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TUCoPS :: Unix :: General :: ca200201.txt

Exploitation of Vulnerability in CDE Subprocess Control Service





CERTŪ Advisory CA-2002-01 Exploitation of Vulnerability in CDE
Subprocess Control Service

Original release date: January 14, 2002
Last revised: --
Source: CERT/CC

A complete revision history can be found at the end of this
file.

Systems Affected

   * Systems running CDE

Overview

The CERT/CC has received credible reports of scanning and
exploitation of Solaris systems running the CDE Subprocess
Control Service buffer overflow vulnerability identified in
CA-2001-31 and discussed in VU#172583.

I. Description

Since CA-2001-31 was originally released last November, the
CERT/CC has received reports of scanning for dtspcd (6112/tcp).
Just recently, however, we have received credible reports of an
exploit for Solaris systems. Using network traces provided by
The Honeynet Project, we have confirmed that the dtspcd
vulnerability identified in CA-2001-31 and discussed in
VU#172583 is actively being exploited.

The Common Desktop Environment (CDE) is an integrated graphical
user interface that runs on UNIX and Linux operating systems.
The CDE Subprocess Control Service (dtspcd) is a network daemon
that accepts requests from clients to execute commands and
launch applications remotely. On systems running CDE, dtspcd is
spawned by the Internet services daemon (typically inetd or
xinetd) in response to a CDE client request. dtspcd is typically

configured to run on port 6112/tcp with root privileges.

There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in
a shared library that is used by dtspcd. During client
negotiation, dtspcd accepts a length value and subsequent data
from the client without performing adequate input validation. As
a result, a malicious client can manipulate data sent to dtspcd
and cause a buffer overflow, potentially executing code with
root privileges. The overflow occurs in a fixed-size 4K buffer
that is exploited by the contents of one of the attack packets.
The signature can be found at bytes 0x3e-0x41 in the following
attack packet from a tcpdump log (lines may wrap):

09:46:04.378306 10.10.10.1.3592 > 10.10.10.2.6112: P
1:1449(1448) ack 1 win 16060 <nop,nop,timestamp 463986683
4158792> (DF)
0x0000   4500 05dc a1ac 4000 3006 241c 0a0a 0a01
 E.....@.0.$.....
0x0010   0a0a 0a02 0e08 17e0 fee2 c115 5f66 192f
 ...f........_f./
0x0020   8018 3ebc e1e9 0000 0101 080a 1ba7 dffb
 ..>.............
0x0030   003f 7548 3030 3030 3030 3032 3034 3130
 .?uH000000020410
0x0040   3365 3030 3031 2020 3420 0000 0031 3000
 3e0001..4....10.
0x0050   801c 4011 801c 4011 1080 0101 801c 4011
 ..@...@.......@.
0x0060   801c 4011 801c 4011 801c 4011 801c 4011
 ..@...@...@...@.
...

The value 0x103e in the ASCII (right) column above is
interpreted by the server as the number of bytes in the packet
to copy into the internal 4K (0x1000) buffer. Since 0x103e is
greater than 0x1000, the last 0x3e bytes of the packet will
overwrite memory after the end of the 4K buffer. This is the
same compromise vector identified in VU#172583.

It is important to note that several Internet-enabled games may
also use port 6112/tcp as a legitimate part of their normal
operation, therefore, not all network activity involving this
service may be malicious. Network administrators monitoring this
type of activity may wish to verify whether probes of this type
are actually attempts to exploit VU#172583.

Many common UNIX systems ship with CDE installed and enabled by
default. To determine if your system is configured to run
dtspcd, check for the following entries (lines may wrap):

     in /etc/services

          dtspc 6112/tcp

     in /etc/inetd.conf

          dtspc stream tcp nowait root /usr/dt/bin/dtspcd
          /usr/dt/bin/dtspcd

Any system that does not run the CDE Subprocess Control Service
is not vulnerable to this problem.

II. Impact

An attacker can execute arbitrary code with root privileges.

III. Solution

Apply a patch

VU#172583 contains information from vendors who have provided
information for this advisory. We will update the vulnerability
note as we receive more information. If a vendor's name does not
appear, then the CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please
contact your vendor directly.

Vendor information can be found in the "Systems Affected"
section of VU#172583

     http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/172583#systems

Limit access to vulnerable service

Until patches are available and can be applied, you may wish to
limit or block access to the Subprocess Control Service from
untrusted networks such as the Internet. Using a firewall or
other packet-filtering technology, block or restrict access to
the port used by the Subprocess Control Service. As noted above,
dtspcd is typically configured to listen on port 6112/tcp. It
may be possible to use TCP Wrapper or a similar technology to
provide improved access control and logging functionality for
dtspcd connections. Keep in mind that blocking ports at a
network perimeter does not protect the vulnerable service from
the internal network. It is important to understand your network
configuration and service requirements before deciding what
changes are appropriate.

TCP Wrapper is available from

     ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/index.html

Disable vulnerable service

You may wish to consider disabling dtspcd by commenting out the
appropriate entry in /etc/inetd.conf. As a best practice, the
CERT/CC recommends disabling any services that are not
explicitly required. As noted above, it is important to consider
the consequences of such a change in your environment.

Appendix A. - References

  1. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/172583
  2. http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-31.html
  3. http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2001-0803
  4. http://xforce.iss.net/alerts/advise101.php
  5. http://www.opengroup.org/cde/
  6. http://www.opengroup.org/desktop/faq/

----------------------------------------------------------------

The CERT Coordination Center thanks The Honeynet Project for
their assistance in providing network traces of the
exploitation.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Authors: Allen Householder and Art Manion
----------------------------------------------------------------
This document is available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-01.html
----------------------------------------------------------------

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Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
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     U.S.A.

CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) /
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Revision History

January 14, 2002:  Initial release


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