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TUCoPS :: Privacy :: priv_318.txt

Privacy Digest 3.18 9/28/94




PRIVACY Forum Digest     Wednesday, 28 September 1994     Volume 03 : Issue 18

          Moderated by Lauren Weinstein (lauren@vortex.com)
            Vortex Technology, Woodland Hills, CA, U.S.A.
	
                     ===== PRIVACY FORUM =====

   	  The PRIVACY Forum digest is supported in part by the 
	      ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy.


CONTENTS 
	No responses in favor of Wiretap Bill received
	   (Lauren Weinstein; PRIVACY Forum Moderator)
	Digitizing signatures (Bob Rahe)
	Electronic Signatures (Terrence P. Maher)
	More Electronic Signatures (John French)
	Looking for Help (Mary Zahn Hanin)
	FBI Wiretap Bill (Marc Rotenberg)
	Another Civil Liberty Group Opposes Wiretap Bill (Dave Banisar)
	ACLU release and letter on FBI wiretap bill (ACLU Information)
	Privacy & American Business conference in DC next week
	   (Lance J. Hoffman)


 *** Please include a RELEVANT "Subject:" line on all submissions! ***
            *** Submissions without them may be ignored! ***

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Internet PRIVACY Forum is a moderated digest for the discussion and
analysis of issues relating to the general topic of privacy (both personal
and collective) in the "information age" of the 1990's and beyond.  The
moderator will choose submissions for inclusion based on their relevance and
content.  Submissions will not be routinely acknowledged.

ALL submissions should be addressed to "privacy@vortex.com" and must have
RELEVANT "Subject:" lines; submissions without appropriate and relevant
"Subject:" lines may be ignored.  Excessive "signatures" on submissions are
subject to editing.  Subscriptions are by an automatic "listserv" system; for
subscription information, please send a message consisting of the word
"help" (quotes not included) in the BODY of a message to:
"privacy-request@vortex.com".  Mailing list problems should be reported to
"list-maint@vortex.com".  All submissions included in this digest represent
the views of the individual authors and all submissions will be considered
to be distributable without limitations. 

The PRIVACY Forum archive, including all issues of the digest and all
related materials, is available via anonymous FTP from site "ftp.vortex.com",
in the "/privacy" directory.  Use the FTP login "ftp" or "anonymous", and
enter your e-mail address as the password.  The typical "README" and "INDEX"
files are available to guide you through the files available for FTP
access.  PRIVACY Forum materials may also be obtained automatically via
e-mail through the listserv system.  Please follow the instructions above
for getting the listserv "help" information, which includes details
regarding the "index" and "get" listserv commands, which are used to access
the PRIVACY Forum archive.  All PRIVACY Forum materials are available
through the Internet Gopher system via a gopher server on site
"gopher.vortex.com".  Access to PRIVACY Forum materials is also available
through the Internet World Wide Web (WWW) via the Vortex Technology WWW home
page at the URL: "http://www.vortex.com/".

For information regarding the availability of this digest via FAX, please
send an inquiry to privacy-fax@vortex.com, call (818) 225-2800, or FAX
to (818) 225-7203.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

VOLUME 03, ISSUE 18

   Quote for the day:

	"If anything should happen to me, you must go to Gort.
	 You must say these words: Klaatu, Barada, Nickto.
	 Please repeat that."

			-- Klaatu (Michael Rennie)
			   "The Day the Earth Stood Still" (1951)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 28 Sep 94 20:45 PDT
From:    lauren@vortex.com (Lauren Weinstein; PRIVACY Forum Moderator)
Subject: No responses in favor of Wiretap Bill received

Greetings.  As you'll see, the PRIVACY Forum received a number of items
opposed to the current "FBI Wiretap Bill" in the current cycle.  Though I
recently suggested here in the digest that persons in favor of the bill 
(I know you're out there) send in their thoughts so that all sides of the
issues can be discussed, no articles in favor of the bill were received.
I'd like to emphasize again that it is important that different points of
view be presented, even where particular views might be perceived to be
minority ones amongst the readership.  However, if proponents don't submit
items, only the points of views of those who do send in articles can be seen.

