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TUCoPS :: Unix :: General :: bindmvul.txt

Bind multiple vulnerabilities





Date: Wed, 8 Apr 1998 20:21:54 -0500
From: Aleph One <aleph1@DFW.NET>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG
Subject: CA-98.05 Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

=============================================================================
CERT* Advisory CA-98.05
Original issue date: April 08, 1998

Topic: Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND
        1. Inverse Query Buffer Overrun in BIND 4.9 and BIND 8 Releases
        2. Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities in BIND 4.9 and BIND 8 Releases
        3. Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in BIND 8 Releases

- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

I.   Description

     This advisory describes three distinct problems in BIND. Topic 1 describes
     a vulnerability that may allow a remote intruder to gain root access on
     your name server or to disrupt normal operation of your name server. Topics
     2 and 3 deal with vulnerabilities that can allow an intruder to disrupt
     your name server. Detailed descriptions of each problem and its solutions
     are included in the individual sections on each topic.

II.  Impact

     Topic 1: A remote intruder can gain root-level access to your name server.

     Topics 2 and 3: A remote intruder is able to disrupt normal operation of
     your name server.

III. Solution

     All three problems can be fixed by upgrading to the latest version of
     BIND, which may be available from your vendor (see Appendix A of this
     advisory). Questions about the availability of patches from your vendor
     should be directed to your vendor.

     Additionally, the Internet Software Consortium will announce new
     publicly available versions of BIND very soon on the BIND WWW page
     (http://www.isc.org/bind.html) and on the USENET newsgroup
     comp.protocols.dns.bind.

     Additionally, patches are provided for Topics 1 and 3, along with steps
     to take until you can apply the patch or upgrade to the latest version of
     BIND.

*******
ffb
******************************************************************
Topic 1: Inverse Query Buffer Overrun in BIND 4.9 and BIND 8 Releases
*************************************************************************

1.A. Description

     BIND 4.9 releases prior to BIND 4.9.7 and BIND 8 releases prior to 8.1.2
     do not properly bounds check a memory copy when responding to an inverse
     query request. An improperly or maliciously formatted inverse query on a
     TCP stream can crash the server or allow an attacker to gain root
     privileges.

1.B. Determining if your system is vulnerable

     The inverse query feature is disabled by default, so only the systems
     that have been explicitly configured to allow it are vulnerable.

     BIND 8
        Look at the "options" block in the configuration file (typically
        /etc/named.conf). If there is a "fake-iquery yes;" line, then the
        server is vulnerable.

      BIND 4.9
        Look at the "options" lines in the configuration file (typically
        /etc/named.boot). If there is a line containing "fake-iquery", then
        the server is vulnerable.

        In addition, unlike BIND 8, inverse query support can be enabled when
        the server is compiled. Examine conf/options.h in the source. If the
        line #defining INVQ is not commented out, then the server is
        vulnerable.

1.C. What To Do

     To address this problem, you can disable inverse queries, upgrade to BIND
     8.1.2 when it becomes available, or apply the patch provided below. We
     urge you to disable inverse queries until you can take one of the other
     steps.

     Disabling inverse queries
     -------------------------

     BIND 8
        Disable inverse queries by editing named.conf so that either there
        is no "fake-iquery" entry in the "options" block or the entry is
        "fake-iquery no;"

     BIND 4.9
        Disable inverse queries by editing named.boot, removing any
        "fake-iquery" entries on "options" lines. Look at conf/options.h
        in the source. If INVQ has been defined, comment it out and then
        rebuild and reinstall the server.

     Note: Disabling inverse query support can break ancient versions of
           nslookup. If nslookup fails, replace it with a version from any
           BIND 4.9 or BIND 8 distribution.

     Fixing the Inverse Query Code
     -----------------------------

     BIND 8
        Upgrade to BIND 8.1.2 when it becomes available
        or apply the patch at this URL:

           ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/Patches/CA-98.05_Topic.1_BIND8_patch.txt

        This file is not PGP signed.  It has the following MD5 checksum:

           MD5 (CA-98.05_Topic.1_BIND8_patch.txt) = 12fc9d395ff987b1aad17a882ccd7840

     BIND 4.9
        Upgrade to BIND 4.9.7 when it becomes available
        or apply the patch at this URL:

          ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/Patches/CA-98.05_Topic.1_BIND4.9_patch.txt

        This file is not PGP signed.  It has the following MD5 checksum:

           MD5 (CA-98.05_Topic.1_BIND4.9_patch.txt) = 32da0db1c27e4d484e6fcb7901267c2f

        Notes:

          (1) We are asking sites to retrieve the patches via FTP rather
              than including them in the advisory since our experience is
              that some mail handling systems translate tabs into spaces.
              This prevents the patch(1) program from working properly.

