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TUCoPS :: General Information :: hack5288.htm

TCP/IP remote timing to learn secret info whitepaper



19th Apr 2002 [SBWID-5288]
COMMAND

        TCP/IP remote timing to learn secret info whitepaper

SYSTEMS AFFECTED

        All that does not implement random timing for authentification

PROBLEM

	In Mauro Lacy whitepaper :
	

	http://maurol.com.ar/security/RTT.pdf

	http://www.maurol.com.ar/security/rtt.tgz

	

	

	

	Introduction

	

	This paper describes remote timing techniques based on TCP/IP  intrinsic
	operation and options. The techniques are used for  careful  observation
	of the TCP/IP data stream to detect timing differences in the  operation
	of the remote application  and  relate  them  to  selected  data  and/or
	phenomena.
	

	

	Basics

	

	The methods will be made clear with a practical  example,  developed  in
	this paper.
	 Suppose that we want to know if a given username exists or not in a remote system. What we can attempt to do is to carefully look for processing timing differences in the remote logon process, between the path taken by the remote application when a given username exists, and when it doesn\'t. If we find a statistical difference (no matter how small) between the two instances, we can determine if the username exists or not.

	For this method to work, some conditions must be met. First  of  all,  a
	relatively appreciable difference in the processing  times  of  the  two
	different processing paths must exist. If this  difference  exists,  the
	problem now is, how can we get  a  detailed  estimation  of  the  remote
	processing times of each processing path, given such facts  as  variable
	network latency and packet loss, variable loads on  the  remote  system,
	local factors, and such.
	

	

	Causes of Appreciable Processing Time Differences

	

	The initial  cause  of  timing  differences  must  be,  of  course,  the
	application\'s  different  processing  paths  itself.  Now,   for   this
	difference to become appreciable, some slow event must occur in  one  of
	the paths and not in the other. A typical \"slow event\" in a  computer,
	is disk access.  Other  main  cause  of  \"slowness\"  is  the  computer
	itself. The examples in this paper were tested  on  relatively  \"slow\"
	(old) computers, and could not be reproducible in all environments.
	

	

	Remote Timing Techniques (RTT)
	

	

	Timestamps

	

	Timestamps were added to TCP to allow precise estimation  of  the  Round
	Trip Time (RTT), which is necessary on high bandwidth networks to  avoid
	data loss and/or congestion. As a  side  effect,  they  also  allow  (at
	least  in  some  implementations),  \"precise\"  estimation  of   remote
	processing times, given birth to a series of new  techniques,  which  we
	will also denominate RTT (Remote  Timing  Techniques).  For  a  detailed
	description  of  timestamps,  see  RFC  1323.  The  precision   of   the
	estimation depends on  the  frequency  of  the  timestamp  clock,  which
	according to the RFC can vary  from  1ms  to  1sec.  The  implementation
	differences in the frequency of this clock are what  render  the  method
	useful (or not) with  respect  to  the  techniques  described  here.  In
	Appendix A you will find a table  with  the  different  timestamp  clock
	frequencies by operating system. Incidentally, timestamps  can  also  be
	used in some cases to know the uptime of the remote  system,  and/or  to
	distinguish between different systems in a  load  balanced  environment.
	See Appendix B for references. Timestamps are a relatively new  addition
	to the TCP/IP protocols (1992, see RFC 1323), and are  consequently  not
	supported by all operating systems, are also not enabled by  default  in
	some OSs, and lastly, their implementation make  timestamps  not  always
	useful with regard to the techniques described here.
	

	TCP Intrinsic Operation

	

	The other method found, which is in some  cases  much  more  \"precise\"
	(and therefore useful)  than  timestamps  to  discriminate  between  two
	different remote  paths  of  execution,  is  related  to  the  intrinsic
	operation of the TCP/IP protocol. It is simply the  fact  that  the  ACK
	and \"PUSH\" flags can be sent together in the  same  packet,  depending
	on if the application layer had passed the data or not to the TCP  stack
	for delivery before the stack \"ACKs\"  a  previously  received  segment
	from the client. That is, if the server stack has something to  ACK  and
	at the same time has some data to send to the client,  it  \"ACKs\"  and
	\"PUSH\" at the same time (in the same packet), but if  the  application
	is busy doing some other slow thing (like writing to disk)  and  didn\'t
	pass the data to the TCP stack quickly, the TCP  stack  sends  a  packet
	with only the pending ACKS (no data) and this difference can  be  easily
	detected on the client side.  This  technique  is  in  some  cases  even
	better than timestamps, due to the fact that its  \"frequency\"  depends
	on the implementation of the TCP stack itself, and must be  much  faster
	(I don\'t know with certainty) than typical timestamp clocks.  Moreover,
	this \"frequency\" is probably not fixed (i.e.: 100/se! c)  but  depends
	on  the  speed  of  the  processor,  and  its  \"precision\"   increases
	accordingly when the processing speed increases. The other advantage  of
	this technique is that is common to  all  TCP  implementations,  and  is
	therefore always \"enabled\" and available in all  systems  with  a  TCP
	stack.
	

