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TUCoPS :: Linux :: Apps N-Z :: ciacg008.txt

splitvt(1) Vulnerability




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             __________________________________________________________

                         The U.S. Department of Energy
                      Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                             ___  __ __    _     ___
                            /       |     /_\   /
                            \___  __|__  /   \  \___
             __________________________________________________________

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

			   splitvt(1) vulnerability

January 9, 1995 2000 GMT                                           Number G-08
______________________________________________________________________________

PROBLEM:        A vulnerability has been discovered in splitvt(1) versions
		prior to 1.6.3 which may allow local users to gain root 
		access.
PLATFORM:	Slackware versions of Linux, also other Linux and UNIX
		operating systems with splitvt installed (pre-1.6.3 versions)
DAMAGE:         Users logged into a system may gain unauthorized root
		privileges.
SOLUTION:       Use the workaround contained in this bulletin to obtain an
		updated patched version of splitvt.
AVAILABILITY:	See the workaround that is contained in this bulletin
______________________________________________________________________________

VULNERABILITY   Unprivileged users who are logged on to a system can use this 
ASSESSMENT:     vulnerability to gain unauthorized root privileges.  An 
		exploit program for this vulnerability has been published
		publically. CIAC advises that the workaround described below 
		be performed immediately.
______________________________________________________________________________

[The following information has been reprinted from the AUSCERT bulletin,
 number AL-95.06a, January 3rd, 1996]

	      Information on the splitvt(1) vulnerability

A vulnerability has been discovered in the splitvt(1) utility which may allow
local users to gain root access.  This utility is included in many
standard Linux distributions including, but not necessarily limited to,
numerous Slackware versions.  The source code for this utility is publicly
available and operating systems other than Linux which have splitvt(1)
installed may also be vulnerable.

This vulnerability exists in splitvt(1) versions prior to 1.6.3.

Description
- -----------
The splitvt(1) utility is a publicly available program for running
multiple shells in a split window.  A vulnerability exists in versions
prior to 1.6.3 which may allow users to gain root access.  The version
may be identified using the command "splitvt -version".	

The splitvt(1) utility is included as part of the standard installation
of numerous Slackware Linux distributions.  Other Linux distributions
and sites which are not running Linux, but have splitvt(1) installed,
may also be vulnerable.

Workaround
- ----------
This vulnerability has been removed in splitvt version 1.6.3.  Sites
that require splitvt(1) are encouraged to upgrade to this version.  It
is available from:

         ftp://dandelion.ceres.ca.gov/pub/splitvt

    The MD5 checksum is:

         MD5 (splitvt-1.6.3.tar) = eec2fe2c5b4a3958261197905a9d9c81

    An interim solution until the official patch is installed is to restrict 
    the permissions and remove the setuid bit from splitvt(1).  As root:

	# chmod 700 /usr/bin/splitvt

    Note: This workaround causes splitvt(1) to become unavailable for
    use by non privileged users.

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUSCERT wishes to thank Sam Lantinga for his rapid response in addressing
this vulnerability and Alexander O. Yuriev for his assistance in this matter.
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the AUSCERT team for providing the information 
contained in this bulletin.
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and 
the backup team for the National Institute of Health (NIH). CIAC is located 
at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC 
is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and 
Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and 
coordination among computer security teams worldwide.

CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be 
contacted at:
    Voice:    +1 510-422-8193
    FAX:      +1 510-423-8002
    STU-III:  +1 510-423-2604
    E-mail:   ciac@llnl.gov

For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the 
NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), call 
the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message, or call 800-759-7243 
(800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two Sky Page PIN numbers, the 
primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC duty person, and the secondary 
PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC Project Leader.

Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are 
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. 

   World Wide Web:      http://ciac.llnl.gov/
   Anonymous FTP:       ciac.llnl.gov (128.115.19.53)
   Modem access:        +1 (510) 423-4753 (14.4K baud)
                        +1 (510) 423-3331 (14.4K baud)

CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic publications:
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical information 
   and Bulletins, important computer security information;
2. CIAC-NOTES for Notes, a collection of computer security articles;
3. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector (SPI) 
   software updates, new features, distribution and availability;
4. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the use of 
   SPI products.

Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called 
ListProcessor, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add 
yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the following request as the 
E-mail message body, substituting CIAC-BULLETIN, CIAC-NOTES, SPI-ANNOUNCE or 
SPI-NOTES for list-name and valid information for LastName FirstName and 
PhoneNumber when sending

E-mail to       ciac-listproc@llnl.gov:
        subscribe list-name LastName, FirstName PhoneNumber
  e.g., subscribe ciac-notes OHara, Scarlett W. 404-555-1212 x36

You will receive an acknowledgment containing address, initial PIN, and 
information on how to change either of them, cancel your subscription, or 
get help. 

PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing 
communities receive CIAC bulletins.  If you are not part of these communities,
please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's 
team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security 
Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member 
organizations and their constituencies can be obtained by sending email to 
docserver@first.org with an empty subject line and a message body containing 
the line: send first-contacts.

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the
United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the
University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty,
express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the
accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product,
or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process,
or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not
necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by
the United States Government or the University of California. The views and
opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those
of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not
be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

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