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Indiana University Security Advisory: Fuji Xerox Printing Systems (FXPS) print engine vulnerabilities



Indiana University Security Advisory: Fuji Xerox Printing Systems (FXPS) print engine vulnerabilities
Indiana University Security Advisory: Fuji Xerox Printing Systems (FXPS) print engine vulnerabilities



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Indiana University Security Advisory: 
Fuji Xerox Printing Systems (FXPS)[1] print engine vulnerabilities

Advisory ID:
20060824_FXPS_Print_Engine_Vulnerabilities[2]

Revisions:
08-24-2006 2350 UTC	1.0	Initial Public Release

Issues:
FTP bounce attack is possible when FTP printing is enabled
(CVE-2006-2112)[3]

Embedded HTTP server allows unauthenticated access to system
configuration and settings (CVE-2006-2113)[4]

Credit/acknowledgement:
CVE-2006-2112
Date of discovery: 04-11-2006
Nate Johnson, Lead Security Engineer, Indiana University
Sean Krulewitch, Deputy IT Security Officer, Indiana University

CVE-2006-2113
Date of discovery: 04-11-2006
Sean Krulewitch, Deputy IT Security Officer, Indiana University

Summary:
Certain FXPS print engines contain vulnerabilities that allow a remote
attacker to perform FTP bounce attacks through the FTP printing
interface or allow unauthenticated access to the embedded HTTP remote
user interface.  The first vulnerability is due to a failure to restrict
the connections made by the FTP PORT command.  This allows an attacker
to cause the FTP server to make arbitrary connections to ports on
another system, which can be used to bypass access controls and hide the
the true identity of the source of the attacker's traffic.  The second
vulnerability is due to a failure to properly authenticate HTTP
requests.  Specially constructed HTTP requests allow an attacker to make
unauthorized changes to system configuration and settings, and can also
be used to cause a denial of service against a vulnerable print server.
A successful attacker would be able to reset the administrator password
but would not be capable of exposing the current password.

Mitigation/workarounds:
Disabling FTP printing prevents the FTP bounce attack.  Disabling the
embedded web server prevents the DoS/unauthorized configuration change
attack.  Best practice suggests that access controls and network
firewall policies be put into place to only allow connections from
trusted machines and networks.

Criticality:
These vulnerabilities have a combined risk of moderately critical.

Products affected:
Dell 5110cn, firmware versions less than A01 [5]
Dell 3110cn, firmware versions less than A01 [6]
Dell 3010cn, firmware versions less than A01 [7]
Dell 5100cn, firmware versions less than A05 [8]
Dell 3100cn, firmware versions less than A05 [9]
Dell 3000cn, firmware versions less than A05 [10]
Other OEM products using the affected FXPS print engine

Recommended steps:
Apply vendor patches and disable remote protocols that are not
necessary.  

Footnotes:
[1]	http://www.fxpsc.co.jp/en/ 
[2]	https://itso.iu.edu/20060824_FXPS_Print_Engine_Vulnerabilities
[3]	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-2112 
[4]	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-2113 
[5]	http://ftp.us.dell.com/printer/R130538.EXE 
[6]	http://ftp.us.dell.com/printer/R130356.EXE 
[7]	http://ftp.us.dell.com/printer/R132075.EXE 
[8]	http://ftp.us.dell.com/printer/R132718.EXE 
[9]	http://ftp.us.dell.com/printer/R132079.EXE 
[10]	http://ftp.us.dell.com/printer/R132368.EXE 

All contents are Copyright 2006 The Trustees of Indiana University. All
rights reserved.

- -- 
Sean Krulewitch, Deputy IT Security Officer
IT Security Office, Office of the VP for Information Technology
Indiana University
For PGP Key or S/MIME cert: https://www.itso.iu.edu/Sean_Krulewitch 

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