	Due that the timestamp information and the ACK and  PUSH  states  depend
	completely on the operation of the remote system, and are passed to  the
	client side as a kind  of  \"snapshot\"  of  the  remote  system,  these
	methods are completely immune to network latency  variations.  They  are
	also statistically immune to packet loss and  load  variations,  and  to
	other variable factors  (disk  IO,  buffer  cache,  etc)  being  anyways
	necessary to increase the number of probes in case of small  differences
	and/or great variations in the aforementioned factors.
	

	Through careful examination of  the  behavior  of  the  TCP  data  flow,
	observing  the  TCP  headers  at  the  right  moments,  is  possible  to
	statistically determine (by example) if a given username exists  or  not
	on a remote system, under the particular circumstances detailed below.
	

	

	Proof of Concept

	

	This example was tried successfully in two Linux boxes,  one  with  Suse
	7.0 (kernel 2.2.16) and the other with RedHat 6.2  with  kernel  2.2.12.
	Both machines are relatively \"old\" machines, a Pentium II  366  and  a
	Pentium MMX 233, both with standard IDE disks. Many tests remain  to  be
	done, but I dare to say that the essential  point  seems  to  be  mostly
	software related, that is, related to the way the remote application  or
	service is written, than to the hardware used.  The  techniques  can  be
	tried on any type of authentication process  over  TCP.  Other  uses  of
	these techniques  can  also  be  found.  Linux  has  a  timestamp  clock
	frequency of 1000/s (1ms),  which  isn\'t  very  good,  but  is  anyways
	useful. Delays greater than 1ms are typical of hard disks, and from  the
	point of view of the application they remain statistically greater  than
	1ms independently of  the  buffer  cache  (at  least  with  IDE  disks).
	Apropos, Cisco IOS implements  a  timestamp  clock  period  of  .1ms(!),
	although timestamps are disabled by default.
	

	

	Description of Operation

	

	Tcpdump is run in the background to capture the specific  data  flow  (a
	telnet logon session) and  an  automated  telnet  session  is  initiated
	against the remote system, with a  chosen  username/password  pair.  The
	password is used as a mark in the stream. The specific  point  at  which
	the analysis must be made is detected (using  the  password  mark),  and
	the script outputs the TCP flags and the  remote  timestamp  differences
	at that point. The later is possible due to  the  fact  that  Linux  had
	timestamps enabled by default (2.2.x kernels) and also because it  sends
	timestamps in both directions (encouraged by the  RFC  for  simplicity).
	If you note statistical differences  between  probes  with  a  known  to
	exist username (root, bin, lp, sys, etc) and probes with a known  to  be
	un-existent  username  (i.e.:   dskhjgfjh),   the   remote   system   is
	vulnerable. The  number  of  probes  doesn\'t  need  to  be  very  large
	(between 1 and 20) but in case of small differences, could be  necessary
	to increase them. The probes will generate logs  in  the  remote  system
	(indeed, the processing time involved with these logs could  be  one  of
	the causes of the timing differences) and, as  long  as  you  made  more
	probes, more logs will be generated.
	

	

	Statistical Differences Detected

	

	- In this particular example, in case that the  username  exits  on  the
	remote system, the first packet sent by  the  remote  system  after  the
	password was sent by the client, tends to be an \"empty\" (no data)  ACK
	packet. This does not happen always, and some probes need to be done.
	

	Due to the fact that the data arrives almost always just  a  little  bit
	later from the application layer to the TCP stack, and  is  then  almost
	immediately sent to the client, the difference of the timestamps of  the
	data packet and the previous ACK packet tends to zero in these cases.
	

	-	In case that the username does not exist, the packet  tends  to  be  a
	data packet (ACK+\"PUSH\"). The  timestamp  differences  with  the  next
	packet (typically other ACK+data packet,  the  next  \"login:\"  banner)
	tend to be relatively big.
	

