system crackers are  the  permis-
            sions  offered  by the file system.  Each file or directory has
            three sets of permission bits associated with it:  one set  for
            the  user who owns the file, one set for the users in the group
            with which the file is associated, and one set  for  all  other
            users  (the  ``world''  permissions).   Each set contains three
            identical permission bits, which control the following:

                 _r_e_a_d     If set, the file or directory may  be  read.   In
                          the  case  of  a  directory, read access allows a
                          user to see the  contents  of  a  directory  (the



                                         24










                          names of the files contained therein), but not to
                          access them.

                 _w_r_i_t_e    If set, the file  or  directory  may  be  written
                          (modified).   In  the  case of a directory, write
                          permission implies the ability to create, delete,
                          and  rename  files.   Note  that  the  ability to
                          remove a file is _n_o_t controlled  by  the  permis-
                          sions  on the file, but rather the permissions on
                          the directory containing the file.

                 _e_x_e_c_u_t_e  If set, the file or  directory  may  be  executed
                          (searched).   In the case of a directory, execute
                          permission implies the ability  to  access  files
                          contained in that directory.

                 In addition, a fourth permission bit is available in  each
            set  of  permissions.  This bit has a different meaning in each
            set of permission bits:

                 _s_e_t_u_i_d  If set in the owner permissions, this bit controls
                         the  ``set  user  id''  (setuid) status of a file.
                         Setuid status means that when a  program  is  exe-
                         cuted,  it  executes  with  the permissions of the
                         user owning the program, in addition to  the  per-
                         missions  of  the user executing the program.  For
                         example, _s_e_n_d_m_a_i_l is setuid ``root,'' allowing  it
                         to  write files in the mail queue area, which nor-
                         mal users are not allowed  to  do.   This  bit  is
                         meaningless on nonexecutable files.

                 _s_e_t_g_i_d  If set in the group permissions, this bit controls
                         the  ``set  group  id'' (setgid) status of a file.
                         This behaves in exactly the same way as the setuid
                         bit, except that the group id is affected instead.
                         This bit is meaningless  on  non-executable  files
                         (but see below).

                 _s_t_i_c_k_y  If set in the world  permissions,  the  ``sticky''
                         bit  tells  the  operating  system  to  do special
                         things with the text image of an executable  file.
                         It  is  mostly  a  holdover from older versions of
                         UNIX, and has little if any use today.   This  bit
                         is  also  meaningless  on nonexecutable files (but
                         see below).


          2.3.1   Setuid Shell Scripts



               Shell scripts that have the setuid or  setgid  bits  set  on



                                         25










          them  are _n_o_t secure, regardless of how many safeguards are taken
          when writing them.  There are numerous software  packages  avail-
          able  that  claim  to  make  shell  scripts secure, but every one
          released so far has not managed to solve all the problems.

               Setuid and setgid shell scripts should never be  allowed  on
          any UNIX system.


          2.3.2   The Sticky Bit on Directories



               Newer versions of UNIX have attached a new  meaning  to  the
          sticky  bit.   When this bit is set on a directory, it means that
          users may not delete or rename other users' files in this  direc-
          tory.   This  is  typically  useful for the /_t_m_p directory.  Nor-
          mally, /_t_m_p  is  world-writable,  enabling  any  user  to  delete
          another  user's  files.  By setting the sticky bit on /_t_m_p, users
          may only delete their own files from this directory.

               To set the sticky bit on a directory, use the command

                  # chmod o+t _d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y



          2.3.3   The Setgid Bit on Directories



               In SunOS 4.0, the setgid bit was also given a  new  meaning.
          Two  rules can be used for assigning group ownership to a file in
          SunOS:

               1.   The System V mechanism, which says that a  user's  pri-
                    mary  group id (the one listed in the password file) is
                    assigned to any file he creates.

               2.   The Berkeley mechanism, which says that the group id of
                    a file is set to the group id of the directory in which
                    it is created.

               If the setgid bit  is  set  on  a  directory,  the  Berkeley
          mechanism  is  enabled.   Otherwise,  the  System  V mechanism is
          enabled.  Normally, the Berkeley mechanism is used; this  mechan-
          ism must be used if creating directories for use by more than one
          member of a group (see Section 2.1.5).

               To set the setgid bit on a directory, use the command





                                         26










                  # chmod g+s _d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y



          2.3.4   The umask Value



               When a file is created by a program, say a text editor or  a
          compiler,  it  is typically created with all permissions enabled.
          Since this is rarely desirable (you don't want other users to  be
          able  to write your files), the _u_m_a_s_k value is used to modify the
          set of permissions a file is created with.  Simply put, while the
          _c_h_m_o_d  command  [Sun88a,  65-66]  specifies  what  bits should be
          turned _o_n, the umask value specifies what bits should  be  turned
          _o_f_f.

               For example, the default umask on most systems is 022.  This
          means  that  write  permission  for the group and world should be
          turned off whenever a file is created.  If instead you wanted  to
          turn  off all group and world permission bits, such that any file
          you created would not be readable,  writable,  or  executable  by
          anyone except yourself, you would set your umask to 077.

               The umask value is specified in the ._c_s_h_r_c or ._p_r_o_f_i_l_e files
          read  by  the  shell  using the _u_m_a_s_k command [Sun88a, 108, 459].
          The ``root'' account should have the line

                  umask 022

          in its /._c_s_h_r_c file, in order to prevent the accidental  creation
          of world-writable files owned by the super-user.


          2.3.5   Encrypting Files



               The standard UNIX _c_r_y_p_t command [Sun88a, 95] is not  at  all
          secure.  Although it is reasonable to expect that _c_r_y_p_t will keep
          the casual ``browser'' from reading a file, it will present noth-
          ing  more  than  a  minor  inconvenience to a determined cracker.
          _C_r_y_p_t implements a one-rotor machine along the lines of the  Ger-
          man  Enigma  (broken  in World War II).  The methods of attack on
          such a machine are well known, and a sufficiently large file  can
          usually  be  decrypted  in  a few hours even without knowledge of
          what the file contains [Reed84].   In  fact,  publicly  available
          packages  of  programs designed to ``break'' files encrypted with
          _c_r_y_p_t have been around for several years.

               There are software implementations of another algorithm, the
          Data  Encryption  Standard  (DES),  available  on  some  systems.



                                         27










          Although this algorithm is much more secure than  _c_r_y_p_t,  it  has
          never  been  proven  that  it  is totally secure, and many doubts
          about its security have been raised in recent years.

               Perhaps the best thing to say about encrypting  files  on  a
          computer system is this:  if you think you have a file whose con-
          tents are important enough to encrypt, then that file should  not
          be stored on the computer in the first place.  This is especially
          true of systems with limited security, such as UNIX  systems  and
          personal computers.

               It  is  important  to  note  that  UNIX  passwords  are  _n_o_t
          encrypted  with  the  _c_r_y_p_t program.  Instead, they are encrypted
          with a modified version of the DES that generates one-way encryp-
          tions  (that is, the password cannot be decrypted).  When you log
          in, the system does  not  decrypt  your  password.   Instead,  it
          encrypts  your  attempted  password, and if this comes out to the
          same result as encrypting your real password, you are allowed  to
          log in.


          2.3.6   Devices



               The security of devices is an important issue in UNIX.  Dev-
          ice files (usually residing in /_d_e_v) are used by various programs
          to access the data on the disk drives or  in  memory.   If  these
          device files are not properly protected, your system is wide open
          to a cracker.  The entire list of devices is too long to go  into
          here, since it varies widely from system to system.  However, the
          following guidelines apply to all systems:

               1.   The files /_d_e_v/_k_m_e_m,  /_d_e_v/_m_e_m,  and  /_d_e_v/_d_r_u_m  should
                    never  be  readable  by the world.  If your system sup-
                    ports the notion of the ``kmem'' group (most newer sys-
                    tems  do) and utilities such as _p_s are setgid ``kmem,''
                    then these files should be owned by user  ``root''  and
                    group ``kmem,'' and should be mode 640.  If your system
                    does not support the notion of the ``kmem'' group,  and
                    utilities  such  as  _p_s are setuid ``root,'' then these
                    files should be owned by user ``root'' and mode 600.

