Remote code execution in BKAV eOffice
Remote code execution in BKAV eOffice
The entire AOH site is optimized to look best in Firefox® 3 on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2014 AOH
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
BLUE MOON SECURITY ADVISORY 2009-06
:Title: Remote code execution in BKAV eOffice
:Reporter: Blue Moon Consulting
:Products: eOffice v5.1.5
:Fixed in: --
We could not find out the definitive description for eOffice in English. This is our own understanding of the application: eOffice is an IMAP email client.
We have discovered a remote code execution vulnerability in eOffice. The attacker could force an unknowning user to execute arbitrary code.
To exploit this bug, an attacker only needs to send a specially-crafted email to his target's address. When the victim clicks on the email, malicious code will run immediately. From there, the attacker might take full control of the machine, or simply cause a Denial of Service.
This vulnerability exists in versions up to 5.1.5. Newer version might also be affected.
Current eOffice users are strongly advised to switch to other email clients such as the free Thunderbird, Sylpheed, Outlook Express, or commercial Outlook in the MS Office suite until the bug has been resolved.
Customers are advised to contact and request a fix directly from the vendor.
Due to negative response in previous report (``_), Blue Moon Consulting decided not to report this bug to the vendor but contacted the Vietnam Computer Emergency Response Team -- VNCERT.
August 01, 2009: Initial security alert sent to firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org
August 01, 2009: Operation team replied that it would be the point of contact for VNCERT.
August 02, 2009: VNCERT requested proof of vulnerability.
August 02, 2009: Blue Moon Consulting showed and recorded the proof of concept exploit.
August 02, 2009: Blue Moon Consulting sent a draft advisory to VNCERT.
August 07, 2009: Blue Moon Consulting showed the proof of concept exploit under close observation of VNCERT and Ministry of Information and Communications.
August 09, 2009: Nguyen Minh Duc from BKAV requested us to provide technical details prior to the emergency meeting called for by VNCERT.
August 10, 2009: Blue Moon Consulting requested to discuss with BKAV at the meeting.
August 10, 2009: Ministry of Information and Communications held an emergency meeting comprising of representatives from the Ministry, VNCERT, VNISA, Blue Moon Consulting, and BKAV to verify the vulnerability in an independent environment. BKAV refused to attend the meeting.
August 17, 2009: Nguyen Minh Duc asked Blue Moon Consulting to provide more technical information about the vulnerability based on VNCERT's request.
August 19, 2009: Blue Moon Consulting replied with clear reasons why BKAV had voluntarily denied itself from such information. Blue Moon Consulting also requested that written request should be made if further assistance was required.
August 24, 2009: Nguyen Minh Duc did not use official communication channel, and therefore was ignored.
September 01, 2009
No exploit code provided.
The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Blue Moon Consulting Co., Ltd disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Your use of the information on the advisory or materials linked from the advisory is at your own risk. Blue Moon Consulting Co., Ltd reserves the right to change or update this notice at any time.
Nam Nguyen, CISA, CISSP, CSSLP
Blue Moon Consulting Co., Ltd
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32)
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
We do not send spam. If you have received spam bearing an artofhacking.com email address, please forward it with full headers to email@example.com.