          (2) We have not PGP signed the files since our experience is that
              some implementations of PGP during the extraction process
              will strip spaces from some lines containing whitespace only.
              This may prevent the patch(1) program from working properly.

**************************************************************************
Topic 2: Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities in BIND 4.9 and BIND 8 Releases
**************************************************************************

2.A. Description

     BIND 4.9 releases prior to BIND 4.9.7 and BIND 8 releases prior to 8.1.2

ffb
   do not properly bounds check many memory references in the server and the
     resolver. An improperly or maliciously formatted DNS message can cause
     the server to read from invalid memory locations, yielding garbage record
     data or crashing the server. Many DNS utilities that process DNS messages
     (e.g., dig, nslookup) also fail to do proper bounds checking.

2.B. Determining if your system is vulnerable

     Any system running BIND 4.9 prior to 4.9.7 or BIND 8 prior to 8.1.2 is
     vulnerable.

2.C. What To Do

     There are no workarounds for these problems.

     BIND 8
        Upgrade to BIND 8.1.2 when it becomes available.

     BIND 4.9
        Upgrade to BIND 4.9.7 when it becomes available.

**************************************************************************
Topic 3: Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in BIND 8 Releases
**************************************************************************

3.A. Description

     Assume that the following self-referential resource record is in the
     cache on a name server:

        foo.example.    IN      A       CNAME   foo.example.

     The actual domain name used does not matter; the important thing is
     that the target of the CNAME is the same name. The record could be in
     the cache either because the server was authoritative for it or
     because the server is recursive and someone asked for it. Once this
     record is in the cache, issuing a zone transfer request using its name
     (e.g., "dig @my_nameserver foo.example. axfr") will cause the server
     to abort().

     Most sites will not contain such a record in their configuration
     files.  However, it is possible for an attacker to engineer such a
     record into the cache of a vulnerable nameserver and thus cause a
     denial of service.

3.B. Determining if your system is vulnerable

     If the BIND 8 server is not recursive and does not fetch glue, then
     the problem can be exploited only if the self-referential resource
     record is in a zone for which the server is authoritative.

     If the global zone transfer ACL in the options block has been set to
     deny access and has no self-referential CNAMEs in its authoritative
     zones, then the server is not vulnerable.

     Otherwise, the server is vulnerable. The nameserver is recursive by
     default, fetches glue by default, and the default global transfer ACL
     allows all hosts; so many BIND 8 servers will be vulnerable to this
     problem.

     (Note: the in.named(8) man page mentions that sending a SIGINT to the
     in.named process will dump the current data base and cache to, by
     default, /var/tmp/named_dump.db. Some sites may find this useful in
     looking for self-referential CNAMEs.  Please see the in.named(8) man
     page for further details.)

3.C. What To Do

     To address this problem, you can apply the workaround described below,
     upgrade to BIND 8.1.2, or apply the patch provided at the end of this
     section. Until you can upgrade or apply the patch, we urge you to use the
     workaround.

     Workaround
     ----------

     First set the global zone transfer ACL to deny access to all hosts by
     adding the following line to the "options" block:

           allow-transfer { none; };

     Next, explicitly authorize zone transfers for each authoritative zone.
     For example, if the server was authoritative for "example", adding

           allow-transfer { any; };

     to the "zone" statement for "example" would allow anyone to transfer
     "example".

     None of the domains for which the server is authoritative should have
     self-referential CNAMEs.

     Fixing the Problem
     ------------------

     Upgrade to BIND 8.1.2 when it becomes available or apply the patch at
     the following URL to the BIND 8.1.1 source:

       ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/Patches/CA-98.05_Topic.3_BIND8.1.1_patch.txt

        This file is not PGP signed.  It has the following MD5 checksum:

           MD5 (CA-98.05_Topic.3_BIND8.1.1_patch.txt) = 33f9dc2e
ffb
af221dd48553f490259c2a8b

        Notes:

          (1) We are asking sites to retrieve the patches via FTP rather
              than including them in the advisory since our experience is
              that some mail handling systems translate tabs into spaces.
              This prevents the patch(1) program from working properly.

          (2) We have not PGP signed the files since our experience is that
              some implementations of PGP during the extraction process
              will strip spaces from some lines containing whitespace only.
              This may prevent the patch(1) program from working properly.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Appendix A - Vendor Information

Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information for this
advisory. We will update this appendix as we receive additional information.
If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that
vendor. Please contact the vendor directly.

Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI)
- -------------------------------------

  1.      BSD/OS 3.0/3.1 AS SHIPPED is not vulnerable.
          Sites wishing to enable fake-iquery can install mod
          M310-025, available at http://www.bsdi.com

  2.      BSDI will issue a 3.1 mod when a fix is available.

  3.      BSD/OS is not vulnerable, since we ship bind 4.9.6

Digital Equipment Corporation
- -----------------------------

  Digital is investigating this problem.

FreeBSD, Inc.
- -------------

  We ship with INVQ not defined. This makes us resistent against the first
  vulnerability. This is true for all release after 2.2.0 (2.1.* releases
  are vulnerable but should be upgraded anyway).  As we do not yet ship
  BIND 8, we are also not vulnerable to the 3rd vulnerability.

  We advise everyone to upgrade to BIND 4.9.7.

Hewlett-Packard Company
- -----------------------

  HP is Vulnerable. Patches in process. Watch for the release of the
  associated HP Security Bulletin.

  Hewlett Packard's HP-UX patches/Security Bulletins/Security patches are
  available via email and/or WWW (via the browser of your choice) on HP's
  Electronic Support Center (ESC).
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------

  To subscribe to automatically receive future NEW HP Security Bulletins from
  the HP ESC Digest service via electronic mail, do the following:

  1)  From your Web browser, access the URL:

  http://us-support.external.hp.com (US,Canada,Asia-Pacific, and
  Latin-America)

  http://europe-support.external.hp.com  (Europe)

  Login with your user ID and password, or register for one (remember to save
  the User ID assigned to you, and your password). Once you are on the Main
  Menu, Click on the Technical Knowledge Database, and it will connect to a HP
  Search Technical Knowledge DB page. Near the bottom is a hyperlink to our
  Security Bulletin archive. Once in the archive there is another link to our
  current security patch matrix. Updated daily, this matrix is categorized by
  platform/OS release, and by bulletin topic.

  To subscribe to receive future Security Bulletins be email, look for the
  subscription section on the Technical Knowledge Database page.

IBM Corporation
- ---------------

  The version of bind shipped with AIX is vulnerable and the following
  APARs will be available soon:

    AIX 4.1.x: IX76958  (fix for Topic 1 only)
    AIX 4.2.x: IX76959  (fix for Topic 1 only)
    AIX 4.3.x: IX76960  (fix for Topic 1 and 3 only)
    AIX 4.3.x: IX76962  (fix for Topic 1, 2, and 3.  This is bind 8.1.2.)

  Until the official fixes are available, a temporary patch can be found
  at:

    ftp://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security

    File                sum               md5
    ====================================================================
    named.415.tar.Z     64980   157    0e795380b84bf29385d2d946d10406cb
    named.421.tar.Z     44963   157    15a9a006abf4a9d0a0d3210f16d619e5
    named4.430.tar.Z    48236   115    8377b14f74e207707154a9677906f20a
    named
ffb
8.430.tar.Z    51175   160    e2db14b7055a7424078456bfbfd9bf2d

    Detached PGP signatures are also available with a ".asc" extension.

  IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business Machines
  Corporation.

NEC Corporation
===============

  Topic1 - Some systems are vulnerable.  Patches will be available
           soon, especially for UX/4800 R11.x and R13.x.

  Topic2 - Some systems are vulnerable.  Patches will be available
           soon after the release of bind-4.9.7, especially for
           UX/4800 R11.x and R13.x.

  Topic3 - We do not ship BIND 8 with our products so we are not
           vulnerable to this problem.

  Patches will be available from ftp://ftp.meshnet.or.jp/pub/48pub/security.

The NetBSD Project
- ------------------

  The first problem can be fixed in NetBSD 1.3, 1.3.1, and -current prior
  to 19980408 with the supplied BIND 4.9.6 patch. A patch will be made
  available for the second problem shortly (alternatively, upgrading to
  BIND 4.9.7 or 8.1.2 when available will also solve this problem.)  NetBSD
  is not affected by the third problem.

Red Hat Software, Inc.
- ----------------------

  Red Hat fixes will be available at:

  Red Hat 5.0
  -------------

  i386:
  rpm -Uvh ftp://ftp.redhat.com/updates/5.0/i386/bind-4.9.6-7.i386.rpm

  alpha:
  rpm -Uvh ftp://ftp.redhat.com/updates/5.0/alpha/bind-4.9.6-7.alpha.rpm

  Red Hat 4.2
  -------------

  i386:
  rpm -Uvh ftp://ftp.redhat.com/updates/4.2/i386/bind-4.9.6-1.1.i386.rpm

  alpha:
  rpm -Uvh ftp://ftp.redhat.com/updates/4.2/alpha/bind-4.9.6-1.1.alpha.rpm

  SPARC:
  rpm -Uvh ftp://ftp.redhat.com/updates/4.2/sparc/bind-4.9.6-1.1.sparc.rpm

The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc.
- ------------------------------

  The following SCO products are vulnerable:

  - SCO Open Desktop/Open Server 3.0, SCO UNIX 3.2v4
  - SCO OpenServer 5.0 (also SCO Internet FastStart)
  - SCO UnixWare 2.1
  - SCO UnixWare 7

  SCO CMW+ 3.0 is not vulnerable as BIND/named is not supported on
  CMW+ platforms.