               2.   The disk devices, such as /_d_e_v/_s_d_0_a, /_d_e_v/_r_x_y_1_b,  etc.,
                    should  be  owned  by  user ``root'' and group ``opera-
                    tor,'' and should be mode 640.  Note that each disk has
                    eight  partitions  and two device files for each parti-
                    tion.  Thus, the disk ``sd0'' would have the  following
                    device files associated with it in /_d_e_v:






                                         28










                            sd0a     sd0e     rsd0a     rsd0e
                            sd0b     sd0f     rsd0b     rsd0f
                            sd0c     sd0g     rsd0c     rsd0g
                            sd0d     sd0h     rsd0d     rsd0h


               3.   With very few exceptions, all other devices  should  be
                    owned  by  user  ``root.''  One exception is terminals,
                    which are changed to be owned  by  the  user  currently
                    logged  in on them.  When the user logs out, the owner-
                    ship of the terminal is automatically changed  back  to
                    ``root.''


          2.4   SECURITY IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY



               This section has detailed numerous tools for improving secu-
          rity  provided  by the UNIX operating system.  The most important
          thing to note about these tools is that although they are  avail-
          able,  they  are  typically not put to use in most installations.
          Therefore, it is incumbent on you, the system  administrator,  to
          take the time and make the effort to enable these tools, and thus
          to protect your system from unauthorized access.






























                                         29

































































                                         30











                                      SECTION 3

                                 MONITORING SECURITY



               One of the most important tasks in keeping any computer sys-
          tem  secure  is  monitoring  the  security  of  the system.  This
          involves examining system log files for unauthorized accesses  of
          the  system, as well as monitoring the system itself for security
          holes.  This section describes the procedures for doing this.  An
          additional  part  of monitoring security involves keeping abreast
          of security problems found by others; this is described  in  Sec-
          tion 5.


          3.1   ACCOUNT SECURITY



               Account security should be monitored periodically  in  order
          to  check for two things: users logged in when they ``shouldn't''
          be (e.g., late at night, when they're  on  vacation,  etc.),  and
          users  executing  commands  they wouldn't normally be expected to
          use.  The commands described in  this  section  can  be  used  to
          obtain this information from the system.


          3.1.1   The lastlog File



               The file /_u_s_r/_a_d_m/_l_a_s_t_l_o_g [Sun88a, 1485]  records  the  most
          recent  login  time  for  each  user  of the system.  The message
          printed each time you log in, e.g.,

                  Last login: Sat Mar 10 10:50:48 from spam.itstd.sri.c

          uses the time stored in the _l_a_s_t_l_o_g file.  Additionally, the last
          login  time reported by the _f_i_n_g_e_r command uses this time.  Users
          should be told to carefully examine this time whenever  they  log
          in,  and  to report unusual login times to the system administra-
          tor.  This is an easy way to detect account break-ins, since each
          user should remember the last time she logged into the system.


          3.1.2   The utmp and wtmp Files



               The file /_e_t_c/_u_t_m_p [Sun88a, 1485] is used to record  who  is



                                         31










          currently  logged  into  the  system.  This file can be displayed
          using the _w_h_o command [Sun88a, 597]:

                  % who
                  hendra   tty0c   Mar 13 12:31
                  heidari  tty14   Mar 13 13:54
                  welgem   tty36   Mar 13 12:15
                  reagin   ttyp0   Mar 13 08:54   (aaifs.itstd.sri.)
                  ghg      ttyp1   Mar  9 07:03   (hydra.riacs.edu)
                  compion  ttyp2   Mar  1 03:01   (ei.ecn.purdue.ed)

          For each user, the login name, terminal being used,  login  time,
          and  remote  host  (if the user is logged in via the network) are
          displayed.

               The file /_u_s_r/_a_d_m/_w_t_m_p [Sun88a, 1485] records each login and
          logout  time  for  every  user.   This file can also be displayed
          using the _w_h_o command:

                  % who /usr/adm/wtmp
                  davy     ttyp4    Jan  7 12:42 (annex01.riacs.ed)
                           ttyp4    Jan  7 15:33
                  davy     ttyp4    Jan  7 15:33 (annex01.riacs.ed)
                           ttyp4    Jan  7 15:35
                  hyder    ttyp3    Jan  8 09:07 (triceratops.itst)
                           ttyp3    Jan  8 11:43

          A line that contains a login name indicates  the  time  the  user
          logged  in; a line with no login name indicates the time that the
          terminal was logged off.  Unfortunately,  the  output  from  this
          command  is  rarely as simple as in the example above; if several
          users log in at once, the login and logout times  are  all  mixed
          together and must be matched up by hand using the terminal name.

               The _w_t_m_p file may also be examined using  the  _l_a_s_t  command
          [Sun88a,  248].   This command sorts out the entries in the file,
          matching up login and logout  times.   With  no  arguments,  _l_a_s_t
          displays  all  information  in the file.  By giving the name of a
          user or terminal, the output can be restricted to the information
          about  the  user or terminal in question.  Sample output from the
          _l_a_s_t command is shown below.

          % last
          davy      ttyp3  intrepid.itstd.s Tue Mar 13 10:55 - 10:56 (00:00)
          hyder     ttyp3  clyde.itstd.sri. Mon Mar 12 15:31 - 15:36 (00:04)
          reboot    ~                       Mon Mar 12 15:16
          shutdown  ~                       Mon Mar 12 15:16
          arms      ttyp3  clyde0.itstd.sri Mon Mar 12 15:08 - 15:12 (00:04)
          hyder     ttyp3  spam.itstd.sri.c Sun Mar 11 21:08 - 21:13 (00:04)
          reboot    ~                       Sat Mar 10 20:05
          davy      ftp    hydra.riacs.edu  Sat Mar 10 13:23 - 13:30 (00:07)




                                         32










          For each login session, the user name, terminal used, remote host
          (if  the user logged in via the network), login and logout times,
          and session duration are shown.  Additionally, the times  of  all
          system  shutdowns  and  reboots  (generated  by  the _s_h_u_t_d_o_w_n and
          _r_e_b_o_o_t commands  [Sun88a,  1727,  1765])  are  recorded.   Unfor-
          tunately,  system crashes are not recorded.  In newer versions of
          the operating system, pseudo logins such as  those  via  the  _f_t_p
          command  are  also  recorded;  an example of this is shown in the
          last line of the sample output, above.


          3.1.3   The acct File



               The file /_u_s_r/_a_d_m/_a_c_c_t [Sun88a, 1344-1345] records each exe-
          cution of a command on the system, who executed it, when, and how
          long it took.  This information is logged  each  time  a  command
          completes,  but only if your kernel was compiled with the SYSACCT
          option enabled (the option is enabled in  some  GENERIC  kernels,
          but is usually disabled by default).

               The _a_c_c_t file can be displayed using  the  _l_a_s_t_c_o_m_m  command
          [Sun88a,  249].   With  no  arguments, all the information in the
          file is displayed.  However, by giving a command name, user name,
          or  terminal name as an argument, the output can be restricted to
          information about the given command, user, or  terminal.   Sample
          output from _l_a_s_t_c_o_m_m is shown below.

          % lastcomm
          sh         S     root     __         0.67 secs Tue Mar 13 12:45
          atrun            root     __         0.23 secs Tue Mar 13 12:45
          lpd         F    root     __         1.06 secs Tue Mar 13 12:44
          lpr        S     burwell  tty09      1.23 secs Tue Mar 13 12:44
          troff            burwell  tty09     12.83 secs Tue Mar 13 12:44
          eqn              burwell  tty09      1.44 secs Tue Mar 13 12:44
          df               kindred  ttyq7      0.78 secs Tue Mar 13 12:44
          ls               kindred  ttyq7      0.28 secs Tue Mar 13 12:44
          cat              kindred  ttyq7      0.05 secs Tue Mar 13 12:44
          stty             kindred  ttyq7      0.05 secs Tue Mar 13 12:44
          tbl              burwell  tty09      1.08 secs Tue Mar 13 12:44
          rlogin     S     jones    ttyp3      5.66 secs Tue Mar 13 12:38
          rlogin      F    jones    ttyp3      2.53 secs Tue Mar 13 12:41
          stty             kindred  ttyq7      0.05 secs Tue Mar 13 12:44

          The first column indicates the name of  the  command.   The  next
          column displays certain flags on the command:  an ``F'' means the
          process spawned a child process, ``S'' means the process ran with
          the  set-user-id  bit  set, ``D'' means the process exited with a
          core dump, and ``X'' means the  process  was  killed  abnormally.
          The  remaining  columns  show  the  name  of the user who ran the
          program, the terminal he ran it from (if applicable), the  amount



                                         33










          of  CPU  time  used by the command (in seconds), and the date and
          time the process started.


