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TUCoPS :: Unix :: General :: cert0149.txt

CERT Advisory CA-97.17 sperl





-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

=============================================================================
CERT* Advisory CA-97.17
Original issue date: May 29, 1997
Last revised: June 9, 1997
              Appendix A - added information from Sun Microsystems, Inc.

              A complete revision history is at the end of this file.

Topic: Vulnerability in suidperl (sperl)
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of a buffer overflow
condition in suidperl built from Perl 4.n and Perl 5.n distributions on UNIX
systems. By calling this program with appropriately crafted parameters,
unauthorized local users can execute arbitrary commands as root. This
vulnerability is being actively exploited.

The CERT/CC team recommends installing a vendor patch if one is available (see
Section III.B). Until you can do so, we recommend disabling suidperl (Section
III.A). Two other alternatives are to install suidperl or sperl from version
5.003 source code along with the patch provided in Appendix B of this
advisory (see also Section III.C), or upgrade to Perl version 5.004 (Section
III.D). Note that Perl4 is no longer supported.

We will update this advisory as we receive additional information.
Please check our advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site.

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

I.   Description

     On some systems, setuid and setgid scripts (scripts written in the C
     shell, Bourne shell, or Perl, for example, with the set user or group ID
     permissions enabled) are insecure due to a race condition in the
     kernel. For those systems, Perl versions 4 and 5 attempt to work around
     this vulnerability with a special program named suidperl, also known as
     sperl. This program attempts to emulate the set-user-ID and set-group-ID
     features of the kernel.

     There is a buffer overflow condition in suidperl built from Perl 4.n and
     Perl 5.n distributions earlier than version 5.004. If this program is
     called with appropriately crafted parameters, an attacker can execute
     arbitrary commands as root. This vulnerability is being actively
     exploited.

II.  Impact

     Users executing Perl scripts with the setuid bit set can execute
     arbitrary commands with the effective uid of the owner of the Perl
     script. Attackers can execute commands as root.


III. Solution

     Use the command in Section A to help you determine if your system is
     vulnerable and, if it is, to (optionally) disable the suidperl and sperl
     programs (see Section A). If you find that your system is vulnerable,
     replace the suidperl and sperl programs with new versions.

     Section B describes how to do that if your site uses versions of suidperl
     and sperl that are provided as part of a vendor-supplied distribution.
     Sites that installed suidperl and sperl programs themselves from the Perl
     source distribution should patch the distribution as described in Section
     C or upgrade to version 5.004 as described in Section D. Note that Perl4
     is no longer supported.

     A. Determine if your system is vulnerable and disable vulnerable programs

        To determine if a system is vulnerable to this problem and to disable
        the programs that are believed to be vulnerable, use the following
        find command or a variant. Consult your local system documentation to
        determine how to tailor the find program on your system.

        After you have run this command on all your systems, they will no
        longer be vulnerable. Note that after disabling the suidperl and sperl
        programs, they will no longer be able to emulate the set-user-ID and
        set-group-ID features of the kernel.

        You will need to run the find command on each system you maintain
        because the command examines files on the local disk only. Substitute
        the names of your local file systems for FILE_SYSTEM_NAMES in the
        example. Example local file system names are /, /usr, and /var.
        You must do this as root.

        Note that this is one long command, though we have separated
        it onto five lines using back-slashes.

             find FILE_SYSTEM_NAMES -xdev -type f -user root \
                    \( -name 'sperl4.[0-9][0-9][0-9]' \
                    -o -name 'sperl5.00[0-3]' \
                    -o -name 'suidperl' \) \
                    -perm -04000 -print -ok chmod ug-s '{}' \;

        This command will find all files on a system that are
            - only in the file system you name (FILE_SYSTEM_NAMES -xdev)
            - regular files (-type f)
            - owned by root (-user root)
            - named appropriately (-name 'sperl4.[0-9][0-9][0-9]'
                                    -o -name 'sperl5.00[0-3]'
                                    -o -name 'suidperl')
            - setuid root (-perm -04000)

        Once found, those files will
            - have their names printed (-print)
            - have their modes changed, but only if you type `y'
              in response to the prompt (-ok chown ug-s '{}' \;)


     B. Obtain and install the appropriate patch from your vendor

        If your vendor ships suidperl or sperl, you may be vulnerable and need
        a patch. Appendix A contains information provided by the following
        vendors. If your vendor is not on this list, please contact the vendor
        directly.

                Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI)
                Cray Research - A Silicon Graphics Company
                Data General Corporation
                Hewlett-Packard Company
                IBM Corporation
                Linux
                The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. (SCO)
                Silicon Graphics, Inc. (SGI)

        Until you can install a patch, we recommend disabling suidperl.
        The find command above will help you do that. If you need
        suidperl or sperl, see the alternatives in Sections C and D below.


     C. Install suidperl or sperl from 5.003 source code and apply a patch.
        Follow the instructions below, which were provided by Chip Salzenberg.

        If you would like to keep using setuid Perl scripts, fix Perl
        yourself by following these steps:

        1. Go to your Perl 5.003 source directory, or else obtain a fresh
           Perl 5.003 distribution from

              http://www.perl.com/CPAN/src/5.0/perl5.003.tar.gz

           or another CPAN archive accessible to you.

           This file is approximately 1.5 megabytes in size.

        2. Using the "patch" program, apply the patch that is enclosed
           below in Appendix B.

        3. Build and install the patched Perl 5.003. (If you have never
           built Perl before, be sure to read the "INSTALL" file first.)

        Perl 5.003 binaries that have had this patch applied, and therefore
        are safe from all known attacks, can be identified by the
        output of the "perl -v" command: the "locally applied patches" list
        will include "SUIDBUF - Buffer overflow fixes for suidperl
        security".


     D. Install suidperl or sperl from 5.004 source code (no patch needed).

        If you would like to upgrade to Perl version 5.004, follow these
        steps:

        1. Obtain a fresh Perl 5.004 distribution from

              http://www.perl.com/CPAN/src/5.0/perl5.004.tar.gz

           or another CPAN archive accessible to you.

           This file is approximately 2.5 megabytes in size.

        2. Build and install Perl 5.004 according to the instructions
           given in the "INSTALL" file. Do NOT apply the patch.

           Perl 5.004 binaries, which are safe from all known attacks, can be
           identified by the output of the "perl -v" command: it should say
           "This is perl, version 5.004". (Unlike the 5.003 patch mentioned
           in Section C, the "locally applied patches" list will NOT include
           "SUIDBUF - Buffer overflow fixes for suidperl security". The fact
           that it is version 5.004 is sufficient in this case.)


...........................................................................

Appendix A - Vendor Information

Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information for this
advisory. We will update this appendix as we receive additional information.
If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that
vendor. Please contact the vendor directly.


Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI)
=====================================
  BSD/OS is vulnerable to the suidperl (sperl) buffer overflow problem. We
  will be releasing a patch for BSDI 3.0 and perl 5.003 and are currently
  working on patches for BSD/OS 3.0 and Perl 4.036. We will also be developing
  patches for the perl versions shipped with BSD/OS 2.1.


Cray Research - A Silicon Graphics Company
==========================================
  Cray Research does not ship perl as part of either Unicos or Unicos/mk.


Data General Corporation
========================
  The only perl executables that are shipped with DG/UX are:

  /bin/perl

  and

  /bin/perl5 /* in R420 */

  These are not set uid programs.

  Therefore,
  No versions of DG/UX are vulnerable to this problem.


Hewlett-Packard Company
=======================
  HP does not ship this product.


IBM Corporation
===============
  AIX versions do not have Perl as part of the standard product.
  However, the SP2's PSSP software does contain suidperl, but the
  program is not installed with the setuid bit set.

  IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business Machines
  Corporation.


Linux
=====
  Red Hat 4.2 is not vulnerable
  Red Hat 4.1/4.0 you can get the upgraded RPM from ftp.redhat.com

  If you wish to check whether you have the fixed perl run perl -v and
  check for

        Locally applied patches:
          SUIDBUF - Buffer overflow fixes for suidperl security


The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. (SCO)
====================================
  suidperl is not included in any SCO products.

  SCO CMW+ and SCO OpenServer do not have kernel support for setuid
  scripts, but you may have installed suidperl in order to emulate
  that functionality - in that case you should replace your version of
  perl with version 5.004, or patch your source code as noted in this
  advisory.

  SCO UnixWare does have safe kernel support for setuid scripts so
  that suidperl is not necessary.  If you have installed a version
  of perl that includes suidperl, you should remove suidperl and
  install a version of perl built so as not to require it.


Silicon Graphics, Inc. (SGI)
=============================
  At this time, Silicon Graphics does not have any public information for
  this suidperl/sperl issue.  Silicon Graphics has communicated with
  CERT and other external security parties and is actively investigating
  this issue.   When more Silicon Graphics information (including any
  possible patches) is available for release, that information will
  be released via the SGI security mailing list, wiretap.

  For subscribing to the wiretap mailing list and other SGI security
  related information, please refer to the Silicon Graphics Security
  Headquarters website located at:

        http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html


Sun Microsystems, Inc.
======================
Sun does not ship this product.

...........................................................................

Appendix B - Source Code Patch Information

The following patch information has been supplied by Chip Salzenberg. If you
built suidperl or sperl from 5.003 source code, we encouraged you to apply
this patch (see the explanation in Section III.C above).


Patch follows.

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------

Index: patchlevel.h
***************
*** 41,42 ****
- --- 41,43 ----
+       ,"SUIDBUF - Buffer overflow fixes for suidperl security"
        ,NULL
  };

Index: perl.c
*************** char *s;
*** 1212,1216 ****
  #  endif
  #endif
!       fputs("\n\t+ suidperl security patch", stdout);
        fputs("\n\nCopyright 1987-1996, Larry Wall\n",stdout);
  #ifdef MSDOS
- --- 1212,1216 ----
  #  endif
  #endif
!       fputs("\n\t+ two suidperl security patches", stdout);
        fputs("\n\nCopyright 1987-1996, Larry Wall\n",stdout);
  #ifdef MSDOS

Index: gv.c
*************** gv_fetchfile(name)
*** 59,67 ****
  char *name;
  {
!     char tmpbuf[1200];
      GV *gv;

!     sprintf(tmpbuf,"::_<%s", name);
      gv = gv_fetchpv(tmpbuf, TRUE, SVt_PVGV);
      sv_setpv(GvSV(gv), name);
      if (*name == '/' && (instr(name,"/lib/") || instr(name,".pm")))
- --- 59,80 ----
  char *name;
  {
!     char smallbuf[256];
!     char *tmpbuf;
!     STRLEN tmplen;
      GV *gv;

!     tmplen = strlen(name) + 4;
!     if (tmplen < sizeof smallbuf)
!       tmpbuf = smallbuf;
!     else
!       New(603, tmpbuf, tmplen + 1, char);
!     tmpbuf[0] = ':';
!     tmpbuf[1] = ':';
!     tmpbuf[2] = '_';
!     tmpbuf[3] = '<';
!     strcpy(tmpbuf + 4, name);
      gv = gv_fetchpv(tmpbuf, TRUE, SVt_PVGV);
+     if (tmpbuf != smallbuf)
+       Safefree(tmpbuf);
      sv_setpv(GvSV(gv), name);
      if (*name == '/' && (instr(name,"/lib/") || instr(name,".pm")))

