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TUCoPS :: Unix :: General :: intrud~1.txt

CERT Intruder Detection Checklist (most sysadmins do much less than this to detect hackers!)




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October 3, 1997	

Version 1.2
ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/intruder_detection_checklist


                         CERT(*) Coordination Center
                         Intruder Detection Checklist

This document outlines suggested steps for determining if your system has
been compromised. System administrators can use this information to look
for several types of break-ins. We encourage you to review all sections of
this document and modify your systems to close potential weaknesses.

In addition to the information in this document, we provide three companion
documents that may help you:

        ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/UNIX_configuration_guidelines
        - contains suggestions for avoiding common UNIX system
          configuration problems that have been exploited

        ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/root_compromise
        - contains suggested steps for recovering from a root compromise on
          a UNIX system

        ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/security_tools
        - contains descriptions of tools that can be used to help secure a
          system and deter break-ins

We also encourage you to check with your vendor(s) regularly for any
updates or new patches that relate to your systems.

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Look For Signs That Your System May Have Been Compromised

Note that all action taken during the course of an investigation should be
in accordance with your organization's policies and procedures.

   1. Examine log files for connections from unusual locations or other
      unusual activity. For example, look at your 'last' log, process
      accounting, all logs created by syslog, and other security logs.
      If your firewall or router writes logs to a different location than the
      compromised system, remember to check these logs also. Note that this is
      not foolproof unless you log to append-only media; many intruders edit
      log files in an attempt to hide their activity.

   2. Look for setuid and setgid files (especially setuid root files)
      everywhere on your system. Intruders often leave setuid copies of
      /bin/sh or /bin/time around to allow them root access at a later
      time. The UNIX find(1) program can be used to hunt for setuid and/or
      setgid files. For example, you can use the following commands to find
      setuid root files and setgid kmem files on the entire file system:

        find / -user root -perm -4000 -print
        find / -group kmem -perm -2000 -print

      Note that the above examples search the entire directory tree,
      including NFS/AFS mounted file systems. Some find(1) commands
      support an "-xdev" option to avoid searching those hierarchies.
      For example:

        find / -user root -perm -4000 -print -xdev

      Another way to search for setuid files is to use the ncheck(8)
      command on each disk partition. For example, use the following command
      to search for setuid files and special devices on the disk partition
      /dev/rsd0g:

        ncheck -s /dev/rsd0g

   3. Check your system binaries to make sure that they haven't been
      altered. We've seen intruders change programs on UNIX systems such as
      login, su, telnet, netstat, ifconfig, ls, find, du, df, libc, sync,
      any binaries referenced in /etc/inetd.conf, and other critical
      network and system programs and shared object libraries. Compare the
      versions on your systems with known good copies, such as those from
      your initial installation media. Be careful of trusting backups; your
      backups could also contain Trojan horses.

      Trojan horse programs may produce the same standard checksum and
      timestamp as the legitimate version. Because of this, the standard
      UNIX sum(1) command and the timestamps associated with the programs
      are not sufficient to determine whether the programs have been
      replaced. The use of cmp(1), MD5, Tripwire, and other cryptographic
      checksum tools is sufficient to detect these Trojan horse programs,
      provided the checksum tools themselves are kept secure and are not
      available for modification by the intruder. Additionally, you may
      want to consider using a tool (PGP, for example) to "sign" the output
      generated by MD5 or Tripwire, for future reference.

   4. Check your systems for unauthorized use of a network monitoring
      program, commonly called a sniffer or packet sniffer. Intruders may
      use a sniffer to capture user account and password information. For
      related information, see CERT advisory CA-94:01 available in

    ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-94:01.network.monitoring.attacks

   5. Examine all the files that are run by 'cron' and 'at.' We've seen
      intruders leave back doors in files run from 'cron' or submitted to
      'at.' These techniques can let an intruder back on the system (even
      after you believe you had addressed the original compromise). Also,
      verify that all files/programs referenced (directly or indirectly) by
      the 'cron' and 'at' jobs, and the job files themselves, are not
      world-writable.

   6. Check for unauthorized services. Inspect /etc/inetd.conf for
      unauthorized additions or changes. In particular, search for entries
      that execute a shell program (for example, /bin/sh or /bin/csh) and
      check all programs that are specified in /etc/inetd.conf to verify
      that they are correct and haven't been replaced by Trojan horse
      programs.

      Also check for legitimate services that you have commented out in
      your /etc/inetd.conf. Intruders may turn on a service that you
      previously thought you had turned off, or replace the inetd program
      with a Trojan horse program.

   7. Examine the /etc/passwd file on the system and check for modifications
      to that file. In particular, look for the unauthorized creation of new
      accounts, accounts with no passwords, or UID changes (especially UID 0)
      to existing accounts.

   8. Check your system and network configuration files for unauthorized
      entries. In particular, look for '+' (plus sign) entries and
      inappropriate non-local host names in /etc/hosts.equiv, /etc/hosts.lpd,
      and in all .rhosts files (especially root, uucp, ftp, and other system
      accounts) on the system. These files should not be world-writable.
      Furthermore, confirm that these files existed prior to any intrusion and
      were not created by the intruder.

   9. Look everywhere on the system for unusual or hidden files (files that
      start with a period and are normally not shown by 'ls'), as these can
      be used to hide tools and information (password cracking programs,
      password files from other systems, etc.). A common technique on UNIX
      systems is to put a hidden directory in a user's account with an unusual
      name, something like '...' or '.. ' (dot dot space) or '..^G' (dot dot
      control-G). Again, the find(1) program can be used to look for hidden
      files, for example:

        find / -name ".. " -print -xdev

        find / -name ".*" -print -xdev | cat -v

      Also, files with names such as '.xx' and '.mail' have been used
      (that is, files that might appear to be normal).

  10. Examine all machines on the local network when searching for signs of
      intrusion. Most of the time, if one host has been compromised, others
      on the network have been, too. This is especially true for networks
      where NIS is running or where hosts trust each other through the use
      of .rhosts files and/or /etc/hosts.equiv files. Also, check hosts for
      which your users share .rhosts access.


B. Review Other CERT Documents

   1. For further information about the types of attack that have recently
      been reported to the CERT Coordination Center and for a list of new
      or updated files that are available for anonymous FTP, see our past
      CERT Summaries, available in the directory

        ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_summaries/

   2. If you suspect that your system has been compromised, please review the
      suggested steps in "Steps for Recovering from a UNIX Root Compromise,"
      available from

        ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/root_compromise

      Also review other appropriate files in our tech_tips directory.

   3. To report a computer security incident to the CERT Coordination
      Center, please complete and return a copy of our Incident Reporting Form,
      available from

        ftp://info.cert.org/pub/incident_reporting_form

      The information on the form helps us provide the best assistance, as
      it enables us to understand the scope of the incident, to determine
      if your incident may be related to any other incidents that have been
      reported to us, and to identify trends in intruder activities.

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Copyright 1996 Carnegie Mellon University. Conditions for use, disclaimers,
and sponsorship information can be found in
http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff.html and ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/legal_stuff .
If you do not have FTP or web access, send mail to cert@cert.org with
"copyright" in the subject line.

CERT is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.


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