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TUCoPS :: HP/UX :: ciacd005.txt

HP-UX NIS Ypbind





			RESTRICTIONS: NONE 

          _____________________________________________________
              The Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                          ___  __ __    _     ___
                         /       |     / \   /
                         \___  __|__  /___\  \___ 
          _____________________________________________________
                          Information Bulletin

             Revised Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind Vulnerability

January 22, 1993, 1400 PST		   	              Number D-05

_________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM:   Allows unauthorized access to NIS data.
PLATFORM:  HP/UX Operating System for series 300, 700, and 800 computers.
DAMAGE:    Remote and local users can obtain unauthorized privileges.
SOLUTION:  Install revised patches. 
_________________________________________________________________________
          Critical Information about Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind

The inclosed advisory was issued by the Computer Emergency Response
Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) and is an update to a previous
advisory CA-92:17.

=============================================================================
CA-93:01                         CERT Advisory
                               January 13, 1993
                Revised Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind Vulnerability

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   *** THIS IS A REVISED CERT ADVISORY ***
   *** IT CONTAINS NEW INFORMATION REGARDING AVAILABILITY OF IMAGE KITS ***
                  *** SUPERSEDES CERT ADVISORY CA-92:17 ***

The CERT Coordination Center has received information concerning a
vulnerability in the NIS ypbind module for the Hewlett-Packard (HP)
HP/UX Operating System for series 300, 700, and 800 computers. 

HP has provided revised patches for all of the HP/UX level 8 releases
(8.0, 8.02, 8.06, and 8.07).  This problem is fixed in HP/UX 9.0.
The following patches have been superseded:

              Patch ID        Replaced by Patch ID
              PHNE_1359       PHNE_1706
              PHNE_1360       PHNE_1707
              PHNE_1361       PHNE_1708

All HP NIS clients and servers running ypbind should obtain and 
install the patch appropriate for their machine's architecture
as described below.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

I.   Description

     A vulnerability in HP NIS allows unauthorized access to NIS data.

II.  Impact

     Root on a remote host running any vendor's implementation of NIS
     can gain root access on any local host running HP's NIS ypbind. 
     Local users of a host running HP's NIS ypbind can also gain root access.

III. Solution
        
     1) All HP NIS clients and servers running ypbind should obtain and 
        install the patch appropriate for their machine's architecture.

        These patches contain a version of ypbind that accepts ypset
        requests only from a superuser port on the local host.  This prevents
        a non-superuser program from sending rogue ypset requests to ypbind.
        The patches also include the mod from the superseded patches that 
        prevents a superuser on a remote system from issuing a ypset -h 
        command to the local system and binding the system to a rogue ypserver.

        These patches may be obtained from HP via FTP (this is NOT
        anonymous FTP) or the HP SupportLine.  To obtain HP security
        patches, you must first register with the HP SupportLine.
        The registration instructions are available via anonymous FTP at
        cert.org (192.88.209.5) in the file
	            "pub/vendors/hp/supportline_and_patch_retrieval".
        The new patch files are:

     Architecture Patch ID   Filename                               Checksum
     ------------ --------   --------                               --------
     Series 300   PHNE_1706  /hp-ux_patches/s300_400/8.X/PHNE_1706  38955 212
     Series 700   PHNE_1707  /hp-ux_patches/s700/8.X/PHNE_1707        815 311
     Series 800   PHNE_1708  /hp-ux_patches/s800/8.X/PHNE_1708      56971 299

     2) The instructions for installing the patch are provided in the
        PHNE_xxxx.text file (this file is created after the patch has
        been unpacked).

        The checksums listed above are for the patch archive files from HP.
        Once unpacked, each shell archive contains additional checksum 
        information in the file "patchfilename.text".  This checksum is
        applicable to the binary patch file "patchfilename.updt".


If you have any questions about obtaining or installing the patches,
contact the USA HP SupportLine at 415-691-3888, or your local HP
SupportLine number.  Please note that the telephone numbers in this
advisory are appropriate for the USA and Canada. 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CERT Coordination Center wishes to thank Brian Kelley of Ford Motor
Company for bringing this vulnerability to our attention.  We would also
like to thank Hewlett-Packard for their response to this problem. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
===========================================================================
CIAC would like to acknowledge the contributions of: CERT/CC.

For additional information or assistance, please contact CIAC at
(510)422-8193/FTS or send E-mail to ciac@llnl.gov. FAX messages to
(510)423-8002/FTS.

The CIAC Bulletin Board, Felicia, can be accessed at 1200 or 2400
baud at (510) 423-4753 and 9600 baud at (510) 423-3331.
Previous CIAC bulletins and other information is available via
anonymous ftp from irbis.llnl.gov (ip address 128.115.19.60).

PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE and ESnet computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins.  If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents.  Some of the other teams include the NASA NSI response team,
DARPA's CERT/CC, NAVCIRT, and the Air Force response team.  Your
agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization.  A list of
FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained by
sending email to Docserver@First.Org with a null subject line, and the
first line of the message reading: send first-contacts.

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency
of the United States Government.  Neither the United States Government
nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any
warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or
responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any
information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents
that its use would not infringe privately owned rights.  Reference
herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by
trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily
constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the
United States Government or the University of California.  The views
and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or
reflect those of the United States Government or the University of
California, and shall not be used for advertising or product
endorsement purposes.




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