Index: toke.c
*************** static char *scan_const _((char *start))
*** 22,26 ****
  static char *scan_formline _((char *s));
  static char *scan_heredoc _((char *s));
! static char *scan_ident _((char *s, char *send, char *dest, I32 ck_uni));
  static char *scan_inputsymbol _((char *start));
  static char *scan_pat _((char *start));
- --- 22,27 ----
  static char *scan_formline _((char *s));
  static char *scan_heredoc _((char *s));
! static char *scan_ident _((char *s, char *send, char *dest, STRLEN destlen,
!                          I32 ck_uni));
  static char *scan_inputsymbol _((char *start));
  static char *scan_pat _((char *start));
*************** static char *scan_str _((char *start));
*** 28,32 ****
  static char *scan_subst _((char *start));
  static char *scan_trans _((char *start));
! static char *scan_word _((char *s, char *dest, int allow_package, STRLEN *slp));
  static char *skipspace _((char *s));
  static void checkcomma _((char *s, char *name, char *what));
- --- 29,34 ----
  static char *scan_subst _((char *start));
  static char *scan_trans _((char *start));
! static char *scan_word _((char *s, char *dest, STRLEN destlen,
!                         int allow_package, STRLEN *slp));
  static char *skipspace _((char *s));
  static void checkcomma _((char *s, char *name, char *what));
*************** static char * filter_gets _((SV *sv, FIL
*** 47,50 ****
- --- 49,54 ----
  static void restore_rsfp _((void *f));

+ static char too_long[] = "Identifier too long";
+
  /* The following are arranged oddly so that the guard on the switch statement
   * can get by with a single comparison (if the compiler is smart enough).
*************** int allow_tick;
*** 475,479 ****
        (allow_tick && *s == '\'') )
      {
!       s = scan_word(s, tokenbuf, allow_pack, &len);
        if (check_keyword && keyword(tokenbuf, len))
            return start;
- --- 479,483 ----
        (allow_tick && *s == '\'') )
      {
!       s = scan_word(s, tokenbuf, sizeof tokenbuf, allow_pack, &len);
        if (check_keyword && keyword(tokenbuf, len))
            return start;
*************** register char *s;
*** 847,851 ****
        unsigned char un_char = 0, last_un_char;
        char *send = strchr(s,']');
!       char tmpbuf[512];

        if (!send)              /* has to be an expression */
- --- 851,855 ----
        unsigned char un_char = 0, last_un_char;
        char *send = strchr(s,']');
!       char tmpbuf[sizeof tokenbuf * 4];

