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TUCoPS :: Unix :: General :: cert0109.txt

CERT Advisory CA-96.04 corrupt info from servers





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=============================================================================
CERT(sm) Advisory CA-96.04
Original issue date: February 22, 1996
Last revised:  June 4, 1997
               Updated the URL pointing to the current version of BIND.

               A complete revision history is at the end of this file.

Topic: Corrupt Information from Network Servers
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of intruders exploiting
systems by corrupting data provided by a Domain Name Service (DNS) server.
Although these reports have focused only on DNS, this vulnerability could
apply to any network service from which data is received and subsequently
used.

Section III.A contains a pointer to two subroutines that address the DNS
problem. These subroutines, written in the C programming language, can be used
to validate host names and IP addresses according to RFCs 952 and 1123, as
well as names containing characters drawn from common practice, namely "_" and
"/".

In the specific case of sendmail, the problem has already been addressed by
patches (see Section III.B).

The CERT staff has received information that the next minor release of BIND
nameserver will be enforcing RFC952 (as modified by RFC1123) hostname
conformance as part of its SECURITY measures. Following The BIND release,
hostnames that fail to conform to these rules will be unreachable from
sites running these servers.

Hostnames (A records) are restricted to the following characters only:

            "A" - "Z", "a" - "z", "0" - "9", "." and "-"

These characters are specifically excluded:  "_" and "/".

For a full description of what is allowed in a hostname, please
refer to RFC952 and RFC1123, available from http://ds.internic.net/ds/

        RFC952: DOD INTERNET HOST TABLE SPECIFICATION, October 1985
        RFC1123: Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Application and
                        Support, October 1989

The latest release of Bind is available from:

        ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind/src/

Please see the README file in that directory for more information.

This information is also included in the latest software versions
directory:

         ftp://info.cert.org/pub/latest_sw_versions/bind

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

I.   Description

     Information provided by an information server may be of a form that
     could cause programs to operate in unexpected ways. The subroutines and
     programs transferring data from that information server could check the
     data for correctness of form; however, programs that *use* that data are
     ultimately responsible for ensuring adherence to the documents that
     define the correct form.

     For example, consider a program that uses the host name returned by
     gethostbyname() as part of the string given to the popen() or system()
     subroutines. Because gethostbyname() may use an information server
     beyond your control, the data returned could be of a form that causes
     the popen() or system() subroutines to execute other commands besides
     the command specified by that program.

     This advisory speaks to a specific instance of a problem caused by the
     information returned by DNS, but information from any server should be
     checked for validity. Examples of other information servers are YP, NIS,
     NIS+, and netinfo.

II.  Impact

     Programs that do not check data provided by information servers may
     operate in unpredictable ways and give unexpected results. In
     particular, exploitation of this vulnerability may allow remote access
     by unauthorized users. Exploitation can also lead to root access by both
     local and remote users.


III. Solution

     For programs that you write or have written, consider integrating the
     general solution in Section A below.

     In the specific case of the sendmail mail delivery program, Eric Allman,
     the original author of sendmail, has produced patches that address the
     problem. Section B provides details about these, along with vendor
     information and additional steps you should take to protect sendmail.


     A. General solution for Internet host names

        Use the host name and IP address validation subroutines available
        at the locations listed below. Include them in all programs that
        use the result of the host name lookups in any way.

          ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/ValidateHostname/IsValid.c
          ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/ValidateHostname/IsValid.c

        The IsValid.c file contains code for the IsValidHostname and
        IsValidIPAddress subroutines. This code can be used to check host
        names and IP addresses for validity according to RFCs 952 and 1123,
        well as names containing characters drawn from common practice,
        namely "_" and "/".

        The following files are in the directory (from the README):

        IsValid.l       The lex/flex file containing the code for
                        IsValidHostname and IsValidIPAddress
                        MD5 (IsValid.l) = 2d35040aacae4fb12906eb1b48957776

        IsValid-raw.c   The C file created by running flex
                        on IsValid.l
                        MD5 (IsValid-raw.c) = 367c77d3ef84bc63a5c23d90eeb69330

        IsValid.c       The editted file created by internalizing
                        variable and function definitions in
                        IsValid-raw.c
                        MD5 (IsValid.c) = ffe45f1256210aeb71691f4f7cdad27f

        IsValid.diffs   The set of diffs between IsValid-raw.c
                        and IsValid.c
                        MD5 (IsValid.diffs) = 3619022cf31d735151f8e8c83cce3744

        htest.c         A main routing for testing IsValidHostname
                        and IsValidIPAddress
                        MD5 (htest.c) = 2d50b2bffb537cc4e637dd1f07a187f4


     B. Specific solutions in the case of sendmail

        Install a patch from your vendor when it becomes available (see B.1)
        or install Eric Allman's patch (B.2). In both cases, install the
        sendmail restricted shell program (B.3).

