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TUCoPS :: Security App Flaws :: bx2286.htm

Panda Internet Security/Antivirus+Firewall 2008 cpoint.sys Kernel Driver Memory Corruption Vulnerability



Panda Internet Security/Antivirus+Firewall 2008 cpoint.sys Kernel Driver Memory Corruption Vulnerability
Panda Internet Security/Antivirus+Firewall 2008 cpoint.sys Kernel Driver Memory Corruption Vulnerability



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Advisory:               Panda Internet Security/Antivirus+Firewall 2008 
                        cpoint.sys Kernel Driver Memory Corruption Vulnerability
Advisory ID:            TKADV2008-001
Revision:               1.0
Release Date:           2008/03/08
Last Modified:          2008/03/08
Date Reported:          2008/01/08
Author:                 Tobias Klein (tk at trapkit.de)
Affected Software:      Panda Internet Security 2008
                        Panda Antivirus+Firewall 2008
Remotely Exploitable:   No
Locally Exploitable:    Yes
Vendor URL: http://www.pandasecurity.com 
Vendor Status:          Vendor has released a hotfix
Patch development time: 60 days


=====================Vulnerability details:
=====================
The kernel driver cpoint.sys shipped with Panda Internet Security and Antivirus+ 
Firewall 2008 contains a vulnerability in the code that handles IOCTL requests. 
Exploitation of this vulnerability can result in:

1) local denial of service attacks (system crash due to a kernel panic), or

2) local execution of arbitrary code at the kernel level (complete system 
   compromise)

The issue can be triggered by sending a specially crafted IOCTL request.

No special user rights are necessary to exploit the vulnerability.


=====================Technical description:
=====================
The IOCTL call 0xba002848 of the cpoint.sys kernel driver shipped with Panda 
Internet Security/Antivirus+Firewall 2008 accepts user supplied input that 
doesn't get validated enough. In consequence it is possible to cause an 
out-of-bound write in kernel memory.

Disassembly of cpoint.sys (Windows Vista 32bit version):

[...]
.text:00012633 loc_12633:
.text:00012633                 mov     edx, 0BA002848h <-- (1)
.text:00012638                 cmp     ecx, edx
.text:0001263A                 ja      loc_12946
[...]
.text:00012640                 jz      loc_128BE
[...]
.text:000128BE loc_128BE:
.text:000128BE                 cmp     [ebp+IOCTL_INPUT_SIZE], 1008h <-- (2)
.text:000128C5                 jb      loc_12A7D
[...]
.text:000128CB                 mov     esi, [ebp+IOCTL_INPUT_DATA] <-- (3)
.text:000128CE                 cmp     dword ptr [esi], 3F256B9Ah <-- (4)
.text:000128D4                 jnz     loc_12A7D
[...]
.text:000128FF                 xor     eax, eax
.text:00012901                 cmp     [esi+8], eax <-- (5)
.text:00012904                 jbe     short loc_1291B 
[...]

(1) Vulnerable IOCTL call
(2) IOCTL input size check
(3) The user supplied data is copied into esi
(4) + (5) Minor input data checks

- From this point there are two different vulnerable code paths. Both will be 
described in the following:

Vulnerable code path 1:

[...]
.text:00012906                 lea     ecx, [esi+0Ch] <-- (6)
[...]
.text:00012909 loc_12909:
.text:00012909                 mov     edx, [ecx] <-- (7)
.text:0001290B                 mov     OVERWRITTEN_DATA[eax*4], edx <-- (8)
.text:00012912                 inc     eax
.text:00012913                 add     ecx, 4
.text:00012916                 cmp     eax, [esi+8] <-- (9)
.text:00012919                 jb      short loc_12909
[...]

(6) Some user controlled data is copied into ecx
(7) The user controlled data is copied into edx
(8) The user controlled data is copied (as dwords) at the memory location 
    OVERWRITTEN_DATA
(9) The size of the copied data (loop counter in eax) can be controlled by the 
    user

This leads to an out-of-bound write in kernel memory.

Vulnerable code path 2:

[...]
.text:0001291B loc_1291B:
.text:0001291B                 xor     eax, eax
.text:0001291D                 cmp     [esi+10Ch], eax <-- (10)
.text:00012923                 jbe     loc_129B4
[...]
.text:00012929                 lea     ecx, [esi+110h] <-- (11)
[...]
.text:0001292F loc_1292F:
.text:0001292F                 mov     edx, [ecx] <-- (12)
.text:00012931                 mov     OVERWRITTEN_DATA2[eax*4], edx <-- (13)
.text:00012938                 inc     eax
.text:00012939                 add     ecx, 4
.text:0001293C                 cmp     eax, [esi+10Ch] <-- (14)
.text:00012942                 jb      short loc_1292F
[...]

(10) Minor check of the user controlled data
(11) Some user controlled data is copied into ecx
(12) The user controlled data is copied into edx
(13) The user controlled data is copied (as dwords) at the memory location 
     OVERWRITTEN_DATA2
(14) The size of the copied data (loop counter in eax) can be controlled by the 
     user

This leads to an out-of-bound write in kernel memory.

In both cases it is possible to write an arbitrary amount of user controlled 
data into kernel memory. As the data that gets overwritten is in the data 
section of the cpoint.sys kernel driver it is possible to control adjacent data 
structures (e.g. some KEVENT structures). If these structures are overwritten 
with carefully crafted data it is possible to force the windows kernel into 
performing a memory corruption that leads to full control of the kernel 
execution flow.


========Solution:
========
  Hotfix for Panda Internet Security 2008:

http://www.pandasecurity.com/homeusers/support/card?id=41337&idIdioma=2&ref=ProdExp 

  Hotfix for Panda Antivirus+Firewall 2008:

http://www.pandasecurity.com/homeusers/support/card?id=41231&idIdioma=2&ref=ProdExp 


=======History:
=======
2008/01/08 - Vendor notified using secure@pandasecurity.com 
  2008/01/13 - Vendor response with PGP key
  2008/01/14 - Detailed vulnerability information sent to the vendor
  2008/01/14 - Vendor acknowledges receipt of the information
  2008/01/16 - Vendor confirms the vulnerability
  2008/02/12 - Status update request sent to vendor
  2008/02/15 - Vendor response stating that a hotfix was developed
  2008/03/03 - Vendor sends time schedule for releasing the hotfix
  2008/03/07 - Vendor releases hotfix
  2008/03/08 - Full technical details released to general public


=======Credits:
=======
  Vulnerability found and advisory written by Tobias Klein.


==========References:
==========
[1] http://www.pandasecurity.com/homeusers/support/card?id=41337&idIdioma=2&ref=ProdExp 

[2] http://www.pandasecurity.com/homeusers/support/card?id=41231&idIdioma=2&ref=ProdExp 

[3] http://www.trapkit.de/advisories/TKADV2008-001.txt 


=======Changes:
=======
  Revision 0.1 - Initial draft release to the vendor
  Revision 1.0 - Public release


==========Disclaimer:
==========
The information within this advisory may change without notice. Use 
of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS 
condition. There are no warranties, implied or express, with regard 
to this information. In no event shall the author be liable for any 
direct or indirect damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection 
with the use or spread of this information. Any use of this 
information is at the user's own risk. 


=================PGP Signature Key:
=================
http://www.trapkit.de/advisories/tk-advisories-signature-key.asc 


Copyright 2008 Tobias Klein. All rights reserved.


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