Regardless of how we feel as individuals about this and other controversial
topics, a well-rounded discussion would be to everyone's advantage.

--Lauren--

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 21 Sep 1994 10:08:31 EDT
From:    bob@hobbes.dtcc.edu (Bob Rahe)
Subject: Digitizing signatures

  In Digest Volume 03, Issue 17 Bill Hensley worries about a local store 
apparantly getting his signature electronicly when he signed a credit card
slip on a 'funny' pad.

  Altho there may be risks to privacy with the storing of someone's signature
like that, it would not seem that this is raising that risk by a significant
amount.  It merely means the store doesn't have to take the slip to a scanner
to get it digitized.  Makes it only marginally easier to get.

  And UPS around here doesn't use paper at all when you sign for packages.
They have an electronic clipboard with a plastic stylus and a window where
you sign and an LCD display that shows what you are scratching.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 21 Sep 1994 11:05:34 -0500 (CDT)
From:    Terrence P Maher <mahert@creighton.edu>
Subject: Electronic Signatures

As I practice credit card and debit card law, I thought a short note on 
why VISA/MC/AMEX ("interchange systems") are moving to electronic signatures 
was necessary.  

Back in the old days, prior to electronic draft capture, in order to get 
paid on these tickets, the merchant had to mail them to its bank (or 
the bank's processor).  These tickets would then be manually keyed into 
the interchange systems for payment.  The paper stayed with the merchant's 
bank, and everything done after that was handled electronically.  

Under the interchange rules, if a cardholder disputed a transaction 
(a "chargeback" in credit card lingo), the cardholder's bank, 
prior to making the chargeback to the merchant's bank, had to request the 
merchant's bank to send a copy of the transaction ticket (a "retrieval 
request" in credit card lingo).  Under the rules, the merchant's bank had a 
few days to send a copy of the actual ticket to the cardholder's bank, to 
avoid the chargeback.  So banks paid people to sift through paper 
tickets to identify a ticket that was subject to a retireval request.

Not only was the system slow (the merchant did not get paid on 
these tickets until approximately a week after they were mailed), but 
many keypunch errors occurred.  The paper ticket volume just got to be 
too much.  It was becoming impossible to store and index all of these 
paper tickets. To get rid of the paper. the interchange systems instituted 
"electronic draft capture" ("EDC").  Under EDC, all of the information 
that the interchange system needs to process a transaction was captured by 
those little POS terminals sitting by the register.  This included the 
merchant's I.D. number, the authorization number, the cardholder's account 
number, the total amount of the sale, and the date and time of the sale.  
At the end of each shift (or the end of the day), the merchant "closed 
the batch" and the electronic "tickets" in that batch were electronically 
summarized and transmitted to the merchant's bank for direct submission 
to the interchange systems.  No mailing of paper tickets or keypunching 
was necessary!

Those little paper tickets that the printers on the POS devices kick out 
are really only for the cardholder's benefit, the yellow copy never 
leaves the merchant's place of business.  Under the agreement between the 
merchant's bank and the merchant for credit card processing services, the 
merchant has to store them for up to 7 years, and has to present a copy 
within 5-10 days in case one of those dreaded retrieval requests come 
through.

There's the problem - if a retrieval request comes in, the merchant 
doesn't want to have pay an employee to search through six months of 
tickets in order to send one copy back to the bank within this short 
period.  Picture a major retailer that might take hundreds of card 
transactions a day.  It was a mess, and both the merchant's bank (who has 
to fund chargebacks if the retrieval request was not timely honored) and 
the merchant could suffer unnecessary losses.

The interchange systems' solution?  Why not capture the signatures and 
transaction information digitially and store them, so the bank can 
directly access the files to get a "copy" of the ticket in the event of a 
cardholder dispute.  With the new data compression systems, these digital 
images can be shrunk down to relatively small data files and easily 
stored on electronic media or CD_ROM.

That is the rationale, but I agree the materials can be used for other 
less honorable purposes.

Terrence (Terry) P. Maher, Esq.