     1. Install a patch from your vendor.

        Below is a summary of the vendors who have reported status to us as
        of the date of this advisory. More complete information is provided in
        the appendix, which we will update as we receive more information.

        If your vendor's name is not on this list, please contact the vendor
        directly.

        Vendor or Source
        ----------------
        Eric Allman
        Hewlett-Packard Co.
        IBM Corporation
        Silicon Graphics Inc.
        Sun Microsystems, Inc.

     2. Install a patch to sendmail.

        If you are presently running sendmail 8.6.12, there is a patch that
        makes version 8.6.13.

        Similarly, if you are presently running sendmail 8.7.3, there is a
        patch that makes version 8.7.4.

        The patches are available for anonymous FTP from

        ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/sendmail/
        ftp://ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/src/sendmail/
        ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/sendmail/
        ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/sendmail/


        Checksums for the 8.6.13 release:
          MD5 (sendmail.8.6.13.base.tar.Z) = e8cf3ea19876d9b9def5c0bcb793d241
          MD5 (sendmail.8.6.13.cf.tar.Z) = 4492026fa9e750cd33974322cb5a6fb9
          MD5 (sendmail.8.6.13.misc.tar.Z) = 7ec5d31656e93e08a3892f0ae542b674
          MD5 (sendmail.8.6.13.xdoc.tar.Z) = e4d3caebcdc4912ed2ecce1a77e45712

        Checksum for the 8.6.13 patch:
           MD5 (sendmail.8.6.13.patch) = 6390b792cb5513ff622da8791d6d2073

        Checksum for the 8.7.4 release:
           MD5 (sendmail.8.7.4.tar.Z) = 4bf774a12752497527aae11e2bdbab36

        Checksum for the 8.7.4 patch:
           MD5 (sendmail.8.7.4.patch) = ef828ad91fe56e4eb6b0cacced864cd5


     3. Run smrsh as additional protection for sendmail.

        With all versions of sendmail, we recommend that you install and use
        the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh). We urge you to do
        this whether you use the vendor's supplied sendmail, install sendmail
        yourself, or patch an earlier version of sendmail.

        Beginning with version 8.7.1, smrsh is included in the sendmail
        distribution, in the subdirectory smrsh. See the RELEASE_NOTES file
        for a description of how to integrate smrsh into your sendmail
        configuration file.

.........................................................................

Appendix A: Vendor Information

Below is information we have received from vendors concerning the
vulnerability described in this advisory. If you do not see your vendor's
name, please contact the vendor directly for information.

- -----------------------
Eric Allman (original author of sendmail)

Install a patch to sendmail.

If you are presently running sendmail 8.6.12, there is a patch that
makes version 8.6.13.

Similarly, if you are presently running sendmail 8.7.3, there is a
patch that makes version 8.7.4.

The patches are available for anonymous FTP from

        ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/sendmail/
        ftp://ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/src/sendmail/
        ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/sendmail/
        ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/sendmail/

Checksums for the 8.6.13 release:
          MD5 (sendmail.8.6.13.base.tar.Z) = e8cf3ea19876d9b9def5c0bcb793d241
          MD5 (sendmail.8.6.13.cf.tar.Z) = 4492026fa9e750cd33974322cb5a6fb9
          MD5 (sendmail.8.6.13.misc.tar.Z) = 7ec5d31656e93e08a3892f0ae542b674
          MD5 (sendmail.8.6.13.xdoc.tar.Z) = e4d3caebcdc4912ed2ecce1a77e45712

        Checksum for the 8.6.13 patch:
           MD5 (sendmail.8.6.13.patch) = 6390b792cb5513ff622da8791d6d2073

        Checksum for the 8.7.4 release:
           MD5 (sendmail.8.7.4.tar.Z) = 4bf774a12752497527aae11e2bdbab36

        Checksum for the 8.7.4 patch:
           MD5 (sendmail.8.7.4.patch) = ef828ad91fe56e4eb6b0cacced864cd5

- ----------------------
Hewlett-Packard Company

Vulnerable, watch file for updates.