	So, when the username exists, the mean of the timestamp  differences  of
	the probes tend to be smaller than the mean of the  differences  if  the
	username does not exist. If timestamps are not enabled, you  can  detect
	the difference anyway (!): The number of times you\'ll see an  \"empty\"
	(no application data) ACK packet (again at the right place of  the  data
	stream) will be greater if the username exist than the number  of  times
	you\'ll see it if the username doesn\'t exist. Of course,  even  without
	this  information,  the  difference  could  be  statistically   detected
	anyway. More (maybe many more) probes will  be  necessary,  to  overcome
	the measurement errors introduced mainly by network latency  variations.
	On  networks  with  high  latency  variations,  this  could  yield   the
	\"attack\" highly unpractical. The techniques described here are  useful
	to diminish the measurement errors over TCP network  links,  diminishing
	then the number of probes  or  samples  necessary  to  detect  a  timing
	difference,  thus  yielding  some  otherwise  unfeasible  or   expensive
	attacks feasible.
	

	

	Other Services

	

	Other tested services known to be vulnerable to this kind of  \"attack\"
	are:
	

	- rlogin: rlogind also gives us the  same  information,  but  after  two
	passwords are entered. (In the pause between the second  password  entry
	and the \"Login incorrect\" message. As  long  as  the  standard  rlogin
	command \"clears\" its standard input before asking for a  password,  no
	automation is possible  without  replacing  it  with  other  version  or
	reproducing the protocol manually.
	

	- ftp: wu-ftp seems to be  vulnerable  also,  just  after  entering  the
	username (after the USER command). A slight  difference  of  around  1ms
	was statistically detected using the timestamp information, on the  Suse
	distribution.
	

	Services that remain to be tested:
	

	- imap
	

	- pop
	

	- rexec
	

	- Auth services over http.
	

	- ssh: ssh (or any other encrypted protocol) is a particular  case,  due
	to the fact that an eavesdropping attack makes  sense  in  these  cases.
	The techniques described here could be used (by example) to extend  Paul
	Kocher attack (see References) over a network  protocol  (i.e.  to  make
	the attack remotely possible).
	

	- ...
	

	All tests were done only on Linux, mainly on the machine with  the  Suse
	distribution. Other operating systems and services remain to be tested.
	

	

	Probable cause of the differences

	

	The probable cause (not verified) of the  differences  in  both  systems
	seems to be the difference in the logging  done  trough  syslog  if  the
	username exists or if  not.  In  the  Suse  distribution,  particularly,
	faillog logging is enabled by default, and this logging occurs  only  if
	the username exists (and the logon failed, of  course).  Other  probable
	(also  unverified)  cause  of  the  differences  could  lie  inside  the
	implementation of the various pam modules on which Linux  authentication
	depends. If pam were the  cause,  the  same  effect  would  have  to  be
	observable in all the services that  relay  on  pam  for  authentication
	(the default).
	

	

	Possible Solutions

	

	As long as at least one of  the  techniques  depends  on  the  intrinsic
	operation of the TCP stacks, no easy solution  seems  to  be  available.
	With regard to timestamps, a partial solution would be to  increase  the
	period of the  timestamp  clock,  let\'s  say,  to  50ms  or  more.  But
	probably, statistical differences would show up in the  long  term.  The
	\"problem\" of the intrinsic operation of  the  TCP  stack  would  still
	remain. The only definitive solution seems to be to modify the  code  of
	the vulnerable services, in order to avoid  the  \"leaking\"  of  timing
	information, by example introducing random  delays,  or  better,  always
	sending data packets to the client with no pending  ACKS  in  them  (and
	random  delays  for  timestamps).  A  \"send\"   function   with   these
	characteristics wouldn\'t be so difficult to write and use.
	

	

	Other Applications And Uses

	

	I\'ll quote here a comment by Paul Kocher, who  told  me  in  a  private
	communication
	

	\"You might want to try some ... statistical attacks ...  ...  --  using
	them, even very tiny differences (<1 us)  can  be  resolved  even  if
	there is quite a lot of measurement error (>1 ms)... . The general  math
	required is quite simple -  you\'d  want  to  look  for  the  difference
	between the *average* time when [for example] n bytes of a password  are
	correct and the  average  time  when  n+1  bytes  of  the  password  are
	correct.\"
	

	That is, the only necessary thing to detect a timing  difference  is  to
	take enough samples or to make  enough  probes  for  the  difference  to
	become statistically appreciable. The number of probes or  samples  will
	be directly proportional to the  measurement  error  (that  is,  to  the
	variance  of  the  measurements),  and  inversely  proportional  to  the
	variance of the timing difference to detect (from Kocher paper).
		I want to make clear here, before generating unnecessary alarms, that Mr. Kocher is talking about an hypothetical case. At least in Unix, passwords can\'t be revealed this way due to the fact that in the encryption process the correlation between clear text and encrypted password is lost; an incorrect clear text password \"closer\" to a correct one, does not yield an encrypted password closer to the real encrypted password. Thus, no \"password approximation\" is possible.