        if (!send)              /* has to be an expression */
*************** register char *s;
*** 872,876 ****
                weight -= seen[un_char] * 10;
                if (isALNUM(s[1])) {
!                   scan_ident(s,send,tmpbuf,FALSE);
                    if ((int)strlen(tmpbuf) > 1 && gv_fetchpv(tmpbuf,FALSE, SVt_PV))
                        weight -= 100;
- --- 876,880 ----
                weight -= seen[un_char] * 10;
                if (isALNUM(s[1])) {
!                   scan_ident(s, send, tmpbuf, sizeof tmpbuf, FALSE);
                    if ((int)strlen(tmpbuf) > 1 && gv_fetchpv(tmpbuf,FALSE, SVt_PV))
                        weight -= 100;
*************** GV *gv;
*** 942,946 ****
  {
      char *s = start + (*start == '$');
!     char tmpbuf[1024];
      STRLEN len;
      GV* indirgv;
- --- 946,950 ----
  {
      char *s = start + (*start == '$');
!     char tmpbuf[sizeof tokenbuf];
      STRLEN len;
      GV* indirgv;
*************** GV *gv;
*** 952,956 ****
            gv = 0;
      }
!     s = scan_word(s, tmpbuf, TRUE, &len);
      if (*start == '$') {
        if (gv || last_lop_op == OP_PRINT || isUPPER(*tokenbuf))
- --- 956,960 ----
            gv = 0;
      }
!     s = scan_word(s, tmpbuf, sizeof tmpbuf, TRUE, &len);
      if (*start == '$') {
        if (gv || last_lop_op == OP_PRINT || isUPPER(*tokenbuf))
*************** yylex()
*** 1629,1633 ****
      case '*':
        if (expect != XOPERATOR) {
!           s = scan_ident(s, bufend, tokenbuf, TRUE);
            expect = XOPERATOR;
            force_ident(tokenbuf, '*');
- --- 1633,1637 ----
      case '*':
        if (expect != XOPERATOR) {
!           s = scan_ident(s, bufend, tokenbuf, sizeof tokenbuf, TRUE);
            expect = XOPERATOR;
            force_ident(tokenbuf, '*');
*************** yylex()
*** 1645,1649 ****
      case '%':
        if (expect != XOPERATOR) {
!           s = scan_ident(s, bufend, tokenbuf + 1, TRUE);
            if (tokenbuf[1]) {
                expect = XOPERATOR;
- --- 1649,1653 ----
      case '%':
        if (expect != XOPERATOR) {
!           s = scan_ident(s, bufend, tokenbuf + 1, sizeof tokenbuf - 1, TRUE);
            if (tokenbuf[1]) {
                expect = XOPERATOR;
*************** yylex()
*** 1748,1752 ****
                s++;
            if (s < bufend && isALPHA(*s)) {
!               d = scan_word(s, tokenbuf, FALSE, &len);
                while (d < bufend && (*d == ' ' || *d == '\t'))
                    d++;
- --- 1752,1756 ----
                s++;
            if (s < bufend && isALPHA(*s)) {
!               d = scan_word(s, tokenbuf, sizeof tokenbuf, FALSE, &len);
                while (d < bufend && (*d == ' ' || *d == '\t'))
                    d++;
*************** yylex()
*** 1847,1851 ****
        }

!       s = scan_ident(s-1, bufend, tokenbuf, TRUE);
        if (*tokenbuf) {
            expect = XOPERATOR;
- --- 1851,1855 ----
        }

!       s = scan_ident(s - 1, bufend, tokenbuf, sizeof tokenbuf, TRUE);
        if (*tokenbuf) {
            expect = XOPERATOR;
*************** yylex()
*** 1956,1960 ****
      case '$':
        if (s[1] == '#'  && (isALPHA(s[2]) || strchr("_{$:", s[2]))) {
!           s = scan_ident(s+1, bufend, tokenbuf+1, FALSE);
            if (expect == XOPERATOR) {
                if (lex_formbrack && lex_brackets == lex_formbrack) {
- --- 1960,1965 ----
      case '$':
        if (s[1] == '#'  && (isALPHA(s[2]) || strchr("_{$:", s[2]))) {
!           s = scan_ident(s + 1, bufend, tokenbuf + 1, sizeof tokenbuf - 1,
!                          FALSE);
            if (expect == XOPERATOR) {
                if (lex_formbrack && lex_brackets == lex_formbrack) {
*************** yylex()
*** 1982,1986 ****
            TOKEN(DOLSHARP);
        }
!       s = scan_ident(s, bufend, tokenbuf+1, FALSE);
        if (expect == XOPERATOR) {
            if (lex_formbrack && lex_brackets == lex_formbrack) {
- --- 1987,1991 ----
            TOKEN(DOLSHARP);
        }
!       s = scan_ident(s, bufend, tokenbuf + 1, sizeof tokenbuf - 1, FALSE);
        if (expect == XOPERATOR) {
            if (lex_formbrack && lex_brackets == lex_formbrack) {
*************** yylex()
*** 2016,2024 ****
                if (*s == '{' && strEQ(tokenbuf, "$SIG") &&
                  (t = strchr(s,'}')) && (t = strchr(t,'='))) {
!                   char tmpbuf[1024];
                    STRLEN len;
                    for (t++; isSPACE(*t); t++) ;
                    if (isIDFIRST(*t)) {
!                       t = scan_word(t, tmpbuf, TRUE, &len);
                        if (*t != '(' && perl_get_cv(tmpbuf, FALSE))
                            warn("You need to quote \"%s\"", tmpbuf);
- --- 2021,2029 ----
                if (*s == '{' && strEQ(tokenbuf, "$SIG") &&
                  (t = strchr(s,'}')) && (t = strchr(t,'='))) {
!                   char tmpbuf[sizeof tokenbuf];
                    STRLEN len;
                    for (t++; isSPACE(*t); t++) ;
                    if (isIDFIRST(*t)) {
!                       t = scan_word(t, tmpbuf, sizeof tmpbuf, TRUE, &len);
                        if (*t != '(' && perl_get_cv(tmpbuf, FALSE))
                            warn("You need to quote \"%s\"", tmpbuf);
*************** yylex()
*** 2093,2097 ****

