AOH :: HP Unsorted M :: BU-2018.HTM

Multiple DOM-Based XSS in Dojo Toolkit SDK



Multiple DOM-Based XSS in Dojo Toolkit SDK
Multiple DOM-Based XSS in Dojo Toolkit SDK



==========================================================Multiple DOM-Based XSS in Dojo Toolkit SDK 
Public Release Date: 3/12/2010
Adam Bixby - Gotham Digital Science (labs@gdssecurity.com) 
Affected Software:  Dojo Toolkit SDK <= Build 1.4.1 
Browser used for testing: IE8 (8.0.7600.16385)
Severity: High
==========================================================1. Summary
==========================================================
The Dojo Toolkit is an open source modular JavaScript library/toolkit designed to ease the rapid development of cross platform, JavaScript/Ajax based applications and web sites.  Multiple instances of DOM-based Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities were found in the _testCommon.js and runner.html files within the SDK.  The XSS vulnerabilities appear to affect all websites that deploy any of the affected SDK files.  These files are designed for testing, however a Google search identified numerous sites which have deployed these files along with the core framework components.

More information on DOM-based XSS can be found at http://www.owasp.org/index.php/DOM_Based_XSS. 

The vendor (Dojo Foundation) was notified of this issue on February 19, 2010. The vendor responded by releasing version 1.4.2 on March 12, 2010 and has also issued a security bulletin: http://dojotoolkit.org/blog/post/dylan/2010/03/dojo-security-advisory/. 
 

==========================================================2. Technical Details
==========================================================
File: dojo-release-1.4.1-src\dojo-release-1.4.1-src\dijit\tests\_testCommon.js
1) Data enters via "theme" URL parameter through the window.location.href property.
Line 25:
var str = window.location.href.substr(window.location.href.indexOf("?")+1).split(/#/);
  ..snip..
2) The "theme" variable with user-controllable input is then passed into "themeCss" and "themeCssRtl" which is then passed to document.write(). Writing the un-validated data to HTML creates the XSS exposure.
Line 54:
  ..snip..
var themeCss = d.moduleUrl("dijit.themes",theme+"/"+theme+".css");
var themeCssRtl = d.moduleUrl("dijit.themes",theme+"/"+theme+"_rtl.css");
document.write(''); 
document.write('');
 

==========================================================
File: dojo-release-1.4.1-src\dojo-release-1.4.1-src\util\doh\runner.html
1) Data enters via "dojoUrl" or "testUrl" URL parameters through the window.location.search property.
Line 40:
var qstr = window.location.search.substr(1);
  ..snip..
2) The "dojoUrl" and "testUrl" variables with user-controllable input are passed to document.write(). Writing the un-validated data to HTML creates the XSS exposure.
Line 64:
document.write("");
  ..snip..
document.write("");


==========================================================3. Proof-of-Concept Exploit
==========================================================
This vulnerability can be exploited against websites that have deployed any of the 145 SDK files which reference _testCommon.js.

Reproduction Request:
 

(Note: test_Button.html is one of the SDK files that includes the _testCommon.js file)

===========================================================
This vulnerability can be exploited against any website that has deployed the runner.html file.

Reproduction Request:
alert(/xss/)http://WebApp/util/doh/runner.html?dojoUrl='/>foo<'" 
 

==========================================================4. Recommendation
==========================================================
Update to Dojo Toolkit SDK 1.4.2

==========================================================5. About Gotham Digital Science
==========================================================
Gotham Digital Science (GDS) is an information security consulting firm that works with clients to identify, prevent, and manage security risks. For more information on GDS, please contact info@gdssecurity.com or visit http://www.gdssecurity.com. 

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