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TUCoPS :: Linux :: Apps A-M :: m-079.txt

Format String Vulnerability in ISC DHCPD (CIAC M-079)




             __________________________________________________________

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                     Computer Incident Advisory Center
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___
             __________________________________________________________

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

                    Format String Vulnerability in ISC DHCPD
                           [CERT Advisory CA-2002-12]

May 8, 2002 18:00 GMT                                             Number M-079
[Revised 24 May 2002]  
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM:       A format string vulnerability exists in ISC's DHCPD code that 
               logs the transaction. 
PLATFORM:      Any system running ISC DHCPD 3.0 to 3.0.1rc8 inclusive. 
DAMAGE:        A format string vulnerability may permit a remote attacker to 
               execute code with the privileges of the DHCPD (typically root). 
SOLUTION:      Apply the patch supplied by vendor. Depending on your network 
               configuration, CIAC recommends that you disable the DHCP 
               service. 
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY  The risk is MEDIUM. Neither CERT nor CIAC have seen active 
ASSESSMENT:    scanning or exploitation of this vulnerability. 
______________________________________________________________________________
LINKS: 
 CIAC BULLETIN:      http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/m-079.shtml 
 ORIGINAL BULLETIN:  http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-12.html 
 PATCHES:            - 24 May, 2002 - SuSe (Linux) Patches available
                     http://www.suse.de/de/support/security/2002_19_dhcp.html
______________________________________________________________________________

[***** Start CERT Advisory CA-2002-12 *****]

CERT Advisory CA-2002-12 Format String Vulnerability in ISC DHCPD

   Original release date: May 8, 2002
   Last revised:--
   Source: CERT/CC

   A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.

Systems Affected

     * ISC DHCPD 3.0 to 3.0.1rc8 inclusive

Overview

   The  Internet  Software  Consortium  (ISC)  provides  a  Dynamic  Host
   Configuration  Protocol Daemon (DHCPD), which is a server that is used
   to  allocate  network addresses and assign configuration parameters to
   hosts.  A  format string vulnerability may permit a remote attacker to
   execute  code  with  the  privileges of the DHCPD (typically root). We
   have not seen active scanning or exploitation of this vulnerability.

I. Description

   ISC's  DHCPD  listens  for requests from client machines connecting to
   the  network.  Versions 3 to 3.0.1rc8 (inclusive) of DHCPD contains an
   option (NSUPDATE) that is enabled by default. NSUPDATE allows the DHCP
   server  to  send  information  about  the host to the DNS server after
   processing  a  DHCP  request.  The  DNS  server responds by sending an
   acknowledgement  message  back  to  the  DHCP  server that may contain
   user-supplied  data  (like a host name). When the DHCP server receives
   the   acknowledgement  message  from  the  DNS  server,  it  logs  the
   transaction.

   A format string vulnerability exists in ISC's DHCPD code that logs the
   transaction.  This  vulnerability  may  permit  a  remote  attacker to
   execute code with the privileges of the DHCP daemon.

II. Impact

   A  remote  attacker may be able to execute code with the privileges of
   the DHCPD (typically root).

III. Solution

   Note  that  some  of  the  mitigation steps recommended below may have
   significant  impact on your normal network operations. Ensure that any
   changes   made   based  on  the  following  recommendations  will  not
   unacceptably affect any of your operations.

Apply a patch from your vendor

   Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory.

Disable the DHCP service

   As  a  general  rule,  the CERT/CC recommends disabling any service or
   capability  that is not explicitly required. Depending on your network
   configuration, you may not need to use DHCP.

Ingress filtering

   As  a temporary measure, it may be possible to limit the scope of this
   vulnerability  by  blocking  access  to  DHCP  services at the network
   perimeter.

