Visit our newest sister site!
Hundreds of free aircraft flight manuals
Civilian • Historical • Military • Declassified • FREE!

TUCoPS :: Unix :: General :: ciack007.txt

Multiple Vulnerabilities bind


                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                    Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

                        Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND

November 16, 1999 17:00 GMT                                       Number K-007
PROBLEM:       Six vulnerabilities have been identified in BIND, the popular 
               domain name server from the Internet Software Consortium (ISC). 
               The bugs are in 1) nxt, 2) sig, 3) so_linger, 4) fdmax, 5) 
               maxdname, and 6) naptr. 
PLATFORM:      BIND is distributed with many operating systems. 
DAMAGE:        Exploits of these vulnerabilities could cause systems to crash 
               or in the worst case, could allow an intruder to gain root 
SOLUTION:      Apply vendor patches or update to the latest version of BIND. 
VULNERABILITY  Risk is high. These vulnerabilities are being discussed on 
ASSESSMENT:    Usenet newsgroups. 

[  Start CERT Advisory  ]

CERT Advisory CA-99-14 Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND

   Original release date: November 10, 1999
   Last revised: --
   Source: CERT/CC
   A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
Systems Affected

     * Systems running various versions of BIND
I. Description

   Six vulnerabilities have been found in BIND, the popular domain name
   server from the Internet Software Consortium (ISC). One of these
   vulnerabilities may allow remote intruders to gain privileged access
   to name servers.
Vulnerability #1: the "nxt bug"

   Some versions of BIND fail to properly validate NXT records. This
   improper validation could allow an intruder to overflow a buffer and
   execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the name server.
   NXT record support was introduced in BIND version 8.2. Prior versions
   of BIND, including 4.x, are not vulnerable to this problem. The
   ISC-supplied version of BIND corrected this problem in version 8.2.2.
Vulnerability #2: the "sig bug"

   This vulnerability involves a failure to properly validate SIG
   records, allowing a remote intruder to crash named; see the impact
   section for additional details.
   SIG record support is found in multiple versions of BIND, including
   4.9.5 through 8.x.
Vulnerability #3: the "so_linger bug"

   By intentionally violating the expected protocols for closing a TCP
   session, remote intruders can cause named to pause for periods up to
   120 seconds.
Vulnerability #4: the "fdmax bug"

   Remote intruders can consume more file descriptors than BIND can
   properly manage, causing named to crash.
Vulnerability #5: the "maxdname bug"

   Improper handling of certain data copied from the network could allow
   a remote intruder to disrupt the normal operation of your name server,
   possibly including a crash.
Vulnerability #6: the "naptr bug"

   Some versions of BIND fail to validate zone information loaded from
   disk files. In environments with unusual combinations of permissions
   and protections, this could allow an intruder to crash named.
Other recent BIND-related vulnerabilities

   AusCERT recently published a report describing denial-of-service
   attacks against name servers. These attacks are unrelated to the
   issues described in this advisory. For information on the
   denial-of-service attacks described by AusCERT, please see AusCERT
   Alert AL-1999.004 available at:
II. Impact

Vulnerability #1

   By exploiting this vulnerability, remote intruders can execute
   arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running named,
   typically root.
Vulnerabilities #2, #4, and #5

   By exploiting these vulnerabilities, remote intruders can disrupt the
   normal operation of your name server, possibly causing a crash.
Vulnerability #3

   By periodically exercising this vulnerability, remote intruders can
   disrupt the ability of your name server to respond to legitimate
   queries. By intermittently exercising this vulnerability, intruders
   can seriously degrade the performance of your name server.
Vulnerability #6

   Local intruders who gain write access to your zone files can cause
   named to crash.
III. Solution

Apply a patch from your vendor or update to a later version of BIND

   Many operating system vendors distribute BIND with their operating
   system. Depending on your support procedures, arrangements, and
   contracts, you may wish to obtain BIND from your operating system
   vendor rather than directly from ISC.
   Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory.
   We will update the appendix as we receive more information. If you do
   not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor.
   Please contact your vendor directly.
Appendix A. Vendor Information

Vendor Name


        db1dda05dbe0f67c2bd2e5049096b42c  RPMS/bind-8.2.2p3-1.i386.rpm
        82bbe025ac091831904c71c885071db1  RPMS/bind-doc-8.2.2p3-1.i386.rpm
        2f9a30444046af551eafd8e6238a50c6  RPMS/bind-utils-8.2.2p3-1.i386.rpm
        0e4f041549bdd798cb505c82a8911198  SRPMS/bind-8.2.2p3-1.src.rpm