	

	An obvious practical use of these techniques is as an addition  to,  for
	example,  a  brute  force  username/password  tester,  to  avoid  trying
	username/password combinations with an inexistent username. The  program
	could start testing username/password pairs normally, at the  same  time
	that it monitors the  data  flow  to  statistically  detect  the  actual
	username existence or inexistence, changing its behavior accordingly.
	

	Timestamps could also be  used  to  precisely  measure  inter  keystroke
	timings of an interactive encrypted session; so, they can  be  used,  by
	example,  to  greatly  improve  the  efficiency  and  precision  of  the
	\"Herbivore\" system (see Wagner et al), especially over networks  links
	with big latency variations.
	

	Other uses  of  these  techniques  could  be  discovered  or  developed.
	(directory  and/or  file  discovery?,  fingerprinting  issues?,   ...?).
	Generally  speaking,  whenever  a  timing  difference  is  identified(by
	source code analysis, by example), RTT could be used to  \"measure\"  or
	detect that difference remotely over TCP.
	

	

	Source code

	

	The appendix B contains scripts that will do the hard work for you.  You
	probably  would  have  to  make  some  manual  adjustments,  mainly  the
	interface name(s), needed by tcpdump. The scripts were  written  without
	taking into account security practices (i.e. writing  \"secure\"  code).
	They are probably even remotely exploitable.
	

	

	Conclusions

	

	Although the particular example shown here does not yield a  great  deal
	of information (just the knowledge of if a given user exists or  not  on
	a remote system) and is successful only if a series  of  conditions  are
	met, the techniques used to know this little bit of information are  new
	(as far as I know), and probably they could be used in many other  ways.
	TCP  timestamps  could  yield  a  \"precise\"  timing  of   the   remote
	processing paths, what can be  potentially  useful  for  many  different
	purposes. In particular, some operating systems  seem  to  have  a  much
	more  precise  timestamp  clock  than   Linux,   and   this   open   new
	possibilities to experimentation. On the  other  side,  given  the  fact
	that one of the techniques (observing TCP flags)  is  intrinsic  to  TCP
	operation, its application is feasible  wherever  a  TCP  connection  is
	being used.
	

	

	Acknowledgments

	

	Thanks to  David  Wagner,  Paul  Kocher  and  Brett  McDanel  for  their
	suggestions and comments.
	

	

	Appendix A: Table of Operating Systems and Timestamp Clock Frequency.
	

	See Bret McDanel Work (Appendix B)

	

	Appendix B: References and Related Works
	

	RFC 1323						http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/cgi-bin/rfc/rfc1323.html

	Bret McDanel Paper on Timestamps			http://www.mcdanel.com/bret/research/tcp_timestamp.jsp

	Paul Kocher Timing Attack Paper				http://www.cryptography.com/timingattack/paper.html

	Dawn Xiaodong Song, David Wagner and Xuqing Tian Paper on

	Timing Attacks on SSH					http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/sec01/song.html

	PDF Version of this Paper				http://www.maurol.com.ar/security/RTT.pdf

	

	Appendix C: Source Code
	

	-------------------------------------------------------------rtt.sh-----------------------------------------------------------------------

	#!/bin/bash

	# Probe a telnet service using remote timing techniques

	# to determine if a user exist or not.

	# Proof of Concept code. 

	# (C) 2002 maurol (maurol@mail.com)

	

	# Customize these if needed:

	LOOPBACK=lo

	LAN=eth0

	#WAN=eth0

	WAN=ppp0

	

	# Default interface to listen to

	#IFACE=$LAN

	IFACE=$WAN

	

	# Default port

	PORT=23

	# Default number of probes

	COUNT=10

	# Time in seconds to wait before sending the username. For slow links

	# and/or no reverse dns resolution this could be as big as 25.

	LAN_SLEEP=1

	WAN_SLEEP=6

	#SLEEP=$LAN_SLEEP

	SLEEP=$WAN_SLEEP

	

	if [ $# -lt 2 ]

	then

		echo \"Usage: $0 <ip> <user> [count] [sleep]\"

		echo \"ip   : IP address of remote system.\"

		echo \"user : Username to probe.\"

		echo \"count: Number of probes.\"

		echo \"sleep: Initial sleep in seconds.\"

		exit 1

	fi

	

	HOST=$1

	USER=$2

	

	[ \"$HOST\" = \"127.0.0.1\" ] && IFACE=$LOOPBACK

	if echo $HOST | grep -E \"^10\\.|^192\\.168\\.\" >/dev/null

	then

		IFACE=$LAN

	fi

	