- ----------------------
IBM Corporation

IBM is working on fixes for sendmail.

- ----------------------
Silicon Graphics Inc.

It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be done on ALL SGI
systems running IRIX 3.x, 4.x, 5.x and 6.x.  The issue will be
permanently corrected in a future release of IRIX.

**** IRIX 3.x ****

Silicon Graphics Inc, no longer supports the IRIX 3.x operating system
and therefore has no patches or binaries to provide.

However, two possible actions still remain: 1) upgrade the system to a
supported version of IRIX (see below) and then install the patch or
2) obtain the sendmail source code from anonymous FTP at
ftp.cs.berkeley.edu and compile the program manually.  Please, note
that SGI will not assist with or support 3rd party sendmail programs.

**** IRIX 4.x ****

As of the date of this document, SGI does not have a IRIX 4.x binary
replacement that addresses this particular issue.   If in the future,
a replacement binary is generated, additional advisory information will
be provided.

However, two other possible actions are: 1) upgrade the system to a
supported version of IRIX (see below) and then install the patch or
2) obtain the sendmail source code from anonymous FTP at
ftp.cs.berkeley.edu and compile the program manually.  Please, note
that SGI will not assist with or support 3rd party sendmail programs.

**** IRIX 5.0.x, 5.1.x ****

For the IRIX operating systems versions 5.0.x and 5.1.x, an upgrade
to 5.2 or better is required first.  When the upgrade is completed,
then the patches described in the following sections can be applied
depending on the final version of the upgrade.

**** IRIX 5.2, 5.3, 6.0, 6.0.1, 6.1 ****

For the IRIX operating system versions 5.2, 5.3, 6.0, 6.0.1, and 6.1
an inst-able patch has been generated and made available via anonymous
FTP and your service/support provider.  The patch is number 1146
and will install on IRIX 5.2, 5.3, 6.0 and 6.0.1.


The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com.   Patch 1146 can be found in the following
directories on the FTP server:

        ~ftp/Security

                or

        ~ftp/Patches/5.2
        ~ftp/Patches/5.3
        ~ftp/Patches/6.0
        ~ftp/Patches/6.0.1
        ~ftp/Patches/6.1

                        ##### Checksums ####

The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:

      Filename:                 patchSG0001146
      Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    15709 3 patchSG0001146
      Algorithm #2 (sum):       16842 3 patchSG0001146
      MD5 checksum:             055B660E1D5C1E38BC3128ADE7FC9A95

      Filename:                 patchSG0001146.eoe1_man
      Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    26276 76 patchSG0001146.eoe1_man
      Algorithm #2 (sum):       1567 76 patchSG0001146.eoe1_man
      MD5 checksum:             883BC696F0A57B47F1CBAFA74BF53E81

      Filename:                 patchSG0001146.eoe1_sw
      Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    61872 382 patchSG0001146.eoe1_sw
      Algorithm #2 (sum):       42032 382 patchSG0001146.eoe1_sw
      MD5 checksum:             412AB1A279A030192EA2A082CBA0D6E7

      Filename:                 patchSG0001146.idb
      Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    39588 4 patchSG0001146.idb
      Algorithm #2 (sum):       10621 4 patchSG0001146.idb
      MD5 checksum:             259DD47E4574DAF9041675D64C39102E


Past SGI Advisories and security patches can be obtained via
anonymous FTP from
                ftp://sgigate.sgi.com
or its mirror
                ftp://ftp.sgi.com


- ----------------------

Sun Microsystems, Inc.

Included below is information concerning sendmail patches as outlined in Sun
Microsystems Security Bulletin: #00133, 8 March 1996. The complete bulletin is
available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/vendors/sun/sun_bulletin_00133.

    Here are our estimates for the availability of fixes incorporating
    into sendmail more strenuous checks against name-server-based attacks.

    Note that the upcoming SunOS 4.1.x patches will represent the first
    backport of sendmail 8.6.x to those platforms, and will probably be
    assigned new patch numbers (instead of being recorded as revisions
    of the existing patches).

         OS version     Est. date
         ----------     ---------
         5.6            in 5.6 FCS release
         5.5.1          in 5.5.1 FCS release
         5.5            Apr '96
         5.4            Apr '96
         5.3            Apr '96
         4.1.4          May '96
         4.1.3_U1       May '96
         4.1.3          May '96

List of Current Sendmail Patches

   Until the patches listed above are available, Sun recommends that every
   customer run the following sendmail patches on their systems.

