========================================================================ACROS Security Problem Report #2008-03-11-2
ASPR #2008-03-11-2: Session Fixation Vulnerability in WebLogic
Document ID: ASPR #2008-03-11-2-PUB
Vendor: BEA Systems (http://www.bea.com)
Target: BEA WebLogic Server 10.0
Impact: There is a session fixation vulnerability  in Bea
WebLogic 10.0 Administration Console that allows the
attacker to assume administrator's identity and thus
gain administrative access to console.
Status: Official patch available, workarounds available
Discovered by: Mitja Kolsek of ACROS Security
There is a session fixation vulnerability  in Bea WebLogic 10.0
Administration Console that allows the attacker to assume administrator's
identity and thus gain administrative access to console. The session
management used for setting up and maintaining administrative sessions
allows the attacker to fix the administrative session cookie(s) in
administrator's web browser and use this cookie to access the
administration console after the administrator has logged into it. The
vulnerability is exploitable even if the Administration Console is only
accessed/accessible via HTTPS and even if Administrative Port is enabled.
- WebLogic Server 10.0
Notes: Our tests were only performed on the above product version. Other
versions may or may not be affected.
During a recent security analysis of a WebLogic-based application for our
customer we took a quick look at the WebLogic Administration Console, and
found it to be vulnerable to a session fixation attack that also works
through the Administrative Port. This attack, however, is dependent on two
1) The attacker must be (or obtain the identity of) a non-administrative
WebLogic user; and
2) The WebLogic administrator must login to the Administration Console
directly through the URL path /console/login/LoginForm.jsp (and not
through /console or /console/, which are much more likely).
If the attacker fixes authentication cookies on the administrator's
browser (see  for various ways to do that), she effectively "hands
over" her identity to the administrator. The administrator, having such
cookies fixed, logs in to the Administration Console and doesn't get any
new cookies from the Console. This means that his successful
authentication results in overwriting the state of the session identified
by the cookies such that this session becomes associated with the
administrator (and no longer with the attacker's non-administrative user).
The final result is that the administrator who has just logged in to the
Administration Console is using the exact same cookies as the attacker,
therefore the attacker automatically gains access to the administrator's
session - and obtains administrator's identity.
BEA Systems has issued a security bulletin  and published a patch which
fixes this issue.
WebLogic administrators can manually delete all cookies in their browsers
before logging in to the Administration Console.
 ACROS Security, "Session Fixation Vulnerability in Web-based
 BEA Systems Security Advisory BEA08-196.00
We would like to acknowledge Gordon Engel and Neil Smithline of BEA
Systems for professional handling of the identified vulnerability.
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March 11, 2008: Initial release
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