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FFmpeg Type Conversion Vulnerability



FFmpeg Type Conversion Vulnerability
FFmpeg Type Conversion Vulnerability



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Please find attached a detailed advisory of the vulnerability.

Alternatively, the advisory can also be found at:
http://www.trapkit.de/advisories/TKADV2009-004.txt 

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Advisory:               FFmpeg Type Conversion Vulnerability
Advisory ID:            TKADV2009-004
Revision:               1.0              
Release Date:           2009/01/28 
Last Modified:          2009/01/28
Date Reported:          2009/01/25
Author:                 Tobias Klein (tk at trapkit.de)
Affected Software:      FFmpeg SVN trunk < revision 16846
Remotely Exploitable:   Yes
Locally Exploitable:    No 
Vendor URL: http://ffmpeg.mplayerhq.hu/ 
Vendor Status:          Vendor has released an updated version
Patch development time: 3 days


=====================Vulnerability Details: 
=====================
FFmpeg contains a type conversion vulnerability while parsing malformed 4X 
movie files. The vulnerability may be exploited by a (remote) attacker to 
execute arbitrary code in the context of FFmpeg or an application using 
the FFmpeg library.

FFmpeg is used by a lot of popular software projects like VLC media player 
[1], Mplayer [2], Perian [3] and Xine [4].


=================Technical Details:
=================
Source code file: libavformat/4xm.c

[..]
 93 static int fourxm_read_header(AVFormatContext *s,
 94                               AVFormatParameters *ap)
 95 {
 ..
103 [8]  int current_track = -1;
 ..
106 [9]  fourxm->track_count = 0;
107 [10] fourxm->tracks = NULL;
 ..
160      } else if (fourcc_tag == strk_TAG) {
161          /* check that there is enough data */
162          if (size != strk_SIZE) {
163              av_free(header);
164              return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
165          }
166 [1]      current_track = AV_RL32(&header[i + 8]);
167 [2]      if (current_track + 1 > fourxm->track_count) {
168             fourxm->track_count = current_track + 1;
169             if((unsigned)fourxm->track_count >= UINT_MAX / 
                           sizeof(AudioTrack))
170               return -1;
171 [3]         fourxm->tracks = av_realloc(fourxm->tracks,
172                 fourxm->track_count * sizeof(AudioTrack));
173             if (!fourxm->tracks) {
174               av_free(header);
175               return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
176             }
177         }
178 [4] fourxm->tracks[current_track].adpcm = AV_RL32(&header[i + 12]);
179 [5] fourxm->tracks[current_track].channels = AV_RL32(&header[i + 36]);
180 [6] fourxm->tracks[current_track].sample_rate = AV_RL32(&header[i+40]);
181 [7] fourxm->tracks[current_track].bits = AV_RL32(&header[i + 44]);
[..]

[1] The signed int variable "current_track" (see [8]) is filled with user 
    supplied data from the media file
[2] This statement checks if the user controlled value of "current_track" 
    is greater than "fourxm->track_count". The variable "fourxm-
    >track_count" is initialized with 0 (see [9]). By supplying a value >= 
    0x80000000 for "current_track" it is possible to cause a change in sign
    that results in "current_track" being negative. If "current_track" is 
    negative, the if statement will always return false and the buffer 
    allocation in [3] will never be reached.
[4] As "fourxm->tracks" is initialized with NULL (see [10]) and line 171 is
    never reached this leads to an exploitable NULL pointer dereference. It
    is possible to write 4 bytes of user controlled data to the memory 
    location "NULL + current_track". As the value of "current_track" is 
    also controlled by the user it is possible to write 4 bytes of 
    arbitrary data at a wide range of memory addresses.
[5] See [4]
[6] See [4]
[7] See [4]

A malicious party may exploit this issue to execute arbitrary code by 
overwriting a sensitive memory location (such as a GOT/IAT entry, a return 
address, buffer length or boolean variable).


========= 
Solution: 
========
  Upgrade to FFmpeg SVN trunk >= revision 16846


======== 
History: 
=======
  2009/01/25 - FFmpeg maintainers notified
  2009/01/27 - Patch developed by FFmpeg maintainers
  2009/01/28 - Public disclosure of vulnerability details by FFmpeg 
               maintainers
  2009/01/28 - Release date of this security advisory


======== 
Credits: 
=======
  Vulnerability found and advisory written by Tobias Klein.


=========== 
References: 
==========
[1] http://www.videolan.org/ 
[2] http://www.mplayerhq.hu/ 
[3] http://www.perian.org/ 
[4] http://www.xinehq.de/ 
[5] http://git.ffmpeg.org/?p=ffmpeg;a=commitdiff;h 72e715fb798f2cb79fd24a6d2eaeafb7c6eeda17 
[6] http://www.trapkit.de/advisories/TKADV2009-004.txt 


======== 
Changes: 
=======
  Revision 0.1 - Initial draft release to the vendor
  Revision 1.0 - Public release


==========Disclaimer:
==========
The information within this advisory may change without notice. Use
of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS
condition. There are no warranties, implied or express, with regard
to this information. In no event shall the author be liable for any
direct or indirect damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection
with the use or spread of this information. Any use of this
information is at the user's own risk.


================== 
PGP Signature Key: 
=================
http://www.trapkit.de/advisories/tk-advisories-signature-key.asc 

  
Copyright 2009 Tobias Klein. All rights reserved.


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