   A. Current sendmail patches

   The latest sendmail patch for each supported version of SunOS is
   shown below. All current SunOS 5.x patches are based on sendmail
   V8; all SunOS 4.1.x patches are currently based on sendmail V5.

   [Note that no sendmail patches exists for SunOS 5.5 and SunOS
    5.5_x86. All earlier fixes were built into these releases.]

         OS version     Patch ID        Released
         ----------     ---------       ---------
         5.4_x86        102064-05       19 Jan 96
         5.4            102066-06       19 Jan 96
         5.3            101739-08       19 Jan 96
         4.1.4          102423-04        5 Oct 95
         4.1.3_U1       101665-07        5 Oct 95
         4.1.3          100377-22        5 Oct 95

    Patch 100377-22 was issued jointly for SunOS 4.1.3 and SunOS 4.1.3c.

    B. Obsolete sendmail patches

    The following sendmail patches are now obsolete, and will no longer
    be maintained. Each is superseded by a patch listed above.

         OS version     Patch ID        Date Released
         ----------     ---------       -------------
         5.4_x86         102320-01      26 May 95
         5.4             102319-01      26 May 95
         5.3             101235-01       1 May 95
         5.3 (sic)       101371-04       9 Feb 94
         4.1.4           102356-01      22 Feb 95
         4.1.3_U1        101436-08      28 Oct 94
         4.1.3           100224-13      28 Oct 94

Checksum Table

In the checksum table we show the BSD and SVR4 checksums and MD5 digital
signatures for the compressed tar archives.

    File            BSD          SVR4        MD5
    Name            Checksum     Checksum    Digital Signature
    --------------- -----------  ----------  --------------------------------
    102064-05.tar.Z 08423   335  16923  669  2816EF17F40E2FA5E8260CD98D349875
    102066-06.tar.Z 62613   385  52067  770  666E6D6075E40D2BFDB539830EF1BCDA
    101739-08.tar.Z 60842   385  28595  770  369D4E0758672ADCDAD2219179B8A062
    102423-04.tar.Z 40900   216  33691  432  022B546A882B42FF826FE28429B2EDD8
    101665-07.tar.Z 44656   216  37045  431  86F942F8CCBAD905AB2AE8CA33490D2B
    100377-22.tar.Z 39051   214  58206  427  7B55564E6104FABAD7283DAE1CDD3D4A

The checksums shown above are from the BSD-based checksum (on 4.1.x,
/bin/sum; on SunOS 5.x, /usr/ucb/sum) and from the SVR4 version on
on SunOS 5.x (/usr/bin/sum).


- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CERT Coordination Center thanks Eric Allman of Pangaea Reference Systems,
Andrew Gross of San Diego Supercomputer Center, Eric Halil of AUSCERT,
Wolfgang Ley of DFN-CERT, and Paul Vixie for their support in the development
of this advisory.
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident
Response and Security Teams (FIRST).

We strongly urge you to encrypt any sensitive information you send by email.
The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key and PGP. Contact the
CERT staff for more information.

Location of CERT PGP key
         ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key

CERT Contact Information
- ------------------------
Email    cert@cert.org

Phone    +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
                CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST
                (GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for
                emergencies during other hours.

Fax      +1 412-268-6989

Postal address
        CERT Coordination Center
        Software Engineering Institute
        Carnegie Mellon University
        Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
        USA

To be added to our mailing list for CERT advisories and bulletins, send your
email address to
        cert-advisory-request@cert.org

CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other
security-related information are available for anonymous FTP from
        ftp://info.cert.org/pub/

CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup
        comp.security.announce


Copyright 1996 Carnegie Mellon University
This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it
is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is included.

CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.

==============================================================================
UPDATES

On March 29, 1996, the isValid.c program was updated. If you obtained a copy
of this program prior to this date, you should retrieve the newer
version. (See Sec. III.A for more information about isValid.c.)


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Revision history

June 4, 1997   Updated the URL pointing to the current version of BIND.
Aug. 30, 1996  Incorporated changes from CA-96.04.README into the advisory.
July 01, 1996  Introduction - added pointer to BIND 4.9.4.
Mar. 29, 1996  Introduction - updated information about the next release of
                  BIND
               Updates section - added isValid.c program information.
               Appendix, Sun - added information from Sun.
Feb. 28, 1996  Appendix, SGI - added information.






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