------------------------------

Date:    22 Sep 94 16:02:29 EDT
From:    John French <73554.271@compuserve.com>
Subject: More Electronic Signatures

Another example of electronic signatures:

At least some Sears stores have already instituted these systems, and the
national consumer relations department cannot tell me whether the sales
clerk at one store was correct when she told me they are intending to
implement it in all Sears stores.  The clerk said it was for the convenience
of the clerks when comparing signatures on the card - they can now compare
it to a signature on their screen as opposed to the receipt just signed by
the customer. Apparently she did not know what Consumer Relations later
admitted to me, that graphics of the signatures are being stored.

I for one will not use the "special pens" when signing my credit
card receipts in the future.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 22 Sep 1994 09:51:06 -0500
From:    mzhanin@omnifest.uwm.edu (Mary Zahn Hanin)
Subject: Looking for Help

Greetings! I am a reporter for the Milwaukee Sentinel (Milwaukee's morning
newspaper) and have been assigned to put together a comprehensive series of
articles on personal privacy in the age of computers. We are specifically
interested in showing people how much information can be gathered about them
without their knowledge. We are hopeful that someone on this list will have
some ideas on how we can go about this; or, in the alternative, have some
stories of their own to share. This is a major issue which few newspapers have
looked at closely. We hope to educate the public and policy makers so that
informed decisions about privacy issues can be made in the future. If you can
help, please send your responses to my E-Mail address. 

One word of caution. The university which handles my Internet account is
changing computers on Monday and Tuesday and will not be functioning. Please
send me responses on or before Sunday or after next Tuesday (Sept 27). 
Thanks for the help. Mary Zahn Hanin.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 23 Sep 1994 10:15:12 EST    
From:    Marc Rotenberg <rotenberg@washofc.epic.org>
Subject: FBI Wiretap Bill

The Electronic Privacy Information Center has begun a campaign to stop the
FBI wiretap bill that is now pending in Congress.  EPIC has compiled 100
Reasons to oppose the legislation.  The Reasons cover a range of issues from
the history of wiretap law to examples of recent abuse.  Some of the Reasons
explore specific ramifications of the wiretap legislation, others look more
broadly on the possible impact on network development. 

Reason 32 and Reason 36 listed below look at the possible impact on network
security and innovation.  The views are based on documents obtained from
federal agencies under the Freedom of Information Act.

To maximize public awareness of the issue while minimizing the flow of
duplicate messages, EPIC is posting the Reasons to different news groups.
The postings are unique, the same Reasons are not posted to more than one
list. 

There is less than two weeks left in this session of Congress.  If you are
interested in this issue and would like to express your views, look at the
posting for more information.

========================================================================
100 Reasons to Oppose the FBI Wiretap Bill

Reason 32:	The FBI wiretap bill is likely to slow and to distort the
                development of communications technology

  A confidential memorandum obtained from the Department of Commerce under
the Freedom of Information Act had this to say about the FBI 
wiretap bill: "The proposed bill could obstruct or distort
telecommunications technology development by limiting fiber optic 
transmission, ISDN, cellular services and other technologies until they are
modified to avoid impeding lawful government access."

	----------------------

Reason 36:	The FBI wiretap bill is likely to jeopardize the
                   security of electronic communications.

  A confidential memorandum obtained from the Department of Commerce under
the Freedom of Information Act had this to say about the FBI wiretap bill:
"The proposal could impair the security of business communications by
requiring system modifications that could facilitate not only lawful
government interception, but unlawful interception by others.  For certain
industries, such as banking and financial services, communications security
is critical."

-> 9/28 NEWS UPDATE: Senate Judiciary Committee approves wiretap 
-> plan, but opposition from individual Senators still likely. Rep. Brooks 
-> to consider bill.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
What To Do: Contact your Senator.  Urge a no vote on S. 2375, the FBI 
Wiretap proposal.  Fax Rep. Jack Brooks 202/225-1584. Express your
concerns. Staff in both the House and Senate report that these 
messages are making a difference..  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 Reasons is a project of the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(EPIC) in Washington, DC.  For more information: 100.Reasons@epic.org.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 23 Sep 1994 20:07:10 EST    
From:    Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.epic.org>
Subject: Another Civil Liberty Group Opposes Wiretap Bill

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) today wrote to Rep. Jack Brooks,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, "to express the ACLU's opposition
to the FBI Wiretap Access Bill, H.R. 4922."  The organization's position is
the latest indication that the legislation is running into serious trouble
in Congress for several reasons, including strong opposition from civil
liberties and privacy advocates.  The bill's proponents had initially hoped
to bring it to a vote on the floors of the House and Senate by
mid-September.  Instead, the bill remains in committees of both houses and
is the object of a grassroots campaign to prevent its enactment.

