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TUCoPS :: Security App Flaws :: bt1465.txt

Vulnerabilities in Kerio Personal Firewall






----- Original Message -----
From: "CORE Security Technologies Advisories" <advisories@coresecurity.com>
To: "Bugtraq" <bugtraq@securityfocus.com>
Sent: Monday, April 28, 2003 10:34 AM
Subject: CORE-2003-0305-02: Vulnerabilities in Kerio Personal Firewall


>                          Core Security Technologies Advisory
>                              http://www.coresecurity.com
>
>                       Vulnerabilities in Kerio Personal Firewall
>
>
>
> Date Published: 2003-04-28
>
> Last Update: 2003-04-28
>
> Advisory ID: CORE-2003-0305-02
>
> Bugtraq ID: 7179, 7180
>
> CVE Name: None currently assigned
>
> Title: Kerio Personal Firewall Replay Attack and Buffer Overflow
>
> Class: Design Error; Boundary Error Condition (Buffer Overflow)
>
> Remotely Exploitable: Yes
>
> Locally Exploitable: Yes
>
> Advisory URL:
>   http://www.coresecurity.com/common/showdoc.php?idx=314&idxseccion=10
>
> Vendors contacted:
>   - Kerio
>   We sent notifications mails to the following addresses:
>   security@kerio.com, support@kerio.com, webmaster@kerio.com,
>   kpf_bugs@kerio.com several times during March and April
>   (2003-03-11, 2003-03-24, 2003-04-10, 2003-04-24) and never
>   received an answer from Kerio.
>
> Release Mode: USER RELEASE
>
>
> *Vulnerability Description:*
>
>   Kerio Personal Firewall (KPF) is a firewall for workstations designed
>   to protect them against attacks from the Internet and the local
>   network. We found two security vulnerabilities in KPF's remote
>   administration system:
>
>   [BID 7179]
>   A replay attack is possible against the authenticated/encrypted
>   channel for remote administration. A design problem in the
>   authentication mechanism for remote administration allows an attacker
>   to replay captured packets from a valid remote administration session
>   in order to reproduce the administrator's directives to the personal
>   firewall.
>   For example if the attacker is able to sniff a valid session in which
>   the administrator disabled the firewall capabilities, then the
>   attacker will gain the ability to disable the personal firewall at
>   will at any time in the future.
>
>   [BID 7180]
>   A remotely exploitable buffer overflow exists in the administrator
>   authentication process.
>
>
> *Vulnerable Packages:*
>
>   Kerio Personal Firewall version 2.1.4 and previous versions.
>
>
> *Solution/Vendor Information/Workaround:*
>
>   Contact the vendor for a fix.
>   Workaround: disable the remote administration feature.
>
>
> *Credits:*
>
>   These vulnerabilities were found by Emiliano Kargieman, Hernán Gips
>   and Javier Burroni from Core Security Technologies during
>   Bugweek 2003 (March 3-7, 2003).
>
>
> *Technical Description - Exploit/Concept Code:*
>
>   We found two security vulnerabilities in Kerio PF's remote
>   administration system.
>
>   [BID 7179]
>   A replay attack is possible against the authenticated/encrypted
>   remote administration channel. As a result of a design problem in the
>   authentication mechanism for remote administration, it is possible
>   to replay a previously captured administration session.
>
>   If 'S' is the workstation running Kerio personal firewall and 'C' is
>   the administrator workstation, the following scheme shows the initial
>   key exchange and authentication packets for a remote administration
>   session:
>
>    S           C
>          <--- connect
>          ---> 10 bytes (0f 00 0a 00 01 00 00 00 02 00)
>   [*]    ---> 128 bytes (the initial 64 bytes are 0 and the last
>                          64 bytes are the 'public' key)
>          ---> 128 bytes (Everything is 0ed except the last 4 bytes
>                          [01 00 01 00])
>   [0]    <--- 4 bytes (00 00 00 40)
>   [1]    <--- 64 bytes (This 64 bytes change from session to session)
>   [2]    <--- 32 bytes (From now on, everything is encrypted and differs
>                         from session to session)
>          ---> 4 bytes ()
>   [3]    <--- 64 bytes (user authentication)
>          ........
>          ........  (The session continues with commands and responses)
>          ........
>
>   [*] The last 64 bytes of this packet are read from the file
>   'persfw.key' on the Kerio installation directory.
>
>   It was noted from analyzing these sessions that the first differences
>   between different sessions come from the administrator's workstation
>   'C'. This led us to try replaying an administration session as a
>   whole, with the unexpected result that it was deemed valid by 'S'.
>   This shows that in fact no randomization or serialization is used on
>   the 'server' side 'S', and thus there is no way for Kerio to ensure
>   that the session is new and not a replay of an old one.
>
>   As a result, an attacker with access to an encrypted administration
>   session can record the session and replay it to the server at a later
>   time to reissue the administration commands to the personal firewall.
>   The commands replayed can include enabling/disabling the firewall,
>   adding firewall rules, etc.
>
>
>   [BID 7180]
>   A remotely exploitable buffer overflow exists in the administrator
>   authentication process. When Administrator connects to the firewall a
>   handshake occurs in order to establish an encrypted session. The 4th
>   packet of the handshake (the first packet sent by the administrator)
>   is a 4 byte packet data, with a fixed number of 0x40 (64) indicating
>   the size of the following packet expected to contain the
>   administrator's key.
>   No boundary checks exist at the firewall side for processing this
>   data, and the recv() reads the 4 bytes and then attempts to read the
>   amount of data indicated by the 4 bytes to a buffer on the stack.
>   As a result an attacker connecting to the administration port on the
>   personal firewall can construct a packet sequence that will overflow
>   the buffer on the stack, allowing her to execute arbitrary code on
>   the machine running the personal firewall.
>
>   It is important to note that these packets are accepted by the
>   personal firewall before authentication of the administrator takes
>   place.
>
>   The following proof of concept Python script will make the program
>   jump to address 0x41414141. Note that there is enough space in the
>   buffer (approx. 1800 bytes) to insert a shell code.
>
> ---------------------
> import os
> import socket
> import struct
> import string
>
> def g():
>      fd = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
>      try:
>          fd.connect(('192.168.66.160', 44334))
>          fd.recv(10)
>          fd.recv(256)
>          fd.send(struct.pack('!L', 0x149c))
>          astr = 'A'*0x149c
>          fd.send(astr)
>
>      except Exception, e:
>          print e
>          pass
>
>      fd.close()
>
> g()
> ---------------------
>
>
>
> *About Core Security Technologies*
>
>   Core Security Technologies develops strategic security solutions for
>   Fortune 1000 corporations, government agencies and military
>   organizations. The company offers information security software and
>   services designed to assess risk and protect and manage information
>   assets.
>   Headquartered in Boston, MA, Core Security Technologies can be
>   reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at http://www.coresecurity.com.
>
>   To learn more about CORE IMPACT, the first comprehensive penetration
>   testing framework, visit:
>   http://www.coresecurity.com/products/coreimpact
>
>
> *DISCLAIMER:*
>
>   The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2003 CORE Security
>   Technologies and may be distributed freely provided that no fee is
>   charged for this distribution and proper credit is given.
>
> $Id: Kerio-advisory.txt,v 1.6 2003/04/28 14:52:05 carlos Exp $
>
>


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