  Binary versions of BIND 4.9.7 will be available shortly from the
  SCO ftp site:

  ftp://ftp.sco.com/SSE/sse012.ltr - cover letter
  ftp://ftp.sco.com/SSE/sse012.tar.Z - replacement binaries

  The fix includes binaries for the following SCO operating systems:

  - SCO Open Desktop/Open Server 3.0, SCO UNIX 3.2v4
  - SCO OpenServer 5.0
  - SCO UnixWare 2.1
  - SCO UnixWare 7

  For the latest security bulletins and patches for SCO products,
  please refer to http://www.sco.com/security/ .

Silicon Graphics, Inc.
- ----------------------

  At this time, Silicon Graphics does not have any public information for
  the DNS issue.  Silicon Graphics is in communication with CERT and other
  external parties and is actively investigating this issue.  Additional
  information, is expected shortly.

  When more Silicon Graphics information (including patch information) is
  available for release, that information will be released via the SGI
  security mailing list, wiretap.

  For subscribing to the wiretap mailing list and other SGI security
  related information, please refer to the Silicon Graphics Security
  Headquarters website located at:

        http://www.sgi.com/Support/security

Sun Microsystems, Inc.
- ----------------------

   Topic 1: Patches will be produced for Solaris 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.5.1
            and 5.6.

   Topic 2: Patches will be produced for Solaris 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.5.1
            and 5.6.

   Topic 3: Bug fix will be integrated in the upcoming release of
            Solaris.

- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

The CERT Coordination Center thanks Bob Halley and Paul Vixie of Vixie
Enterprises, who provided most of the text of this advisory.

Reminder:

  The Internet Software Consortium will announce new publicly available
  versions of BIND on the BIND WWW page (http://www.isc.org/bind.html) and
  on the USENET newsgroup comp.protocols.dns.bind.

- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

If you believe that your syste
ffb
m has been compromised, contact the CERT
Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams (FIRST). See http://www.first.org/team-info/.

We strongly urge you to encrypt any sensitive information you send by email.
The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key and PGP. Contact
the CERT staff for more information.

Location of CERT PGP key
         ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key

CERT Contact Information
- ------------------------
Email    cert@cert.org

Phone    +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
                CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST
                (GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for
                emergencies during other hours.

Fax      +1 412-268-6989

Postal address
        CERT Coordination Center
        Software Engineering Institute
        Carnegie Mellon University
        Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
        USA

Using encryption
   We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. We can
   support a shared DES key or PGP. Contact the CERT/CC for more information.
   Location of CERT PGP key
         ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key

Getting security information
   CERT publications and other security information are available from
        http://www.cert.org/
        ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/

   CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup
        comp.security.announce

   To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send
   email to
        cert-advisory-request@cert.org
   In the subject line, type
        SUBSCRIBE  your-email-address

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Copyright 1998 Carnegie Mellon University. Conditions for use, disclaimers,
and sponsorship information can be found in
http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff.html and ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/legal_stuff .
If you do not have FTP or web access, send mail to cert@cert.org with
"copyright" in the subject line.

* CERT is registered U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This file: ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-98.05.bind_problems
           http://www.cert.org/pub/alerts.html

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This file contains the source code patch to BIND v8 for the problem
described in CA-98.05, "Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND", Topic 1.

*** ns_req.c    1997/06/09 17:46:59     8.39
--- ns_req.c    1998/03/23 23:27:41
***************
*** 1011,1017 ****
         */
        switch (type) {
        case T_A:
!               if (!ns_option_p(OPTION_FAKE_IQUERY))
                        return (Refuse);
                break;
        default:
--- 1011,1017 ----
         */
        switch (type) {
        case T_A:
!               if (!ns_option_p(OPTION_FAKE_IQUERY) || dlen != INT32SZ)
                        return (Refuse);
                break;
        default:
***************
*** 1022,1027 ****
--- 1022,1029 ----

        fname = (char *)msg + HFIXEDSZ;
        alen = (char *)*cpp - fname;
+       if ((size_t)alen > sizeof anbuf)
+               return (Refuse);
        memcpy(anbuf, fname, alen);
        data = anbuf + alen - dlen;
        *cpp = (u_char *)fname;



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