      case '@':
!       s = scan_ident(s, bufend, tokenbuf+1, FALSE);
        if (expect == XOPERATOR)
            no_op("Array",s);
- --- 2098,2102 ----

      case '@':
!       s = scan_ident(s, bufend, tokenbuf + 1, sizeof tokenbuf - 1, FALSE);
        if (expect == XOPERATOR)
            no_op("Array",s);
*************** yylex()
*** 2129,2133 ****
                        : !GvHV(gv) )))
            {
!               char tmpbuf[1024];
                sprintf(tmpbuf, "Literal @%s now requires backslash",tokenbuf+1);
                yyerror(tmpbuf);
- --- 2134,2138 ----
                        : !GvHV(gv) )))
            {
!               char tmpbuf[sizeof tokenbuf + 40];
                sprintf(tmpbuf, "Literal @%s now requires backslash",tokenbuf+1);
                yyerror(tmpbuf);
*************** yylex()
*** 2293,2297 ****
        keylookup:
        bufptr = s;
!       s = scan_word(s, tokenbuf, FALSE, &len);
        
        if (*s == ':' && s[1] == ':' && strNE(tokenbuf, "CORE"))
- --- 2298,2302 ----
        keylookup:
        bufptr = s;
!       s = scan_word(s, tokenbuf, sizeof tokenbuf, FALSE, &len);
        
        if (*s == ':' && s[1] == ':' && strNE(tokenbuf, "CORE"))
*************** yylex()
*** 2338,2342 ****

                if (*s == '\'' || *s == ':' && s[1] == ':') {
!                   s = scan_word(s, tokenbuf + len, TRUE, &len);
                    if (!len)
                        croak("Bad name after %s::", tokenbuf);
- --- 2343,2348 ----

                if (*s == '\'' || *s == ':' && s[1] == ':') {
!                   s = scan_word(s, tokenbuf + len, sizeof tokenbuf - len,
!                                 TRUE, &len);
                    if (!len)
                        croak("Bad name after %s::", tokenbuf);
*************** yylex()
*** 2557,2561 ****
                s += 2;
                d = s;
!               s = scan_word(s, tokenbuf, FALSE, &len);
                tmp = keyword(tokenbuf, len);
                if (tmp < 0)
- --- 2563,2567 ----
                s += 2;
                d = s;
!               s = scan_word(s, tokenbuf, sizeof tokenbuf, FALSE, &len);
                tmp = keyword(tokenbuf, len);
                if (tmp < 0)
*************** yylex()
*** 3244,3250 ****

            if (isIDFIRST(*s) || *s == '\'' || *s == ':') {
!               char tmpbuf[128];
                expect = XBLOCK;
!               d = scan_word(s, tmpbuf, TRUE, &len);
                if (strchr(tmpbuf, ':'))
                    sv_setpv(subname, tmpbuf);
- --- 3250,3256 ----