          3.2   NETWORK SECURITY



               Monitoring network security is more difficult, because there
          are  so many ways for a cracker to attempt to break in.  However,
          there are some programs available to aid you in this task.  These
          are described in this section.


          3.2.1   The syslog Facility



               The _s_y_s_l_o_g facility  [Sun88a,  1773]  is  a  mechanism  that
          enables  any command to log error messages and informational mes-
          sages to the system console, as well as to  a  log  file.   Typi-
          cally,  error  messages  are logged in the file /_u_s_r/_a_d_m/_m_e_s_s_a_g_e_s
          along with the date, time, name of the program sending  the  mes-
          sage, and (usually) the process id of the program.  A sample seg-
          ment of the _m_e_s_s_a_g_e_s file is shown below.

          Mar 12 14:53:37 sparkyfs login: ROOT LOGIN ttyp3 FROM setekfs.itstd.sr
          Mar 12 15:18:08 sparkyfs login: ROOT LOGIN ttyp3 FROM setekfs.itstd.sr
          Mar 12 16:50:25 sparkyfs login: ROOT LOGIN ttyp4 FROM pongfs.itstd.sri
          Mar 12 16:52:20 sparkyfs vmunix: sd2c:  read failed, no retries
          Mar 13 06:01:18 sparkyfs vmunix: /: file system full
          Mar 13 08:02:03 sparkyfs login: ROOT LOGIN ttyp4 FROM triceratops.itst
          Mar 13 08:28:52 sparkyfs su: davy on /dev/ttyp3
          Mar 13 08:38:03 sparkyfs login: ROOT LOGIN ttyp4 FROM triceratops.itst
          Mar 13 10:56:54 sparkyfs automount[154]: host aaifs not responding
          Mar 13 11:30:42 sparkyfs login: REPEATED LOGIN FAILURES ON ttyp3 FROM
                          intrepid.itstd.s, daemon

          Of particular interest in this sample are the messages  from  the
          _l_o_g_i_n  and  _s_u  programs.   Whenever someone logs in as ``root,''
          _l_o_g_i_n logs this information.  Generally, logging in  as  ``root''
          directly,   rather   than   using   the  _s_u  command,  should  be
          discouraged, as it is hard to  track  which  person  is  actually
          using  the  account.   Once  this  ability  has been disabled, as
          described  in  Section  2.2.2,  detecting  a  security  violation
          becomes  a simple matter of searching the _m_e_s_s_a_g_e_s file for lines
          of this type.

               _L_o_g_i_n also logs any case of someone repeatedly trying to log
          in  to  an account and failing.  After three attempts, _l_o_g_i_n will
          refuse to let  the  person  try  anymore.   Searching  for  these
          messages  in  the  _m_e_s_s_a_g_e_s  file  can  alert  you  to  a cracker



                                         34










          attempting to guess someone's password.

               Finally, when someone uses the _s_u command, either to  become
          ``root'' or someone  else, _s_u logs the success or failure of this
          operation.  These messages can be used to check for users sharing
          their  passwords, as well as for a cracker who has penetrated one
          account and is trying to penetrate others.


          3.2.2   The showmount Command



               The _s_h_o_w_m_o_u_n_t command [Sun88a, 1764] can be used on  an  NFS
          file server to display the names of all hosts that currently have
          something mounted from the server.  With no options, the  program
          simply  displays  a  list  of  all the hosts.  With the -_a and -_d
          options, the output is somewhat more useful.  The  first  option,
          -_a,  causes _s_h_o_w_m_o_u_n_t to list all the host and directory combina-
          tions.  For example,

                  bronto.itstd.sri.com:/usr/share
                  bronto.itstd.sri.com:/usr/local.new
                  bronto.itstd.sri.com:/usr/share/lib
                  bronto.itstd.sri.com:/var/spool/mail
                  cascades.itstd.sri.com:/sparky/a
                  clyde.itstd.sri.com:/laser_dumps
                  cm1.itstd.sri.com:/sparky/a
                  coco0.itstd.sri.com:/sparky/a

          There will be one line of output for each directory mounted by  a
          host.   With  the  -_d  option,  _s_h_o_w_m_o_u_n_t  displays a list of all
          directories that are presently mounted by some host.

               The output from _s_h_o_w_m_o_u_n_t should be checked for two  things.
          First,  only  machines  local  to your organization should appear
          there.  If you have set up proper netgroups as described in  Sec-
          tion  2.2.3,  this  should not be a problem.  Second, only ``nor-
          mal'' directories should be mounted.  If you find unusual  direc-
          tories  being  mounted,  you should find out who is mounting them
          and why - although it is probably innocent, it may indicate some-
          one trying to get around your security mechanisms.


          3.3   FILE SYSTEM SECURITY



               Checking for security holes in the file  system  is  another
          important part of making your system secure.  Primarily, you need
          to check for files that can be modified  by  unauthorized  users,
          files  that  can  inadvertently grant users too many permissions,



                                         35










          and files that can inadvertently grant access to crackers.  It is
          also important to be able to detect unauthorized modifications to
          the file system, and to recover  from  these  modifications  when
          they are made.


          3.3.1   The find Command



               The _f_i_n_d command [Sun88a, 183-185] is a general-purpose com-
          mand  for  searching  the  file system.  Using various arguments,
          complex matching patterns based on a  file's  name,  type,  mode,
          owner,  modification time, and other characteristics, can be con-
          structed.  The names of files that are found using these patterns
          can then be printed out, or given as arguments to other UNIX com-
          mands.  The general format of a _f_i_n_d command is

                  % find _d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_i_e_s _o_p_t_i_o_n_s

          where _d_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_i_e_s is a list of directory names to  search  (e.g.,
          /_u_s_r),  and _o_p_t_i_o_n_s contains the options to control what is being
          searched for.  In general, for the examples in this section,  you
          will  always want to search from the root of the file system (/),
          in order to find all files matching the patterns presented.

               This section describes how to use _f_i_n_d to  search  for  four
          possible security problems that were described in Section 2.


          3.3.1.1   Finding Setuid and Setgid Files



               It is important to check the system often  for  unauthorized
          setuid and setgid programs.  Because these programs grant special
          privileges to the user who is executing them, it is necessary  to
          ensure that insecure programs are not installed.  Setuid ``root''
          programs should be closely guarded - a  favorite  trick  of  many
          crackers  is to break into ``root'' once, and leave a setuid pro-
          gram hidden somewhere that will enable them to regain  super-user
          powers even if the original hole is plugged.

               The command to search for setuid and setgid files is

                  # find / -type f -a \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \) -print

          The options to this command have the following meanings:

               /    The name of the directory  to  be  searched.   In  this
                    case,  we  want to search the entire file system, so we
                    specify /.  You might instead restrict  the  search  to



                                         36










                    /_u_s_r or /_h_o_m_e.

               -type f
                    Only examine files whose type is ``f,''  regular  file.
                    Other  options  include  ``d'' for directory, ``l'' for
                    symbolic link, ``c'' for character-special devices, and
                    ``b'' for block-special devices.

               -a   This specifies ``and.''  Thus, we want  to  know  about
                    files whose type is ``regular file,'' _a_n_d whose permis-
                    sions bits match the other part of this expression.

               \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \)
                    The parentheses in this part of the  command  are  used
                    for  grouping.   Thus,  everything  in this part of the
                    command matches a single pattern, and is treated as the
                    other half of the ``and'' clause described above.

                    -perm -4000
                         This specifies a match if the ``4000'' bit (speci-
                         fied as an octal number) is set in the file's per-
                         mission modes.  This is the set-user-id bit.

                    -o   This specifies ``or.''  Thus, we want to match  if
                         the  file  has  the  set-user-id  bit  _o_r the set-
                         group-id bit set.

                    -perm -2000
                         This specifies a match if the ``2000'' bit (speci-
                         fied as an octal number) is set in the file's per-
                         mission modes.  This is the set-group-id bit.

