Visit our newest sister site!
Hundreds of free aircraft flight manuals
Civilian • Historical • Military • Declassified • FREE!

TUCoPS :: Crypto :: crypfq02.txt

Cryptogrphy Faq Part 2

Archive-name: cryptography-faq/part02

This is the second of ten parts of the sci.crypt FAQ. The parts are
mostly independent, but you should read the first part before the rest.
We don't have the time to send out missing parts by mail, so don't ask.
Notes such as ``[KAH67]'' refer to the reference list in the last part.


2.1. What groups are around? What's a FAQ? Who am I? Why am I here?
2.2. Do political discussions belong in sci.crypt?
2.3. How do I present a new encryption scheme in sci.crypt?

2.1. What groups are around? What's a FAQ? Who am I? Why am I here?

  Read news.announce.newusers and news.answers for a few weeks. Always
  make sure to read a newsgroup for some time before you post to it.
  You'll be amazed how often the same question can be asked in the same
  newsgroup. After a month you'll have a much better sense of what the
  readers want to see.

2.2. Do political discussions belong in sci.crypt?

  No. In fact some newsgroups (notably were
  created exactly so that political questions like ``Should RSA be
  patented?'' don't get in the way of technical discussions. Many
  sci.crypt readers also read,,
  comp.patents, sci.math, comp.compression, et al.; for the benefit of
  people who don't care about those other topics, try to put your
  postings in the right group.

  Questions about microfilm and smuggling and other non-cryptographic
  ``spy stuff'' don't belong in sci.crypt either.

2.3. How do I present a new encryption scheme in sci.crypt?

  ``I just came up with this neat method of encryption. Here's some
  ciphertext: FHDSIJOYW^&%$*#@OGBUJHKFSYUIRE. Is it strong?'' Without a
  doubt questions like this are the most annoying traffic on sci.crypt.

  If you have come up with an encryption scheme, providing some
  ciphertext from it is not adequate. Nobody has ever been impressed by
  random gibberish. Any new algorithm should be secure even if the
  opponent knows the full algorithm (including how any message key is
  distributed) and only the private key is kept secret. There are some
  systematic and unsystematic ways to take reasonably long ciphertexts
  and decrypt them even without prior knowledge of the algorithm, but
  this is a time-consuming and possibly fruitless exercise which most
  sci.crypt readers won't bother with.

  So what do you do if you have a new encryption scheme? First of all,
  find out if it's really new. Look through this FAQ for references and
  related methods. Familiarize yourself with the literature and the
  introductory textbooks.

  When you can appreciate how your cryptosystem fits into the world at
  large, try to break it yourself! You shouldn't waste the time of tens
  of thousands of readers asking a question which you could have easily
  answered on your own.

  If you really think your system is secure, and you want to get some
  reassurance from experts, you might try posting full details of your
  system, including working code and a solid theoretical explanation, to
  sci.crypt. (Keep in mind that the export of cryptography is regulated
  in some areas.)

  If you're lucky an expert might take some interest in what you posted.
  You can encourage this by offering cash rewards---for instance, noted
  cryptographer Ralph Merkle is offering $1000 to anyone who can break
  Snefru-4---but there are no guarantees. If you don't have enough
  experience, then most likely any experts who look at your system will
  be able to find a flaw. If this happens, it's your responsibility to
  consider the flaw and learn from it, rather than just add one more
  layer of complication and come back for another round.

  A different way to get your cryptosystem reviewed is to have the NSA
  look at it. A full discussion of this procedure is outside the scope
  of this FAQ.

  Among professionals, a common rule of thumb is that if you want to
  design a cryptosystem, you have to have experience as a cryptanalyst.

TUCoPS is optimized to look best in Firefox® on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2014 AOH