	[ \"$IFACE\" = \"$LOOPBACK\" ] && SLEEP=$LAN_SLEEP

	[ \"$IFACE\" = \"$LAN\" ] && SLEEP=$LAN_SLEEP

	[ \"$IFACE\" = \"$WAN\" ] && SLEEP=$WAN_SLEEP

	

	PASS=zzzzz

	export PASS

	

	[ -z \"$3\" ] || COUNT=$3

	[ -z \"$4\" ] || SLEEP=$4

	

	export IFACE HOST PORT USER

	

	MEAN=./mean

	VAR=./var

	

	[ -x $MEAN ] || cc -o mean mean.c

	#[ -x $VAR ]  || cc -o var -lm var.c

	

	>tests.$USER

	c=0

	while [ $c -lt $COUNT ]

	do

	# Launch the capture script in the background

		(./capture.sh >/tmp/regs.$$ ; ./dif.sh /tmp/regs.$$ | tee -a tests.$USER; rm -f /tmp/regs.$$) &

	# Start telnet session

		(sleep $SLEEP; echo $USER; sleep 1 ; echo $PASS ; sleep 3)| telnet $HOST

		c=`expr $c + 1`

		sleep 1

	done

	echo

	(

	cat tests.$USER | egrep -v \"^[ 	]*$\"

	echo -n \"mean:	\" ; cat tests.$USER | egrep -v \"^[ 	]*$\" | $MEAN 2 ;echo

	#echo -n \"var.:	\" ; cat tests.$USER | egrep -v \"^[ 	]*$\" | ./var.sh 2 ;echo

	) | tee stats.$USER ; rm -f tests.$USER

	----------------------------------------------------------------capture.sh---------------------------------------------------------------------

	#!/bin/bash

	# Captures the telnet session and seeks the useful timestamps and flags.

	

	HEX=/usr/bin/hex

	TCPDUMP=/usr/sbin/tcpdump

	

	if [ -x $HEX ]

	then

		PATTERN=`echo $PASS | $HEX -w 3 -g | head -1 | sed \"s/^[^ ]* //;s/ //\" | cut -c-7| sed \"s/[ 	]*$//\"`

	else

		PATTERN=\"7a7a 7a\"		# \"zz z\" ;-)

	fi

	

	if [ -x $TCPDUMP ]

	then

		$TCPDUMP -l -n -n -i $IFACE -x port $PORT > /tmp/lst &

	else

		echo \"$TCPDUMP not found or not executable!\"

		exit 1

	fi

	

	sleep 2

	while ! grep \"$PATTERN\" /tmp/lst >/dev/null

	do

		sleep 1

	done

	sleep 3

	sed -n \"/$PATTERN/,\\$p\" /tmp/lst | grep \"$HOST.$PORT >\" | sort -u | head -2 | sed \"s/^.*$HOST.$PORT >//\" | awk \'{print $2\" \"$8\" \"$9}\'

	

	killall tcpdump

	rm -f /tmp/lst

	--------------------------------------------------------------------dif.sh----------------------------------------------------------------------

	#!/bin/bash

	

	FLG1=`head -1 $1 |awk \'{print $1}\'`

	TS1=`head -1 $1 | grep timestamp | awk \'{print $3}\'`

	

	FLG2=`head -2 $1 |tail -1 |awk \'{print $1}\'`

	TS2=`head -2 $1 |tail -1 | grep timestamp | awk \'{print $3}\'`

	

	DIF1=\"-\"

	[ -z \"$TS1\" ] || [ -z \"$TS2\" ] || DIF1=`expr $TS2 - $TS1`

	

	echo \"$FLG1	$DIF1\"

	--------------------------------------------------------------------mean.c----------------------------------------------------------------------

	#include <stdio.h>

	#include <stdlib.h>

	

	#define MAXLINE 1024

	#define MAXVAL  MAXLINE

	

	main(int argc, char **argv) 

	{

		int col=1,c=0,v=0;

		float s=0;

		float va;

		char *line,*pline, *val;

		line=(char *)malloc(MAXLINE);

		val =(char *)malloc(MAXVAL);

		pline=line;

		

		if (argc>1)

			col=atoi(argv[1]);

	

		while (line=fgets(line, MAXLINE, stdin)) {

			for(v=0;v<col;v++)

				val=strsep(&line, \"	\");

			line=pline;

			if (val[0] == \'\\0\') 

				continue;

			va=strtod(val,NULL);	

			s=s+va;

			c++;

		}

		printf(\"%.6f	\", s/c);

	}

	

	

SOLUTION

	


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