               -printThis indicates that for  any  file  that  matches  the
                    specified  expression  (is  a  regular file _a_n_d has the
                    setuid _o_r setgid bits set in  its  permissions),  print
                    its name on the screen.

               After executing this command (depending  on  how  much  disk
          space  you have, it can take anywhere from 15 minutes to a couple
          of hours to complete), you will have a list of  files  that  have
          setuid  or setgid bits set on them.  You should then examine each
          of these programs, and determine  whether  they  should  actually
          have  these  permissions.  You should be especially suspicious of
          programs that are _n_o_t in one of the directories (or  a  subdirec-
          tory) shown below.

                  /bin
                  /etc
                  /usr/bin
                  /usr/ucb
                  /usr/etc




                                         37










               One file distributed with SunOS, /_u_s_r/_e_t_c/_r_e_s_t_o_r_e,  is  dis-
          tributed  with  the  setuid  bit  set  on  it, and should not be,
          because of a security hole.  You should be  sure  to  remove  the
          setuid bit from this program by executing the command

                  # chmod u-s /usr/etc/restore



          3.3.1.2   Finding World-Writable Files



               World-writable files, particularly system files,  can  be  a
          security  hole if a cracker gains access to your system and modi-
          fies  them.    Additionally,   world-writable   directories   are
          dangerous,  since  they allow a cracker to add or delete files as
          he wishes.  The _f_i_n_d command to find all world-writable files is

                  # find / -perm -2 -print

          In this case, we do not use the  -_t_y_p_e  option  to  restrict  the
          search,  since  we  are  interested in directories and devices as
          well as files.  The -_2 specifies the world write bit (in octal).

               This list of files will be fairly  long,  and  will  include
          some files that _s_h_o_u_l_d be world writable.  You should not be con-
          cerned if terminal devices  in  /_d_e_v  are  world  writable.   You
          should  also  not be concerned about line printer error log files
          being world writable.  Finally, symbolic links may be world writ-
          able  -  the permissions on a symbolic link, although they exist,
          have no meaning.


          3.3.1.3   Finding Unowned Files



               Finding files that are owned by nonexistent users can  often
          be  a clue that a cracker has gained access to your system.  Even
          if this is not the case, searching for these files gives  you  an
          opportunity  to  clean  up files that should have been deleted at
          the same time the user herself was deleted.  The command to  find
          unowned files is

                  # find / -nouser -print

          The -_n_o_u_s_e_r option matches files that are owned by a user id  not
          contained   in  the  /_e_t_c/_p_a_s_s_w_d  database.   A  similar  option,
          -_n_o_g_r_o_u_p, matches files owned by nonexistent groups.  To find all
          files  owned by nonexistent users _o_r groups, you would use the -_o
          option as follows:



                                         38











                  # find / -nouser -o -nogroup -print



          3.3.1.4   Finding .rhosts Files



               As mentioned in Section 2.2.1.2, users should be  prohibited
          from having ._r_h_o_s_t_s files in their accounts.  To search for this,
          it is only necessary to search the parts of the file system  that
          contain home directories (i.e., you can skip / and /_u_s_r):

                  # find /home -name .rhosts -print

          The -_n_a_m_e option indicates that the complete  name  of  any  file
          whose name matches ._r_h_o_s_t_s should be printed on the screen.


          3.3.2   Checklists



               Checklists can be a useful tool for discovering unauthorized
          changes  made  to  system  directories.  They aren't practical on
          file systems that contain users'  home  directories  since  these
          change  all  the time.  A checklist is a listing of all the files
          contained in a group of directories:  their sizes, owners, modif-
          ication dates, and so on.  Periodically, this information is col-
          lected and compared with the information in the master checklist.
          Files  that  do  not  match in all attributes can be suspected of
          having been changed.

               There are several utilities that implement checklists avail-
          able from public software sites (see Section 4).  However, a sim-
          ple utility can be constructed using only the  standard  UNIX  _l_s
          and _d_i_f_f commands.

               First, use the _l_s command [Sun88a, 285] to generate a master
          list.  This is best done immediately after installing the operat-
          ing system, but can be done at any time provided you're confident
          about the correctness of the files on the disk.  A sample command
          is shown below.

                  # ls -aslgR /bin /etc /usr > MasterChecklist

          The file _M_a_s_t_e_r_C_h_e_c_k_l_i_s_t now contains a complete list of all  the
          files  in  these  directories.  You will probably want to edit it
          and delete the lines for files you know will  be  changing  often
          (e.g.,   /_e_t_c/_u_t_m_p,  /_u_s_r/_a_d_m/_a_c_c_t).   The  _M_a_s_t_e_r_C_h_e_c_k_l_i_s_t  file
          should be stored somewhere safe where a cracker  is  unlikely  to



                                         39










          find  it  (since  he could otherwise just change the data in it):
          either on a different computer system, or on magnetic tape.

               To search for changes in the file system, run the  above  _l_s
          command  again,  saving  the  output  in  some  other  file,  say
          _C_u_r_r_e_n_t_L_i_s_t.  Now use the _d_i_f_f command [Sun88a, 150]  to  compare
          the two files:

                  # diff MasterChecklist CurrentList

          Lines that are only in the master checklist will be printed  pre-
          ceded  by  a  ``<,''  and lines that are only in the current list
          will be preceded by a ``>.''  If there is one line  for  a  file,
          preceded  by  a  ``<,'' this means that the file has been deleted
          since the master checklist was created.  If there is one line for
          a  file,  preceded  by a ``>,'' this means that the file has been
          created since the master checklist was created.  If there are two
          lines  for  a single file, one preceded by ``<'' and the other by
          ``>,'' this indicates that some attribute of the file has changed
          since the master checklist was created.

               By carefully  constructing  the  master  checklist,  and  by
          remembering  to update it periodically (you can replace it with a
          copy of _C_u_r_r_e_n_t_L_i_s_t, once you're sure the differences between the
          lists are harmless), you can easily monitor your system for unau-
          thorized changes.  The software packages available from the  pub-
          lic  software  distribution  sites  implement  basically the same
          scheme as the one here, but offer many more options for  control-
          ling what is examined and reported.


          3.3.3   Backups



               It is impossible to overemphasize the need for a good backup
          strategy.   File  system backups not only protect you in the even
          of hardware failure or accidental deletions, but they  also  pro-
          tect  you  against  unauthorized  file  system  changes made by a
          cracker.

               A good backup strategy will dump the entire system at  level
          zero  (a  ``full''  dump)  at  least  once  a month.  Partial (or
          ``incremental'') dumps should be done at least twice a week,  and
          ideally  they  should  be  done daily.  The _d_u_m_p command [Sun88a,
          1612-1614] is recommended over other programs  such  as  _t_a_r  and
          _c_p_i_o.   This is because only _d_u_m_p is capable of creating a backup
          that can be used to restore a disk to the exact state it  was  in
          when  it was dumped.  The other programs do not take into account
          files deleted or renamed between dumps, and do  not  handle  some
          specialized database files properly.




                                         40










          3.4   KNOW YOUR SYSTEM



               Aside from running large monitoring programs such  as  those
          described in the previous sections, simple everyday UNIX commands
          can also be useful for spotting security violations.  By  running
          these  commands often, whenever you have a free minute (for exam-
          ple, while waiting for someone to answer  the  phone),  you  will
          become  used  to  seeing  a specific pattern of output.  By being
          familiar with the processes normally running on your system,  the
          times different users typically log in, and so on, you can easily
          detect when something is out of the ordinary.


          3.4.1   The ps Command



               The _p_s command [Sun88a, 399-402]  displays  a  list  of  the
          processes  running  on your system.  _P_s has numerous options, too
          many to list here.  Generally, however, for the purpose of  moni-
          toring, the option string -_a_l_x_w_w is the most useful.*  On  a  Sun
          system  running  SunOS 4.0, you should expect to see at least the
          following:

               _s_w_a_p_p_e_r, _p_a_g_e_d_a_e_m_o_n
                    System programs that help the virtual memory system.

               /_s_b_i_n/_i_n_i_t
                    The _i_n_i_t process, which  is  responsible  for  numerous
                    tasks,  including bringing up login processes on termi-
                    nals.

               _p_o_r_t_m_a_p, _y_p_b_i_n_d, _y_p_s_e_r_v
                    Parts of the Yellow Pages system.

