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TUCoPS :: Network Appliances :: estation.txt

Remote users can remove files and alter the configuration of an Intel InBusiness E-mail Station.





www.rootshell.com
Security Bulletin #27
January 2nd, 2000 (Happy New Year!)

[ http://www.rootshell.com/ ]

(C) 1999-2000 Rootshell - Duplication permitted provided that this advisory
is not modififed in any way.

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01. Intel InBusiness E-mail Station
-----------------------------------

http://www.intel.com/network/smallbiz/inbusiness_email.htm

The Intel InBusiness E-mail Station is a small application server designed
for the small office.

Summary
-------
Unauthenticated remote attackers can remove arbitrary files from the hard
drive, and alter the configuration of the e-mail station.  Under certain
configurations it is possible for a remote user to read the e-mail of any
user on the server.

Affected Versions
-----------------
All versions <= v1.04.  At the time of this advisory there is NOT an
available fix.  If you have a firewall we suggest you filter port 244. 

Should a patch ever become available, we believe it would be posted here :

http://support.intel.com/support/inbusiness/emailstation/index.htm

Details
-------

Sept. 24, 1997 Intel announced it had agreed to acquire Dayna Communications
Inc.  All Dayna products were discontinued as of June 1998, while a subset
of their products was merged into the InBusiness product line.

The e-mail station runs the VxWorks operating system on a 486 SX25
processor.

A daemon called "daynad" is bound to TCP port 244 in the e-mail station.  We
believe that this portion of the code is from the product line that they
acquired.

Upon close examination it was discovered that many commands can be executed
when connecting to this service, without ANY AUTHENTICATION.  By simply
making a TCP connection to this service, the following commands are
available :

"FormSet" Upon next reboot, the e-mail station will revert to factory
defaults.  This is the most interesting command.  By default the e-mail
station will use a DHCP server to get its IP address.  This means that the
next time the e-mail station reboots you can connect without a password and
take control of the entire unit.  While we have not located a method to
cause a reboot, a simple TCP SYN flood would result in the admin rebooting
the box for you.  We also found that a steady flood of fragmented UDP
packets freeze the IP stack leaving mbuf allocation errors in the event log.

"FormProtect" Upon next reboot, the e-mail station will revert to factory
defaults and have all passwords disabled.  The only way we found to recover
was to connect back to this service and use the "FormSet" command.

"MakeDir <directory>" Creates a directory on the hard drives filesystem.

"Remove <filename>" Removes the specified file from the hard drive. 
Interesting files being users mail spool files, etc.

"Z" This command drops you to a unix style login prompt.  From here the
super-user password is required to get any further.  If you have reset the
password using FormSet it is possible to login without a password. 
Interesting commands once you have logged in here include the ability to
format the internal IDE hard drive.

It is unclear if this daynad code is in other Intel or Dayna products.  If
you are the owner of other similar products it is suggested that you examine
all services running on their machines.

Timeline
--------
12/14/1999	Reported security hole to Intel.  Mr. Lee assured me they
would look into this right away and call me back.  I never got a call back.

12/20/1999	Called them again.  They insisted that they couldnt help me
without a serial number.  I didn't have the unit next to me so this proved
to be a large problem.  After checking with a supervisor I was given case
#862463.

12/21/1999	Received a call back from their engineering department
stating that they understand the problem, but do not believe it is severe
enough to warrant a fix.  They may correct the problem in a later software
release.




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