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TUCoPS :: Cisco :: ciacl097.txt

Cisco 6400 NRP2 telnet Vulnerability


                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                     Computer Incident Advisory Center
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

                      Cisco 6400 NRP2 telnet Vulnerability

June 14, 2001 20:00 GMT                                           Number L-097
PROBLEM:       The Cisco 6400 Access Concentrator Node Route Processor 2 
               (NRP2) module allows telnet access when no password has been 
               set. The vulnerability affects the Gigabit Ethernet, ATM and 
               serial interface on the NRP2. 
PLATFORM:      Cisco 6400 NRP2 running Cisco IOS release earlier than 
DAMAGE:        Telnet access is allowed when no password is set for the VTYs 
               on the NRP2. An attacker could gain access. 
SOLUTION:      Apply passwords to all the 32 VTYs on the NRP2 or apply the 
               software upgrade as described below. 
VULNERABILITY  The risk is MEDIUM: Unless the passwords have been set, telnet 
ASSESSMENT:    is wide open. 

[******  Start Cisco Security Advisory ******]

Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco 6400 NRP2 Telnet Vulnerability
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2001 June 14 at 1500 UTC

The Cisco 6400 Access Concentrator Node Route Processor 2 (NRP2) module
allows Telnet access when no password has been set. The correct response is
to disallow any remote access to the module until the password has been
set. This vulnerability may result in users gaining unintended access to
secure systems.

This vulnerability is documented as Cisco bug ID CSCdt65960.

This advisory will be posted at

Affected Products
Cisco 6400 NRP2 modules running Cisco IOS(r) release earlier than
12.1(05)DC01 are affected by this vulnerability.

Cisco 6400 NSP and Cisco 6400 NRP1 modules are not affected by this
vulnerability. No other Cisco product is currently known to be affected by
this vulnerability.

To determine your software revision, type show version at the command line

The Cisco 6400 Access Concentrator NRP2 module allows Telnet access when no
password is set for the vtys on the NRP2. This vulnerability affects the
Gigabit Ethernet, ATM and Serial interface on the NRP2. The correct
response is to not allow any remote access to the module until the vty
password has been set.

This vulnerability is documented as Cisco bug ID CSCdt65960, which requires
a CCO account to view.

A user can gain access to secure systems if the initial vtys have not had
their password set.

This vulnerability can be eliminated by applying the workaround or by
upgrading the IOS.

Software Versions and Fixes
This vulnerability has been fixed in Cisco IOS release 12.1(05)DC01 or

Obtaining Fixed Software
Cisco is offering free software upgrades to eliminate this vulnerability
for all affected customers.

Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's Worldwide Web
site at Customers whose Cisco products are provided
or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support
organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service
providers should contact that support organization for assistance with the
upgrade, which should be free of charge.

Customers without contracts should get their upgrades by contacting the
Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows:

   * +1 800 553 2447 (toll-free from within North America)
   * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
   * e-mail:

Give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free
upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through
the TAC. Please do not contact either "" or
"" for software upgrades.

Apply password to all the 32 vtys on the NRP2.

Enable Prompt>  vty 0 31 password "the-password"

Exploitation and Public Announcements
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use
of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory.

This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by a Cisco customer.

Status of This Notice: FINAL
This is a final PSIRT advisory. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the
accuracy of all statements in this notice, all of the facts have been
checked to the best of our ability. Cisco does not anticipate issuing
updated versions of this advisory unless there is some material change in
the facts. Should there be a significant change in the facts, Cisco may
update this advisory.

This notice will be posted on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at

In addition to Worldwide Web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients:

   * (includes CERT/CC)
   * Various internal Cisco mailing lists

Future updates of this notice, if any, will be placed on Cisco's Worldwide
Web server, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or
newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the
URL given above for any updates.

Revision History
 Revision 1.0	June 14,2001	Initial public release

Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to
receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's Worldwide
Web site at This
includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices.

This notice is Copyright 2001 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the text,
provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, and include
all date and version information.

[******  End Cisco Security Advisory ******]

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Cisco Systems for the 
information contained in this bulletin.

CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Center, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.

CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
    Voice:    +1 925-422-8193 (7x24)
    FAX:      +1 925-423-8002
    STU-III:  +1 925-423-2604

Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.

   World Wide Web:
   Anonymous FTP:

PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins.  If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.

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