               _b_i_o_d, _n_f_s_d, _r_p_c._m_o_u_n_t_d, _r_p_c._q_u_o_t_a_d, _r_p_c._l_o_c_k_d
                    Parts of the Network File System (NFS).  If the  system
                    you  are  looking  at  is  not  a file server, the _n_f_s_d
                    processes probably won't exist.

               _r_a_r_p_d, _r_p_c._b_o_o_t_p_a_r_a_m_d
                    Part of the system  that  allows  diskless  clients  to
                    boot.

               Other commands you should expect to  see  are  _u_p_d_a_t_e  (file
          system  updater);  _g_e_t_t_y  (one  per  terminal  and  one  for  the
          _________________________
            * This  is  true  for  Berkeley-based  systems.   On  System  V
          systems, the option string -_e_l_f should be used instead.




                                         41










          console); _l_p_d (line printer daemon); _i_n_e_t_d (Internet daemon,  for
          starting other network servers); _s_h and _c_s_h (the Bourne shell and
          C shell, one or more per logged in user).  In addition, if  there
          are  users  logged in, you'll probably see invocations of various
          compilers, text editors, and word processing programs.


          3.4.2   The who and w Commands



               The _w_h_o command, as mentioned previously, displays the  list
          of  users  currently  logged  in  on the system.  By running this
          periodically, you can learn at what times during the day  various
          users  log  in.   Then,  when you see someone logged in at a dif-
          ferent time, you can investigate and make sure that it's  legiti-
          mate.

               The _w command [Sun88a, 588] is somewhat of a  cross  between
          _w_h_o  and  _p_s.   Not  only does it show a list of who is presently
          logged in, but it also displays how  long  they  have  been  idle
          (gone  without  typing  anything),  and  what  command  they  are
          currently running.


          3.4.3   The ls Command



               Simple as its function is, _l_s is actually  very  useful  for
          detecting  file system problems.  Periodically, you should use _l_s
          on the  various  system  directories,  checking  for  files  that
          shouldn't be there.  Most of the time, these files will have just
          ``landed'' somewhere by accident.  However, by  keeping  a  close
          watch on things, you will be able to detect a cracker long before
          you might have otherwise.

               When using _l_s to check for oddities, be sure to use  the  -_a
          option,  which  lists  files whose names begin with a period (.).
          Be particularly alert for files or directories named ``...'',  or
          ``..(space)'',  which  many  crackers  like  to use.  (Of course,
          remember that ``.'' and ``..'' are supposed to be there.)


          3.5   KEEP YOUR EYES OPEN



               Monitoring for security breaches is every bit  as  important
          as  preventing  them  in the first place.  Because it's virtually
          impossible to make a system totally secure, there is  always  the
          chance,  no matter how small, that a cracker will be able to gain



                                         42










          access.  Only by monitoring can this be detected and remedied.






















































                                         43

































































                                         44











                                      SECTION 4

                           SOFTWARE FOR IMPROVING SECURITY



               Because security is of great concern to many sites, a wealth
          of software has been developed for improving the security of UNIX
          systems.  Much of this software has been developed  at  universi-
          ties and other public institutions, and is available free for the
          asking.   This  section  describes  how  this  software  can   be
          obtained, and mentions some of the more important programs avail-
          able.


          4.1   OBTAINING FIXES AND NEW VERSIONS



               Several sites on the Internet maintain large repositories of
          public-domain  and  freely  distributable software, and make this
          material available for anonymous  FTP.   This  section  describes
          some of the larger repositories.


          4.1.1   Sun Fixes on UUNET



               Sun Microsystems has contracted  with  UUNET  Communications
          Services,  Inc.  to make fixes for bugs in Sun software available
          via anonymous FTP.  You can access these fixes by using  the  _f_t_p
          command  [Sun88a,  195-201]  to  connect  to the host _f_t_p._u_u._n_e_t.
          Then change into the directory _s_u_n-_f_i_x_e_s, and obtain a  directory
          listing, as shown in the example on the following page.



















                                         45










          % ftp ftp.uu.net
          Connected to uunet.UU.NET.
          220 uunet FTP server (Version 5.93 Mar 20 11:01:52 EST 1990) ready
          Name (ftp.uu.net:davy): anonymous
          331 Guest login ok, send ident as password.
          Password:            _e_n_t_e_r _y_o_u_r _m_a_i_l _a_d_d_r_e_s_s _y_o_u_r_n_a_m_e@_y_o_u_r_h_o_s_t _h_e_r_e
          230 Guest login ok, access restrictions apply.
          ftp> cd sun-fixes
          _2_5_0 _C_W_D _c_o_m_m_a_n_d _s_u_c_c_e_s_s_f_u_l.
          _f_t_p> _d_i_r
          200 PORT command successful.
          150 Opening ASCII mode data connection for /bin/ls.
          total 2258
          -rw-r--r--  1 38       22           4558 Aug 31  1989 README
          -rw-r--r--  1 38       22         484687 Dec 14  1988 ddn.tar.Z
          -rw-r--r--  1 38       22         140124 Jan 13  1989 gated.sun3.Z
          -rwxr-xr-x  1 38       22          22646 Dec 14  1988 in.ftpd.sun3.Z
          .....
          .....
          -rw-r--r--  1 38       22          72119 Aug 31  1989 sendmail.sun3.Z
          -rwxr-xr-x  1 38       22          99147 Aug 31  1989 sendmail.sun4.Z
          -rw-r--r--  1 38       22           3673 Jul 11  1989 wall.sun3.Z
          -rw-r--r--  1 38       22           4099 Jul 11  1989 wall.sun4.Z
          -rwxr-xr-x  1 38       22           7955 Jan 18  1989 ypbind.sun3.Z
          -rwxr-xr-x  1 38       22           9237 Jan 18  1989 ypbind.sun4.Z
          226 Transfer complete.
          1694 bytes received in 0.39 seconds (4.2 Kbytes/s)
          ftp> quit
          _2_2_1 _G_o_o_d_b_y_e.
          %

          The file _R_E_A_D_M_E contains a brief description of what each file in
          this directory contains, and what is required to install the fix.


          4.1.2   Berkeley Fixes



               The University of California at Berkeley  also  makes  fixes
          available via anonymous FTP; these fixes pertain primarily to the
          current release of BSD UNIX (currently  release  4.3).   However,
          even if you are not running their software, these fixes are still
          important, since many vendors (Sun, DEC,  Sequent  ,  etc.)  base
          their software on the Berkeley releases.

               The Berkeley fixes are available for anonymous FTP from  the
          host  _u_c_b_a_r_p_a._b_e_r_k_e_l_e_y._e_d_u  in  the directory _4._3/_u_c_b-_f_i_x_e_s.  The
          file _I_N_D_E_X in this directory describes what each file contains.

               Berkeley also distributes new versions of _s_e_n_d_m_a_i_l and _n_a_m_e_d
          [Sun88a,  1758-1760,  1691-1692] from this machine.  New versions



                                         46










          of these commands are stored in the _4._3 directory, usually in the
          files _s_e_n_d_m_a_i_l._t_a_r._Z and _b_i_n_d._t_a_r._Z, respectively.


          4.1.3   Simtel-20 and UUNET



               The two largest general-purpose software repositories on the
          Internet are the hosts _w_s_m_r-_s_i_m_t_e_l_2_0._a_r_m_y._m_i_l and _f_t_p._u_u._n_e_t.

               _w_s_m_r-_s_i_m_t_e_l_2_0._a_r_m_y._m_i_l is a TOPS-20 machine operated by  the
          U.  S. Army at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.  The direc-
          tory _p_d_2:<_u_n_i_x-_c> contains a large amount of UNIX software,  pri-
          marily  taken  from  the  _c_o_m_p._s_o_u_r_c_e_s newsgroups.  The file _0_0_0-
          _m_a_s_t_e_r-_i_n_d_e_x._t_x_t contains a master list and description  of  each
          piece  of  software  available  in the repository.  The file _0_0_0-
          _i_n_t_r_o-_u_n_i_x-_s_w._t_x_t contains information on the mailing  list  used
          to  announce  new software, and describes the procedures used for
          transferring files from the archive with FTP.