Excerpts from the ACLU letter:

"The principal problem remains that any digital telephone bill 
which mandates that communications providers make technological 
changes for the sole purpose of making their systems wiretap-
ready creates a dangerous and unprecedented presumption that 
government not only has the power, subject to warrant to 
intercept private communications, but that it can require private 
parties to create special access.  It is as if the government had 
required all builders to construct new housing with an internal 
surveillance camera for government use. ...

"Moreover, the FBI has not borne the burden of proving why such 
an extraordinary requirement is necessary. ...

"H.R. 4922 proposes a radical and expensive change in our 
telecommunications structure.  The threats it poses, now and 
prospectively, are real, but the need for it is far less than 
evident or proven.  We urge that your Committee not rush into 
consideration of this far reaching measure with so little time 
left in the session."

The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) is urging all 
concerned individuals and organizations to contact the following 
members of Congress immediately:

Rep. Jack Brooks                   Sen. Howard Metzenbaum
(202) 225-6565 (voice)             (202) 224-7494 (voice)	
(202) 225-1584 (fax)               (202) 224-5474 (fax)

For more information about the FBI Wiretap Bill, check the Voters 
Telecomm Watch (VTW) gopher site (gopher.panix.com) or send 
e-mail to <info@epic.org>.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 26 Sep 1994 17:52:45 -0400
From:    ACLU Information <infoaclu@aclu.org>
Subject: ACLU release and letter on FBI wiretap bill

ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU 
 NEWS RELEASE * NEWS RELEASE * NEWS RELEASE * NEWS RELEASE  
 
ACLU Opposes FBI Wiretap Access Bill; 
Legislation Would Create Dangerous Precedent 
 
For IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
September 26, 1994                                       
 
Contact: Barry Steinhardt 
         BarryS @ aclu.org 
         or Kathy Parrent, 212-944-9800, ext. 424 
 
 
	The American Civil Liberties Union today called on the House 
Judiciary Committee to reject the FBI Wiretap Access Bill, H.R. 4922, 
which would require private electronics manufacturers to insure that the 
FBI can wiretap using developing telecommunications technologies.  
 
	In a letter sent to Congressman Jack Brooks, Chair of the House 
Judiciary Committee, the ACLU stated that the bill "... creates a 
dangerous and unprecedented presumption that government not only has the 
power, subject to warrant to intercept private communications, but that it 
can require private parties to create special access. It is as if the 
government had required all builders to construct new housing with an 
internal surveillance camera for government use."  
 
	"Moreover, the FBI has not borne the burden of proving why such an 
extraordinary requirement is necessary..." the letter said.  
 
	A copy of the full letter with the ACLU's detailed objections 
follows. 
___________________________________________________________________________

September 22, 1994 
 
Honorable Jack Brooks 
Congressman, State of Texas 
2449 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 20515-4309 
 
Dear Congressman Brooks: 
 
	We are writing to you to express the ACLU's opposition to the 
FBI-Wiretap Access Bill, H.R. 4922.  While we were not actively involved 
in Subcommittee deliberations, we have reviewed the legislation and we 
have several major concerns.  
 
	The principal problem remains that any digital telephone bill 
which mandates that communications providers make technological changes 
for the sole purpose of making their systems wiretap-ready creates a 
dangerous and unprecedented presumption that government not only has the 
power, subject to warrant, to intercept private communications, but that 
it can require private parties to create special access.  It is as if the 
government had required all builders to construct new housing with an 
internal surveillance camera for government use.  Even if such use were 
triggered only by a judicial warrant, such a requirement would be strongly 
resisted by the American people.  H.R. 4922 establishes a similar 
requirement, and is without precedent.  
 