            if (isIDFIRST(*s) || *s == '\'' || *s == ':') {
!               char tmpbuf[sizeof tokenbuf];
                expect = XBLOCK;
!               d = scan_word(s, tmpbuf, sizeof tmpbuf, TRUE, &len);
                if (strchr(tmpbuf, ':'))
                    sv_setpv(subname, tmpbuf);
*************** char *what;
*** 4091,4102 ****

  static char *
! scan_word(s, dest, allow_package, slp)
  register char *s;
  char *dest;
  int allow_package;
  STRLEN *slp;
  {
      register char *d = dest;
      for (;;) {
        if (isALNUM(*s))
            *d++ = *s++;
- --- 4097,4112 ----

  static char *
! scan_word(s, dest, destlen, allow_package, slp)
  register char *s;
  char *dest;
+ STRLEN destlen;
  int allow_package;
  STRLEN *slp;
  {
      register char *d = dest;
+     register char *e = d + destlen - 3;  /* two-character token, ending NUL */
      for (;;) {
+       if (d >= e)
+           croak(too_long);
        if (isALNUM(*s))
            *d++ = *s++;
*************** STRLEN *slp;
*** 4119,4129 ****

  static char *
! scan_ident(s,send,dest,ck_uni)
  register char *s;
  register char *send;
  char *dest;
  I32 ck_uni;
  {
      register char *d;
      char *bracket = 0;
      char funny = *s++;
- --- 4129,4141 ----

  static char *
! scan_ident(s, send, dest, destlen, ck_uni)
  register char *s;
  register char *send;
  char *dest;
+ STRLEN destlen;
  I32 ck_uni;
  {
      register char *d;
+     register char *e;
      char *bracket = 0;
      char funny = *s++;
*************** I32 ck_uni;
*** 4134,4143 ****
        s = skipspace(s);
      d = dest;
      if (isDIGIT(*s)) {
!       while (isDIGIT(*s))
            *d++ = *s++;
      }
      else {
        for (;;) {
            if (isALNUM(*s))
                *d++ = *s++;
- --- 4146,4161 ----
        s = skipspace(s);
      d = dest;
+     e = d + destlen - 3;      /* two-character token, ending NUL */
      if (isDIGIT(*s)) {
!       while (isDIGIT(*s)) {
!           if (d >= e)
!               croak(too_long);
            *d++ = *s++;
+       }
      }
      else {
        for (;;) {
+           if (d >= e)
+               croak(too_long);
            if (isALNUM(*s))
                *d++ = *s++;

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------

End of patch.

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

The CERT Coordination Center staff thanks Chip Salzenberg for supplying a fix,
Larry Wall for tweaking the fix, and Warner Losh for his work on patches.

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams (see http://www.first.org/team-info/)


CERT/CC Contact Information
- ----------------------------
Email    cert@cert.org

Phone    +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
                CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
                and are on call for emergencies during other hours.

Fax      +1 412-268-6989

Postal address
         CERT Coordination Center
         Software Engineering Institute
         Carnegie Mellon University
         Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
         USA

Using encryption
   We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. We can
   support a shared DES key or PGP. Contact the CERT/CC for more information.
   Location of CERT PGP key
         ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key

Getting security information
   CERT publications and other security information are available from
        http://www.cert.org/
        ftp://info.cert.org/pub/

   CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup
        comp.security.announce

   To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send
   email to
        cert-advisory-request@cert.org
   In the subject line, type
        SUBSCRIBE  your-email-address

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Registered U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.

Copyright 1997 Carnegie Mellon University
This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided
it is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is
included.

The CERT Coordination Center is part of the Software Engineering Institute
(SEI). The SEI is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense.
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This file: ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-97.17.sperl
           http://www.cert.org
               click on "CERT Advisories"


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Revision history

June 9, 1997  Appendix A - added information from Sun Microsystems, Inc.

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