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Symantec Vulnerability Research
Advisory ID: SYMSA-2006-013
Advisory Title: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Mandiant First Response
Author: Brian Reilly / firstname.lastname@example.org
Release Date: 18-12-2006
Application: Mandiant First Response 1.1
Platform: Windows 2000/XP/2003
Severity: Multiple -- Denial of Service, Data Manipulation, Client/Server
Vendor status: New Version of product available
CVE Number: CVE-2006-6475, CVE-2006-6476, CVE-2006-6477
Mandiant First Response is an incident response tool to collect system
information such as running processes, system services, registry
information, event logs, and file lists from a local or remote host. The
First Response agent (FRAgent.exe) can be installed and configured as a
daemon on target hosts in order to collect information remotely via a
First Response Command Console. Multiple vulnerabilities exist that could
lead to a variety of attack payloads. Agents running in either HTTP or
SSL mode are vulnerable to denial of service and server hijacking
conditions. The server hijacking vulnerability present in HTTP agents can
be further leveraged to allow a rogue process to intercept and modify
legitimate agent/console communication, and force a Command Console to
download arbitrary content and visit arbitrary URLs.
Vulnerability #1: Denial of Service against an SSL agent through malformed
When run in daemon mode, the First Response agent (FRAgent.exe) accepts
remote connections from a First Response console via HTTP or a modified
HTTPS implementation. By sending a series of specially-crafted requests
to an SSL-enabled agent, it is possible to force the agent to throw an
exception that is not properly handled. After this occurs, the agent's
sockets will enter an indefinite CLOSE_WAIT state and all subsequent
connection attempts will be refused. The service then must be restarted
in order to recover and accept connections again.
Vulnerability #2: Denial of Service against an HTTP or SSL agent through
An FRAgent daemon permits other processes to bind to the same socket
addresses on which it is already listening. If FRAgent is bound to a
0.0.0.0 wildcard address ("all interfaces"), a rogue process can intercept
client connections by subsequently binding to the same port on a specific
IP address. By hijacking an agent with a non-responsive listener, an
attacker can effectively prevent all legitimate client connections.
Vulnerability #3: Command Console and Data Manipulation through HTTP
If an HTTP FRAgent daemon is hijacked, the attacker can control the response
data sent to and processed by a client, as well as other aspects of client
behavior. A rogue process can conduct a man-in-the-middle attack to
redirect and modify all requests and responses between the client and a
legitimate agent. The attacker can also send specially-crafted HTTP
responses that force the client to visit arbitrary URLs and/or download
arbitrary content. (NOTE: The use of HTTPS/SSL is default behavior for First
Response; using cleartext HTTP requires manual configuration.)
Mandiant has confirmed the reports provided by Symantec and updated
Mandiant First Response (MFR) to correct these issues. Version 1.1.1 is now
available for download from
http://www.mandiant.com/firstresponse.htm. Mandiant advises all
users of MFR to upgrade to 1.1.1 as soon as possible. Registered
users of the software have been notified via email of availability
of the upgrade.
During the course of our review we noted the following addenda to
Vulnerability 1: The DoS condition was due to a design error where
the Agent would choose to exit upon receipt of a malformed request.
The exit was an explicit choice exercised by the code path and not
caused by a buffer overflow or heap corruption. Version 1.1.1
addresses the explicit exit condition and correctly handles
requests with malformed payloads, allowing the MFR Agent to
continue operation while correctly rejecting malformed requests.
Vulnerability 2 and 3: The vulnerabilities are present because the
MFR Agent opens its listening port in non-exclusive mode. Version
1.1.1 correctly opens the port as exclusive, preventing the
Mandiant would like to thank Brian Reilly and Scott King for
discovering and notifying us of these vulnerabilities, and Symantec
for their participation in public disclosure.
Upgrade to MFR version 1.1.1, available at
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information:
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned
the following names to these issues. These are candidates for
inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes
names for security problems.
CVE-2006-6475, CVE-2006-6476, CVE-2006-6477
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Copyright (c) 2006 by Symantec Corp.
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