	Moreover, the FBI has not borne the burden of proving why such an 
extraordinary requirement is necessary.  In 1993, there were fewer than 
1,000 wiretaps authorized and many of them failed to yield any substantive 
evidence while intercepting many innocent conversations.  It is far from 
clear that digital telephones will substantially obstruct legitimate law 
enforcement efforts.  Without further public discussion and debate, the 
public will not have a sufficient opportunity to weigh the loss of privacy 
against the FBI's claims.  There has been no opportunity to learn the full 
extent of the types of investigations that the FBI claims were precluded 
because of a restriction on their public dissemination.  Yet, based on 
these secret assertions, 91 such incidents were cited by the FBI.  On 
those slim assertions, the public's loss of privacy in digital 
communications is all but assured and taxpayers will be asked to pay an 
extraordinary price.  
 
	H.R. 4922 authorizes $500 million over the next four years to 
reimburse telecommunications carriers for the costs that would be imposed 
by the bill. Even if you accept these cost estimates -- the industry puts 
the real cost in the billions -- we will spending $125 million or $125,000 
per wiretap, for the fewer than 1,000 taps that will be conducted each 
year.  
 
	As you know, the ACLU has the greatest respect for Congressman 
Edwards and Senator Leahy. Both have been tireless champions for civil 
liberties. The Edwards/Leahy proposal is an improvement over earlier 
versions offered by the FBI and we applaud their efforts to add new 
privacy protections.  
 
	The proposed expansion of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act to cordless phones and the requirement that a court order be obtained 
for transactional data from electronic communication providers both are 
steps forward and merit separate consideration by the Congress.  But they 
cannot and should not be traded for the unprecedented intrusion 
represented by H.R. 4922.  
 
	In several respects, H.R. 4922 is still too broad in its 
application.  
 
	For example, earlier versions of the bill would have applied 
directly to on-line communication and information services such as 
internet providers, America On Line, Compuserve, Prodigy etc. H.R. 4922 
would apply directly only to "telecommunications carriers" such as the 
Regional Bell Operating Companies.  
 
	But this provision does not narrow the scope of the bill as much 
as it might seem. First, with the new presumption that the government is 
entitled to require private manufacturers to insure its ability to 
wiretap, law enforcement will undoubtedly be back in future years 
insisting that this limitation thwarts its efforts and will seek to 
broaden the coverage to other information providers.  Once the basic 
principle of H.R. 4922 is accepted, what arguments remain to resist its 
expansion.  The limited application of H.R. 4922 is surely temporary; what 
matters is the basic requirement, not its immediate application.  
 
	More importantly, law enforcement will still have the opportunity 
to intercept on-line communications over the internet or commercial 
on-line networks, by tapping into the facilities of the telecommunications 
companies. As critics of the earlier versions had noted the coverage of 
the on-line providers was largely redundant.  All these communications 
still pass over telephone lines.  
 
	Law enforcement does not need access at every point in a 
telecommunication in order to intercept it. Access at any one point is 
sufficient and that would be readily available since ultimately on-line 
communications must travel over the public switched telephone network 
which the bill requires be wiretap ready.  
 
	Moreover, given the commingled nature of digital communication 
lines, it is inevitable that more private information from third parties 
will be intercepted than would be the case with analog phones, and the 
minimization requirements in the bill will not prevent this.  
  
	In the end, this proposal will make our telecommunications 
structure more, not less vulnerable.  
 
	In its original form the FBI Digital Telephony proposal would have 
given the power to the Attorney General to impose standards on 
communication providers which would guarantee that their systems were 
wiretap-ready.  
	 
	Essentially, this would have created a centralized wiretapping 
system that threatened the privacy of the entire nation and was dependent 
for its security on a few select people. 
	 
	This raised the real concern that if electronic communications 
service providers must design their systems to allow and ensure FBI 
access, then the resulting mandatory "back doors" may become known to and 
be exploited by "criminals."  
 
	The new proposal contains the same risks. It would have the 
technical standards developed by the industry, through trade associations 
or standard-setting bodies, in consultation with the Attorney General.  
But it contains a "safe harbor" provision, which protects a carrier from 
sanction if it is in compliance with standards created by this approach.  
 