               _f_t_p._u_u._n_e_t is operated  by  UUNET  Communications  Services,
          Inc.  in Falls Church, Virginia.  This company sells Internet and
          USENET access to sites all over  the  country  (and  internation-
          ally).   The software posted to the following USENET source news-
          groups is stored here, in directories of the same name:

                  comp.sources.games
                  comp.sources.misc
                  comp.sources.sun
                  comp.sources.unix
                  comp.sources.x

          Numerous other distributions, such as all the  freely  distribut-
          able  Berkeley  UNIX  source  code, Internet Request for Comments
          (RFCs), and so on are also stored on this machine.


          4.1.4   Vendors



               Many vendors make fixes for bugs in their software available
          electronically,  either  via  mailing lists or via anonymous FTP.
          You should contact your vendor to find out  if  they  offer  this
          service,  and  if  so, how to access it.  Some vendors that offer
          these services include  Sun  Microsystems  (see  above),  Digital
          Equipment  Corp.,  the  University of California at Berkeley (see
          above), and Apple Computer.






                                         47










          4.2   THE NPASSWD COMMAND



               The _n_p_a_s_s_w_d  command,  developed  by  Clyde  Hoover  at  the
          University  of  Texas  at Austin, is intended to be a replacement
          for the standard UNIX _p_a_s_s_w_d command [Sun88a, 379],  as  well  as
          the  Sun _y_p_p_a_s_s_w_d command [Sun88a, 611].  _n_p_a_s_s_w_d makes passwords
          more secure by refusing to allow users to select  insecure  pass-
          words.  The following capabilities are provided by _n_p_a_s_s_w_d:

               +o    Configurable minimum password length

               +o    Configurable to force users to use mixed case or digits
                    and punctuation

               +o    Checking for ``simple'' passwords such  as  a  repeated
                    letter

               +o    Checking against the host name and other  host-specific
                    information

               +o    Checking against the login name, first and last  names,
                    and so on

               +o    Checking for words in various  dictionaries,  including
                    the system dictionary.

               The _n_p_a_s_s_w_d distribution is available for anonymous FTP from
          _e_m_x._u_t_e_x_a_s._e_d_u in the directory _p_u_b/_n_p_a_s_s_w_d.


          4.3   THE COPS PACKAGE




               COPS is a  security  tool  for  system  administrators  that
          checks  for  numerous  common  security problems on UNIX systems,
          including many of the things described in this document.  COPS is
          a  collection  of shell scripts and C programs that can easily be
          run on almost any UNIX variant.  Among other  things,  it  checks
          the  following items and sends the results to the system adminis-
          trator:

               +o    Checks  /_d_e_v/_k_m_e_m   and   other   devices   for   world
                    read/writability.

               +o    Checks  special/important  files  and  directories  for
                    ``bad'' modes (world writable, etc.).

               +o    Checks for easily guessed passwords.



                                         48










               +o    Checks for duplicate user ids, invalid  fields  in  the
                    password file, etc.

               +o    Checks for duplicate group ids, invalid fields  in  the
                    group file, etc.

               +o    Checks all users' home directories  and  their  ._c_s_h_r_c,
                    ._l_o_g_i_n,  ._p_r_o_f_i_l_e, and ._r_h_o_s_t_s files for security prob-
                    lems.

               +o    Checks all  commands  in  the  /_e_t_c/_r_c  files  [Sun88a,
                    1724-1725] and _c_r_o_n files [Sun88a, 1606-1607] for world
                    writability.

               +o    Checks for bad ``root'' paths, NFS file system exported
                    to the world, etc.

               +o    Includes an expert system that checks to see if a given
                    user  (usually ``root'') can be compromised, given that
                    certain rules are true.

               +o    Checks for _c_h_a_n_g_e_s in the setuid status of programs  on
                    the system.

               The COPS package is  available  from  the  _c_o_m_p._s_o_u_r_c_e_s._u_n_i_x
          archive  on  _f_t_p._u_u._n_e_t,  and  also  from the repository on _w_s_m_r-
          _s_i_m_t_e_l_2_0._a_r_m_y._m_i_l.


          4.4   SUN C2 SECURITY FEATURES



               With the release of SunOS 4.0,  Sun  has  included  security
          features  that  allow  the system to operate at a higher level of
          security, patterned after the C2* classification.  These features
          can be installed as one of the options when installing the system
          from the distribution tapes.  The security features added by this
          option include

               +o    Audit trails that record all login  and  logout  times,
                    the  execution of administrative commands, and the exe-
                    cution of privileged (setuid) operations.

               +o    A more secure password file mechanism  (``shadow  pass-
                    word  file'')  that  prevents crackers from obtaining a
                    list of the encrypted passwords.
          _________________________
            * C2 is one of several security classifications defined by  the
          National  Computer Security Center, and is described in [NCSC85],
          the ``orange book.''




                                         49










               +o    DES encryption capability.

               +o    A (more) secure NFS implementation that uses public-key
                    encryption  to authenticate the users of the system and
                    the hosts on the network, to be sure  they  really  are
                    who they claim to be.

          These security features are described in detail in [Sun88c].


          4.5   KERBEROS



               Kerberos [Stei88] is an authentication system  developed  by
          the  Athena Project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
          Kerberos  is  a  third-party  authentication  service,  which  is
          trusted by other network services.  When a user logs in, Kerberos
          authenticates that user (using a password), and provides the user
          with a way to prove her identity to other servers and hosts scat-
          tered around the network.

               This authentication is then used by programs such as  _r_l_o_g_i_n
          [Sun88a,  418-419]  to  allow  the  user to log in to other hosts
          without a password (in place of the ._r_h_o_s_t_s file).  The authenti-
          cation is also used by the mail system in order to guarantee that
          mail is delivered to the correct person, as well as to  guarantee
          that  the sender is who he claims to be.  NFS has also been modi-
          fied by M.I.T. to work with Kerberos, thereby making  the  system
          much more secure.

               The overall effect of installing Kerberos and  the  numerous
          other  programs  that  go  with  it is to virtually eliminate the
          ability of users to ``spoof'' the system into believing they  are
          someone   else.    Unfortunately,  installing  Kerberos  is  very
          intrusive, requiring the modification or replacement of  numerous
          standard  programs.  For this reason, a source license is usually
          necessary.  There are plans to make Kerberos a part of 4.4BSD, to
          be  released by the University of California at Berkeley sometime
          in 1990.















                                         50











                                      SECTION 5

                             KEEPING ABREAST OF THE BUGS



               One of the hardest things about keeping a system  secure  is
          finding  out  about the security holes before a cracker does.  To
          combat this, there are several sources of information you can and
          should make use of on a regular basis.


          5.1   THE COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM



               The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) was  established
          in December 1988 by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
          to address computer security concerns of research  users  of  the
          Internet.   It  is operated by the Software Engineering Institute
          at Carnegie-Mellon University.  The CERT serves as a focal  point
          for  the  reporting of security violations, and the dissemination
          of security advisories to the Internet community.   In  addition,
          the  team works with vendors of various systems in order to coor-
          dinate the fixes for security problems.

               The CERT sends out security advisories to the  _c_e_r_t-_a_d_v_i_s_o_r_y
          mailing  list  whenever appropriate.  They also operate a 24-hour
          hotline that can be called to  report  security  problems  (e.g.,
          someone  breaking into your system), as well as to obtain current
          (and accurate) information about rumored security problems.

               To join the _c_e_r_t-_a_d_v_i_s_o_r_y mailing list, send  a  message  to
          _c_e_r_t@_c_e_r_t._s_e_i._c_m_u._e_d_u  and  ask  to be added to the mailing list.
          Past advisories are available for anonymous  FTP  from  the  host
          _c_e_r_t._s_e_i._c_m_u._e_d_u.  The 24-hour hotline number is (412) 268-7090.


          5.2   DDN MANAGEMENT BULLETINS



               The _D_D_N _M_a_n_a_g_e_m_e_n_t _B_u_l_l_e_t_i_n is distributed electronically by
          the  Defense  Data Network (DDN) Network Information Center under
          contract to the Defense Communications Agency.  It is a means  of
          communicating  official policy, procedures, and other information
          of concern to management personnel at DDN facilities.

               The _D_D_N _S_e_c_u_r_i_t_y _B_u_l_l_e_t_i_n is distributed  electronically  by
          the  DDN  SCC (Security Coordination Center), also under contract
          to DCA, as a means of communicating information  on  network  and



                                         51










          host  security  exposures,  fixes,  and  concerns to security and
          management personnel at DDN facilities.