Compaq Computer Corporation

   At the time of writing this document, Compaq is currently
   investigating the potential impact to Compaq's BIND release(s).
   As further information becomes available Compaq will provide notice of
   the completion/availability of any necessary patches through AES
   services (DIA, DSNlink FLASH and posted to the Services WEB page) and
   be available from your normal Compaq Services Support channel.
Data General

   We are investigating. We will provide an update when our investigation
   is complete.
Hewlett-Packard Company

   HP is vulnerable, see the chart in the ISC advisory for details on
   your installed version of BIND. Our fix strategy is under
   investigation, watch for updates to this CERT advisory in the CERT
   archives, or an HP security advisory/bulletin.
IBM Corporation

   The bind8 shipped with AIX 4.3.x is vulnerable. We are currently
   working on the following APARs which will be available soon:
   APAR 4.3.x: IY05851
   To Order
   APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via FixDist)
   or from the IBM Support Center. For more information on FixDist,
   reference URL:
   or send e-mail to with a subject of "FixDist".
   IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business
   Machines Corporation.
The Internet Software Consortium

   ISC has published an advisory regarding these problems, available at
   The ISC advisory also includes a table summarizing which versions of
   BIND are susceptible to the vulnerabilities described in this

   As far as we know, we don't ship with any of those vulnerabilities.
Santa Cruz Operation, Inc

   Security patches for the following SCO products will be made available
   OpenServer 5.x.x, UnixWare 7.x.x, UnixWare 2.x.x
Sun Microsystems

   Vulnerability #1
   Solaris 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.5.1, 2.6, and 7 are not vulnerable.
   Vulnerability #2
   Solaris 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.5.1, 2.6, and 7 are not vulnerable.
   Vulnerability #3
   Solaris 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.5.1, and 2.6 are not vulnerable.
          Sun will be producing patches for Solaris 7.
   Vulnerability #4
   Solaris 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.5.1, and 2.6 are not vulnerable.
          Solaris 7 is probably not vulnerable. We are still
   Vulnerability #5
   Solaris 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.5.1, and 2.6 are not vulnerable.
          Sun will be producing patches for Solaris 7.
   Vulnerability #6
   Solaris 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.5.1, and 2.6 are not vulnerable.
          Sun will be producing patches for Solaris 7.
   The CERT Coordination Center would like to thank David Conrad, Paul
   Vixie and Bob Halley of the Internet Software Consortium for notifying
   us of these problems and for their help in constructing the advisory,
   and Olaf Kirch of Caldera for notifying us of some of these problems
   and providing technical assistance and advice.
   This document is available from:

[  End CERT Advisory  ]


CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of CERT for the information 
contained in this bulletin.

CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.

CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
    Voice:    +1 925-422-8193
    FAX:      +1 925-423-8002
    STU-III:  +1 925-423-2604

For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), use one of the following methods to contact CIAC:

    1.  Call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message, or

    2.  Call 888-449-8369 to send a Sky Page to the CIAC duty person or

    3.  Send e-mail to, or

    4.  Call 800-201-9288 for the CIAC Project Leader.

Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.

   World Wide Web:
                        (or -- they're the same machine)
   Anonymous FTP:
                        (or -- they're the same machine)
   Modem access:        +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
                        +1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)

CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical
   information and Bulletins, important computer security information;
2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector
   (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and
3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the
   use of SPI products.

Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To
subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the
following request as the E-mail message body, substituting
ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name:

E-mail to or
        subscribe list-name 
  e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin 

You will receive an acknowledgment E-mail immediately with a confirmation
that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the
instructions in the E-mail.  This is a partial protection to make sure
you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question.

If you include the word 'help' in the body of an E-mail to the above address,
it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe,
get past issues of CIAC bulletins via E-mail, etc.

PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins.  If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.

LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC)

J-069: SunOS LC MESSAGES Environment Variable Vulnerability
J-070: Microsoft Windows 95 and 98 Telnet Client Vulnerability
J-071: Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in amd
J-072: IBM AIX Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
K-001: Four Vulnerabilities in the Common Desktop Environment
K-002: Microsoft IE 5 Vulnerability - "download behavior"
K-003: Windows NT 4.0 does not delete Unattended Installation File
K-004: Microsoft "Excel SYLK" Vulnerability
K-005: Microsoft "Virtual Machine Verifier" Vulnerability
K-006: Microsoft - Improve TCP Initial Sequence Number Randomness

TUCoPS is optimized to look best in Firefox® on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2014 AOH