	The safe harbor provision virtually guarantees that the standards 
developed through the industry-based process will be adopted by all.  
Whether the standards are directly imposed by government or created by 
concerted industry action, in consultation with the government, makes 
little difference. The result is the same.  A centralized wiretapping 
capacity with all of its vulnerabilities will still be created.  
 
	Finally, we have grave concerns about the encryption provisions.  
The Edwards/Leahy version has been described as "neutral" on encryption. 
The bill provides that telecommunications providers do not need to decrypt 
data, unless they hold the key.  
 
	In the short term, this is an improvement over the earlier 
versions of the bill which would have created obligations to decrypt, but 
there are at least two longer term problems.  
 
	First, is the new presumption that industry has the affirmative 
responsibility to create special technical capacity for the government to 
snoop. Can there be any real doubt that the FBI will be back in the years 
to come asserting that its ability to intercept communications has been 
thwarted by easily available encryption and that an industry obligation, 
analogous to the new obligation to provide wiretap capacity, must be 
created.  
 
	Secondly, in some cases the telecommunications providers may well 
hold the key -- particularly as they expand the services they provide to 
their customers.  
 
	H.R. 4922 proposes a radical and expensive change in our 
telecommunications structure.  The threats it poses, now and 
prospectively, are real, but the need for it far less than evident or 
proven. We urge that your Committee not rush into consideration of this 
far reaching measure with so little time left in the session.  
 
	We thank you for your consideration of our views and we would be 
happy to sit down with you to discuss these issues.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
Ira Glasser                                   Laura Murphy Lee  
 
--endit-- 
 
The ACLU urges interested persons to contact the following members of  
Congress immediately: 
 
Rep. Jack Brooks			Sen. Howard Metzenbaum 
(202) 225-6565 (voice)			(202) 224-7494 (voice) 
(202) 225-1584 (fax)			(202) 224-5474 (fax) 
 
------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 28 Sep 1994 12:00:39 -0400 (EDT)
From:    "Lance J. Hoffman" <hoffman@seas.gwu.edu>
Subject: Privacy & American Business conference in DC next week

"Managing the Privacy Revolution" Oct. 4-5, 1994 Features Top Privacy
Experts in Landmark Washington Conference 
 
 Fifty leading privacy experts from the administration, federal and state
 government, the business community, public interest and advocacy groups,
 corporate legal representatives, telecommunications, the academic and policy
 community, national industry associations, the media, and survey research
 will participate in "Managing the Privacy Revolution," the first annual
 business/privacy conference sponsored by Privacy & American Business,
 October 4-5, 1994 at Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, Washington, D.C. (Program,
 speakers, and P&AB information attached).
 
 The conference will also offer the first look at a new P&AB/Louis Harris
 survey on the Consumer, Interactive Services, and Privacy.  

 Geared to assist those who handle personal information about consumers,
 clients and employees, the conference is expected to attract those who
 manage information privacy issues and policy in consumer credit,
 telecommunications, banking credit cards, employment, life/health/ property
 insurance, health care, telemessaging, direct marketing and medical
 records. 

 The conference will lay out the sweeping political, legal, and technological
 changes affecting the way every U.S. business will handle personal customer
 and employee information in the future and will provide a forum for
 addressing the changes.  

 The $595 registration fee for the two day conference includes all sessions,
 private time with speakers, interaction with fellow conferees, cocktail
 party and buffet reception, two banquet luncheons, two continental
 breakfasts, three refreshment breaks.  Also a Washington Legislative
 Briefing Book, a Handbook of Company Privacy Codes, a specially prepared
 35-page book of Highlights from 1994 Louis Harris Privacy Surveys and a
 six-month trial subscription to Privacy & American Business (or a six month
 renewal of an existing subscription). Special rates for nonprofit
 organizations, multiple registrations, and a $100 Early Bird registration
 discount are available.

 For further conference information, call P&AB, 201-996-1154 or fax
 201-996-1883.

------------------------------

End of PRIVACY Forum Digest 03.18
************************


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