               Anyone may join the mailing lists for these two bulletins by
          sending  a  message to _n_i_c@_n_i_c._d_d_n._m_i_l and asking to be placed on
          the mailing lists.


          5.3   SECURITY-RELATED MAILING LISTS



               There are several other mailing lists operated on the Inter-
          net  that  pertain  directly  or  indirectly  to various security
          issues.  Some of the more useful ones are described below.


          5.3.1   Security



               The UNIX Security  mailing  list  exists  to  notify  system
          administrators  of  security  problems  _b_e_f_o_r_e they become common
          knowledge, and to provide security enhancement  information.   It
          is a restricted-access list, open only to people who can be veri-
          fied as being principal systems people at a  site.   Requests  to
          join  the  list must be sent by either the site contact listed in
          the Network Information Center's  WHOIS  database,  or  from  the
          ``root''  account  on  one  of the major site machines.  You must
          include the destination address you want on the list, an  indica-
          tion  of  whether  you  want  to be on the mail reflector list or
          receive weekly digests, the electronic  mail  address  and  voice
          telephone  number  of  the  site contact if it isn't you, and the
          name, address, and telephone number of your  organization.   This
          information should be sent to _s_e_c_u_r_i_t_y-_r_e_q_u_e_s_t@_c_p_d._c_o_m.


          5.3.2   RISKS



               The RISKS digest is a component of the ACM Committee on Com-
          puters and Public Policy, moderated by Peter G. Neumann.  It is a
          discussion forum on risks to the public in computers and  related
          systems,  and along with discussing computer security and privacy
          issues, has discussed such subjects as the  Stark  incident,  the
          shooting  down of the Iranian airliner in the Persian Gulf (as it
          relates to the computerized weapons systems), problems in air and
          railroad  traffic  control  systems, software engineering, and so
          on.   To  join  the  mailing  list,  send  a  message  to  _r_i_s_k_s-
          _r_e_q_u_e_s_t@_c_s_l._s_r_i._c_o_m.   This  list is also available in the USENET
          newsgroup _c_o_m_p._r_i_s_k_s.



                                         52










          5.3.3   TCP-IP



               The TCP-IP list is intended to act as a discussion forum for
          developers  and maintainers of implementations of the TCP/IP pro-
          tocol suite.  It also discusses network-related security problems
          when  they  involve  programs providing network services, such as
          _s_e_n_d_m_a_i_l.  To join the TCP-IP list, send  a  message  to  _t_c_p-_i_p-
          _r_e_q_u_e_s_t@_n_i_c._d_d_n._m_i_l.   This  list is also available in the USENET
          newsgroup _c_o_m_p._p_r_o_t_o_c_o_l_s._t_c_p-_i_p.


          5.3.4   SUN-SPOTS, SUN-NETS, SUN-MANAGERS



               The SUN-SPOTS, SUN-NETS, and SUN-MANAGERS lists are all dis-
          cussion  groups  for users and administrators of systems supplied
          by Sun Microsystems.  SUN-SPOTS is a fairly  general  list,  dis-
          cussing  everything  from  hardware configurations to simple UNIX
          questions.   To  subscribe,  send   a   message   to   _s_u_n-_s_p_o_t_s-
          _r_e_q_u_e_s_t@_r_i_c_e._e_d_u.   This  list  is  also  available in the USENET
          newsgroup _c_o_m_p._s_y_s._s_u_n.

               SUN-NETS is a discussion list for items pertaining  to  net-
          working  on  Sun  systems.   Much of the discussion is related to
          NFS, Yellow Pages, and name servers.  To subscribe, send  a  mes-
          sage to _s_u_n-_n_e_t_s-_r_e_q_u_e_s_t@_u_m_i_a_c_s._u_m_d._e_d_u.

               SUN-MANAGERS is a discussion list for Sun system administra-
          tors  and  covers  all  aspects of Sun system administration.  To
          subscribe, send a message to _s_u_n-_m_a_n_a_g_e_r_s-_r_e_q_u_e_s_t@_e_e_c_s._n_w_u._e_d_u.


          5.3.5   VIRUS-L



               The VIRUS-L list is a forum for the discussion  of  computer
          virus  experiences, protection software, and related topics.  The
          list is open to the public, and is implemented as a mail  reflec-
          tor,  not  a  digest.  Most of the information is related to per-
          sonal computers, although some of it may be applicable to  larger
          systems.  To subscribe, send the line

                  SUB VIRUS-L _y_o_u_r _f_u_l_l _n_a_m_e

          to the address _l_i_s_t_s_e_r_v%_l_e_h_i_i_b_m_1._b_i_t_n_e_t@_m_i_t_v_m_a._m_i_t._e_d_u.






                                         53

































































                                         54











                                      SECTION 6

                                  SUGGESTED READING



               This section suggests some alternate sources of  information
          pertaining to the security and administration of the UNIX operat-
          ing system.

          _U_N_I_X _S_y_s_t_e_m _A_d_m_i_n_i_s_t_r_a_t_i_o_n _H_a_n_d_b_o_o_k
          Evi Nemeth, Garth Snyder, Scott Seebass
          Prentice Hall, 1989, $26.95

               This is perhaps the best general-purpose book on UNIX system
               administration  currently on the market.  It covers Berkeley
               UNIX, SunOS, and System V.  The 26 chapters  and  17  appen-
               dices  cover numerous topics, including booting and shutting
               down the system, the file system,  configuring  the  kernel,
               adding  a  disk,  the line printer spooling system, Berkeley
               networking, _s_e_n_d_m_a_i_l, and _u_u_c_p.  Of particular interest  are
               the  chapters  on  running  as  the super-user, backups, and
               security.

          _U_N_I_X _O_p_e_r_a_t_i_n_g _S_y_s_t_e_m _S_e_c_u_r_i_t_y
          F. T. Grammp and R. H. Morris
          AT&T Bell Laboratories Technical Journal
          October 1984

               This is an excellent discussion of some of the  more  common
               security  problems in UNIX and how to avoid them, written by
               two of Bell Labs' most prominent security experts.

          _P_a_s_s_w_o_r_d _S_e_c_u_r_i_t_y: _A _C_a_s_e _H_i_s_t_o_r_y
          Robert Morris and Ken Thompson
          Communications of the ACM
          November 1979

               An excellent discussion on the problem of password security,
               and  some interesting information on how easy it is to crack
               passwords and why.  This document is  usually  reprinted  in
               most vendors' UNIX documentation.

          _O_n _t_h_e _S_e_c_u_r_i_t_y _o_f _U_N_I_X
          Dennis M. Ritchie
          May 1975

               A discussion on UNIX security from one of the original crea-
               tors  of  the system.  This document is usually reprinted in
               most vendors' UNIX documentation.
          _T_h_e _C_u_c_k_o_o'_s _E_g_g



                                         55










          Clifford Stoll
          Doubleday, 1989, $19.95

               An excellent story of Stoll's experiences tracking down  the
               German  crackers who were breaking into his systems and sel-
               ling the data they found to the KGB.   Written  at  a  level
               that nontechnical users can easily understand.

          _S_y_s_t_e_m _a_n_d _N_e_t_w_o_r_k _A_d_m_i_n_i_s_t_r_a_t_i_o_n
          Sun Microsystems
          May, 1988

               Part of the SunOS documentation,  this  manual  covers  most
               aspects  of  Sun  system  administration, including security
               issues.  A must for anyone operating a  Sun  system,  and  a
               pretty good reference for other UNIX systems as well.

          _S_e_c_u_r_i_t_y _P_r_o_b_l_e_m_s _i_n _t_h_e _T_C_P/_I_P _P_r_o_t_o_c_o_l _S_u_i_t_e
          S. M. Bellovin
          ACM Computer Communications Review
          April, 1989

               An interesting discussion of some of the  security  problems
               with  the  protocols  in  use on the Internet and elsewhere.
               Most of these problems are far beyond  the  capabilities  of
               the  average  cracker, but it is still important to be aware
               of them.  This article is technical in nature,  and  assumes
               familiarity with the protocols.