   Ingress  filtering  manages the flow of traffic as it enters a network
   under your administrative control. In the network usage policy of many
   sites,  there  are  few reasons for external hosts to initiate inbound
   traffic  to  machines  that  provide no public services. Thus, ingress
   filtering  should  be  performed  at the border to prohibit externally
   initiated  inbound  traffic  to  non-authorized  services.  For  DHCP,
   ingress filtering of the following ports can prevent attackers outside
   of  your network from reaching vulnerable devices in the local network
   that are not explicitly authorized to provide public DHCP services.

   bootps     67/tcp     # Bootstrap Protocol Server
   bootps     67/udp     # Bootstrap Protocol Server
   bootpc     68/tcp     # Bootstrap Protocol Client
   bootpc     68/udp     # Bootstrap Protocol Client

Appendix A. - Vendor Information

   This  appendix  contains  information  provided  by  vendors  for this
   advisory.  As  vendors  report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
   update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
   particular  vendor is not listed below, please check the Vulnerability
   Note (VU#854315) or contact your vendor directly.

Alcatel

     The  security of our customers' networks is of highest priority for
     Alcatel.  Alcatel  is  aware  of  this  security  issue in the DHCP
     implementation of ISC and has put measures in place to assess which
     of  its products might be affected and to apply the necessary fixes
     where required. An update will be shortly published to provide more
     details on any affected products.

Conectiva

     Conectiva Linux 8 ships dhcp-3.0 and is vulnerable to this problem.
     Updates  will be available at our ftp site and an announcement will
     be  sent  to  our  mailing  lists  as  soon  as  CERT publishes its
     advisory.

F5 Networks, Inc.

     F5  Networks' products do not include any affected version of ISC's
     DHCPD, and are therefore not vulnerable.

FreeBSD

     The  FreeBSD base system does not ship with the ISC dhcpd server by
     default  and  is  not affected by this vulnerability. The ISC dhcpd
     server is available in the FreeBSD Ports Collection; updates to the
     ISC  dhcp  port (ports/net/isc-dhcp3) are in progress and corrected
     packages will be available in the near future.

IBM

     IBM's AIX operating system, all versions, is not vulnerable.

Internet Software Consortium

     A  patch  is  included  below, and we have a patched version of 3.0
     available (3.0pl1) and a new release candidate for the next bug-fix
     release (3.0.1RC9).  Both of these new releases are not vulnerable.

     --- common/print.c      Tue Apr  9 13:41:17 2002
     +++ common/print.c.patched      Tue Apr  9 13:41:56 2002
     @@ -1366,8 +1366,8 @@
                    *s++ = '.';
            *s++ = 0;
            if (errorp)
     -               log_error (obuf);
     +               log_error ("%s",obuf);
            else
     -               log_info (obuf);
     +               log_info ("%s",obuf);
     }
     #endif /* NSUPDATE */
     
Lotus Development Corporation

     This issue does not affect Lotus products.

Microsoft Corporation

     Microsoft does not ship the ISC DHCPD program.

NetBSD

     NetBSD  fixed  this  during  a  format  string  sweep  performed on
     11-Oct-2000.  No  released  version of NetBSD is vulnerable to this
     issue.

Silicon Graphics, Inc.

     SGI is not vulnerable.
     _________________________________________________________________

   The  CERT  Coordination  Center  acknowledges Next Generation Security
   Technologies  as  the discoverer of this vulnerability and thanks them
   and  the  Internet  Software  Consortium  (ISC) for their cooperation,
   reporting, and analysis of this vulnerability.
     _________________________________________________________________

   Feedback can be directed to the author: Ian A. Finlay
   ______________________________________________________________________

   This document is available from:
   http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-12.html
   ______________________________________________________________________

CERT/CC Contact Information

   Email: cert@cert.org
          Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
          Fax: +1 412-268-6989
          Postal address:
          CERT Coordination Center
          Software Engineering Institute
          Carnegie Mellon University
          Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
          U.S.A.

   CERT/CC   personnel   answer  the  hotline  08:00-17:00  EST(GMT-5)  /
   EDT(GMT-4)  Monday  through  Friday;  they are on call for emergencies
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Using encryption

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   http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key

   If  you  prefer  to  use  DES,  please  call the CERT hotline for more
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   ______________________________________________________________________

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     _________________________________________________________________

   Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information

   Copyright 2002 Carnegie Mellon University.

   Revision History
May 8, 2002:  Initial release

[***** End CERT Advisory CA-2002-12 *****]

_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of CERT for the 
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________


CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Center, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
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This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
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employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
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