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Xerox WorkCentre multiple models Denial of Service



Xerox WorkCentre multiple models Denial of Service
Xerox WorkCentre multiple models Denial of Service



          Louhi Networks Information Security Research
                       Security Advisory


     Advisory: Xerox WorkCentre multiple models Denial of Service
 Release Date: 2009/08/25
Last Modified: 2009/08/25
      Authors: Juho Ranta
[juho.ranta@louhi.fi] 
               Henri Lindberg, CISA
[henri.lindberg@louhi.fi] 

  Application: Xerox WorkCentre
     Verified: Controller+PS ROM Version 1.202.1 and 1.202.5
      Devices: Xerox WorkCentre 7132,
	       WC7232/7242, WC7328/7335/7345/7346 and
               WC7425/28/35
  Attack type: Denial of Service
         Risk: Low
Vendor Status: Patch available for WC7232/7242
References: http://www.louhinetworks.fi/advisory/xerox_0908.txt 

http://www.cert.fi/haavoittuvuudet/2009/haavoittuvuus-2009-081.html 

http://www.support.xerox.com/go/results.asp?Xtype=download&prodID=WC7232_WC7242&Xlang=en_US&Xcntry=USA 


Overview

Quote from http://www.xerox.com/ 
   "The Xerox WorkCentre 7132 multifunction is the affordable transition
    to the next level of productivity for your office. One easy-to-use
    device offers powerful printing, copying, scanning, and faxing. The
    WorkCentre 7132 also gives you color when you need it, for critical
    documents and for added impact. Robust functions, straightforward
    operation, and color within your budget . that should keep everyone
    smiling and productive."

    During a brief assessment performed for Xerox WorkCentre 7132 it was
    discovered that LPD daemon implementation contains a weakness
    related  to robustness of LPD protocol handling. Attacker can crash
    the whole device with a relatively simple attack. Recovering from
    the denial-of-service condition requires power cycling the device.

Details

    Device freezes when it is flooded with LPD requests having oversized
    queue name length AND other features of the device are accessed
    during the attack.

    The LPD daemon terminates the connection when it receives a request
    with an oversized queue name. The required minimum length for this
    seems to vary. Our proof-of-concept attack sends ASCII character
    blocks to the LPD daemon until connection is closed, while sending
    HTTP requests to the web administration interface.

    By flooding the device with these invalid LPD requests and accessing
    other features at the same time, the device can be crashed. This was
    verified with two different firmware versions (1.202.1 and 1.202.5).

    It must be noted that successful denial-of-service attack requires
    the steps described above. Sending requests with oversized queue
    names does crash the device by itself.

    Due to the black box nature of the performed attack against a
    production device, we were not able to determine the exact root
    cause for the crash. According to vendor this is caused by a memory
    leak, but further exploitability or memory corruption has neither
    been confirmed nor denied.

    Vulnerability was detected with an LPD protocol implementation
    written for Sulley Fuzzing Framework.


Preconditions

    *LPD daemon is enabled.
    *Attacker has network access to the LPD daemon
    *Attacker has network access to other features OR
    *Valid user uses the device on location


Symptoms of successful attack

    One or more of the following:
     *Control panel lights are blinking, no response to pushing buttons
     *LCD panel displays error message
     *LCD panel displays a halted progress bar
     *Switching power off from on/off button takes more than 10 seconds

Proof of Concept:

    Python code available at:
http://www.louhinetworks.fi/advisory/xerox/exploit.py 
http://www.louhinetworks.fi/advisory/xerox/webInterface.py 

    Pictures of a crashed control panel (Finnish language):
http://www.louhinetworks.fi/advisory/xerox/error1.jpg 
http://www.louhinetworks.fi/advisory/xerox/freeze1.jpg 

    Web interface requests are performed with a separate Python
    process/script in order to achieve more reliable exploitation under
    Windows.

Mitigation:

    Preventive
     *Install patch from vendor
     *Configure IPS signature for LPD requests with oversized queue
      names
     *Allow only trusted users to access LPD daemon
     *Disable LPD daemon

    Detective
     *Configure IDS signature for LPD requests with oversized queue
      names

Disclosure Timeline (selected dates):

       X         2008    - Vulnerability discovered
   3.  September 2008    - Contacted CERT-FI by email describing the
                           issue with Xerox WC 7132
   20. November  2008    - CERT-FI confirms vendor has been notified
   21. January   2009    - Vendor is unable to reproduce the issue,
                           but continues trying
   22. January   2009    - Vulnerability reproduced, vendor investigates
                           other devices. Apologizes slow response.
   17. June      2009    - Vendor has identified vulnerable devices,
                           patch due in July.
   20. August    2009    - Patch available for download (only
                           WC7232/7242)
   25. August    2009    - Advisory released

A Big Thank You to CERT-FI's Vulnerability Coordination for persistent
coordination effort.

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