          _A _W_e_a_k_n_e_s_s _i_n _t_h_e _4._2_B_S_D _U_N_I_X _T_C_P/_I_P _S_o_f_t_w_a_r_e
          Robert T. Morris
          AT&T Bell Labs Computer Science Technical Report 117
          February, 1985

               An interesting article from the author of the Internet worm,
               which  describes  a  method  that  allows  remote  hosts  to
               ``spoof'' a host into believing they  are  trusted.   Again,
               this article is technical in nature, and assumes familiarity
               with the protocols.

          _C_o_m_p_u_t_e_r _V_i_r_u_s_e_s _a_n_d _R_e_l_a_t_e_d _T_h_r_e_a_t_s: _A _M_a_n_a_g_e_m_e_n_t _G_u_i_d_e
          John P. Wack and Lisa J. Carnahan
          National Institute of Standards and Technology
          Special Publication 500-166

               This document  provides  a  good  introduction  to  viruses,
               worms,  trojan horses, and so on, and explains how they work
               and how they are used to attack computer  systems.   Written
               for the nontechnical user, this is a good starting point for
               learning about these security problems.  This  document  can
               be  ordered  for  $2.50  from  the U. S. Government Printing
               Office, document number 003-003-02955-6.



                                         56











                                      SECTION 7

                                     CONCLUSIONS



               Computer security is playing an increasingly important  role
          in our lives as more and more operations become computerized, and
          as computer networks become more widespread.  In order to protect
          your  systems  from snooping and vandalism by unauthorized crack-
          ers, it is necessary to enable  the  numerous  security  features
          provided by the UNIX system.

               In this document, we have covered the major areas  that  can
          be made more secure:

               +o    Account security

               +o    Network security

               +o    File system security.

          Additionally, we have discussed how to monitor for security  vio-
          lations, where to obtain security-related software and bug fixes,
          and numerous mailing lists for finding out about  security  prob-
          lems that have been discovered.

               Many crackers are not interested in breaking  into  specific
          systems, but rather will break into any system that is vulnerable
          to the attacks they know.  Eliminating these well-known holes and
          monitoring  the  system  for other security problems will usually
          serve as adequate defense against all  but  the  most  determined
          crackers.   By using the procedures and sources described in this
          document, you _c_a_n make your system more secure.




















                                         57

































































                                         58










                                     REFERENCES



          [Eich89]  Eichin, Mark W., and Jon A. Rochlis.   _W_i_t_h  _M_i_c_r_o_s_c_o_p_e
                    _a_n_d  _T_w_e_e_z_e_r_s:   _A_n  _A_n_a_l_y_s_i_s  _o_f _t_h_e _I_n_t_e_r_n_e_t _V_i_r_u_s _o_f
                    _N_o_v_e_m_b_e_r _1_9_8_8.  Massachusetts Institute of  Technology.
                    February 1989.

          [Elme88]  Elmer-DeWitt, Philip.   ``  `The  Kid  Put  Us  Out  of
                    Action.' '' _T_i_m_e, 132 (20): 76, November 14, 1988.

          [Gram84]  Grammp, F. T., and R. H. Morris.  ``UNIX Operating Sys-
                    tem Security.''  _A_T&_T _B_e_l_l _L_a_b_o_r_a_t_o_r_i_e_s _T_e_c_h_n_i_c_a_l _J_o_u_r_-
                    _n_a_l, 63 (8): 1649-1672, October 1984.

          [Hind83]  Hinden, R., J. Haverty, and A. Sheltzer.   ``The  DARPA
                    Internet:  Interconnecting  Heterogeneous Computer Net-
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                    33-48, September 1983.

          [McLe87]  McLellan, Vin.  ``NASA Hackers:  There's  More  to  the
                    Story.''  _D_i_g_i_t_a_l _R_e_v_i_e_w, November 23, 1987, p. 80.

          [Morr78]  Morris, Robert, and Ken Thompson.  ``Password Security:
                    A  Case History.''  _C_o_m_m_u_n_i_c_a_t_i_o_n_s _o_f _t_h_e _A_C_M, 22 (11):
                    594-597,  November  1979.   Reprinted  in  _U_N_I_X  _S_y_s_t_e_m
                    _M_a_n_a_g_e_r'_s  _M_a_n_u_a_l,  4.3 Berkeley Software Distribution.
                    University of California, Berkeley.  April 1986.

          [NCSC85]  National  Computer  Security  Center.   _D_e_p_a_r_t_m_e_n_t   _o_f
                    _D_e_f_e_n_s_e  _T_r_u_s_t_e_d  _C_o_m_p_u_t_e_r  _S_y_s_t_e_m _E_v_a_l_u_a_t_i_o_n _C_r_i_t_e_r_i_a,
                    Department  of  Defense   Standard   DOD   5200.28-STD,
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          [Quar86]  Quarterman, J. S., and J. C. Hoskins.   ``Notable  Com-
                    puter  Networks.''  _C_o_m_m_u_n_i_c_a_t_i_o_n_s _o_f _t_h_e _A_C_M, 29 (10):
                    932-971, October 1986.

          [Reed84]  Reeds, J. A., and P. J.  Weinberger.   ``File  Security
                    and the UNIX System Crypt Command.''  _A_T&_T _B_e_l_l _L_a_b_o_r_a_-
                    _t_o_r_i_e_s _T_e_c_h_n_i_c_a_l _J_o_u_r_n_a_l, 63  (8):  1673-1683,  October
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          [Risk87]  _F_o_r_u_m _o_n _R_i_s_k_s _t_o _t_h_e _P_u_b_l_i_c _i_n _C_o_m_p_u_t_e_r_s  _a_n_d  _R_e_l_a_t_e_d
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                                         59










                    Issue 7.85, December 1, 1988.

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                    _S_y_s_t_e_m_s.  ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy,
                    Peter G. Neumann, Moderator.   Internet  mailing  list.
                    Issue 8.2, January 4, 1989.

          [Risk89b] _F_o_r_u_m _o_n _R_i_s_k_s _t_o _t_h_e _P_u_b_l_i_c _i_n _C_o_m_p_u_t_e_r_s  _a_n_d  _R_e_l_a_t_e_d
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                                         60










                    Part Number 800-1733-10, May 1988.

          [Sun88c]  Sun Microsystems.  _S_e_c_u_r_i_t_y _F_e_a_t_u_r_e_s _G_u_i_d_e, Part Number
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                    Number 800-1779-10, May 1988, pp. 165-185.















































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                                         62










                           APPENDIX A - SECURITY CHECKLIST



               This checklist summarizes the information presented in  this
          paper, and can be used to verify that you have implemented every-
          thing described.



          _A_c_c_o_u_n_t _S_e_c_u_r_i_t_y
               []  Password policy developed and distributed to all users
               []  All passwords checked against obvious choices
               []  Expiration dates on all accounts
               []  No ``idle'' guest accounts
               []  All accounts have passwords or ``*'' in the password field
               []  No group accounts
               []  ``+'' lines in _p_a_s_s_w_d and _g_r_o_u_p checked if running Yellow Pages

          _N_e_t_w_o_r_k _S_e_c_u_r_i_t_y
               []  _h_o_s_t_s._e_q_u_i_v contains only local hosts, and no ``+''
               []  No ._r_h_o_s_t_s files in users' home directories
               []  Only local hosts in ``root'' ._r_h_o_s_t_s file, if any
               []  Only ``console'' labeled as ``secure'' in _t_t_y_t_a_b (servers only)
               []  No terminals labeled as ``secure'' in _t_t_y_t_a_b (clients only)
               []  No NFS file systems exported to the world
               []  _f_t_p_d version later than December, 1988
               []  No ``decode'' alias in the aliases file
               []  No ``wizard'' password in _s_e_n_d_m_a_i_l._c_f
               []  No ``debug'' command in _s_e_n_d_m_a_i_l
               []  _f_i_n_g_e_r_d version later than November 5, 1988
               []  Modems and terminal servers handle hangups correctly

          _F_i_l_e _S_y_s_t_e_m _S_e_c_u_r_i_t_y
               []  No setuid or setgid shell scripts
               []  Check all ``nonstandard'' setuid and setgid programs for security
               []  Setuid bit removed from /_u_s_r/_e_t_c/_r_e_s_t_o_r_e
               []  Sticky bits set on world-writable directories
               []  Proper umask value on ``root'' account
               []  Proper modes on devices in /_d_e_v

          _B_a_c_k_u_p_s
               []  Level 0 dumps at least monthly
               []  Incremental dumps at least bi-weekly











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