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Fujitsu-Siemens PRIMERGY BX300 Switch Blade Information Disclosure



Fujitsu-Siemens PRIMERGY BX300 Switch Blade Information Disclosure
Fujitsu-Siemens PRIMERGY BX300 Switch Blade Information Disclosure



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Advisory: Fujitsu-Siemens PRIMERGY BX300 Switch Blade Information
          Disclosure

RedTeam Pentesting discovered an information disclosure in the Fujitsu-
Siemens BX300 Switch Blade during a penetration test. By accessing URLs
of the web interface directly and aborting the authentication dialog,
one is able to access the restricted management interface without proper
authentication, having read-only access.


Details
======
Product: Fujitsu Siemens Computers PRIMERGY BX300 Switch Blade
Affected Versions: All
=46ixed Versions: None
Vulnerability Type: Information Disclosure
Security-Risk: medium
Vendor-URL: 
http://www.fujitsu.com/global/services/computing/server/ia/bladeserver/ 
Vendor-Status: informed, decided not to fix
Advisory-URL: http://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2007-003.php 
Advisory-Status: public
CVE: CVE-2007-3012
CVE-URL: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-3012 


Introduction
===========
"Packing the punch of 300 compute nodes in a single 19-inch rack

With up to 20 blades in a three-unit rack space, the PRIMERGY BX300
delivers previously unimaginable performance, dependability and
flexibility. Every blade corresponds to a compute node complete with
main memory, hard disks and network interface. The PRIMERGY BX300 is
thus ideal for front-end enterprise applications such as terminal
servers, network or caching systems."

(from the vendor's homepage)


More Details
===========
The web interface of the Switch Blade which is accessible per HTTP, will
by default ask for authentication by HTTP Auth. If the authentication
dialog gets cancelled in the browser, an empty page will be shown.

The HTML code of this empty page reveals some hyperlinks to subpages of
the web interface. If those get accessed directly in the browser, the
authentication dialog shows up again. But after clicking "Cancel", the
page will be shown regardless of the cancelled authentication and the
data in the form fields is shown.

It is not possible to manipulate any of the data. When changing
parameters and sending the POST request, the server answers with an
error page. The error page contains a javascript popup telling the user
that he does not have enough permissions.

This means that an attacker is able to bypass the authentication of the
web interface and access the information contained in the admin
interface websites.


Proof of Concept
===============
Directly surf to one of the following URLs:

https://switchblade.example.com/config/ip_management.htm
https://swtichblade.example.com/config/snmp_config.htm

Click "Cancel" to abort the authentication dialog. The frame with the
form fields will be shown anyway.

More URLs can be found by clicking "Cancel" and viewing the source code
of the main page.


Workaround
=========
Block access to the PRIMERGY BX300 web interface for all untrusted
users.


=46ix
==
The vulnerability will not be fixed by the vendor, as the BX300 product
line is discontinued.


Security Risk
============
The risk of this vulnerability is medium. The attacker is cannot
manipulate the entries he sees, as the server will check if the user has
the permissions to change any data.  Being able to see the data in the
form fields however is an information disclosure which gives the
attacker valuable information about his targets.

In case of the SNMP community strings, the attacker may be able to get
access to the systems' SNMP functionality, as with SNMPv1 and v2, the
community string is held secret. Only users knowing the community string
(or users having access to the connection, as the string is sent in
cleartext) can access the SNMP functionality. The snmp_config.htm page
will reveal this information to the attacker.


History
======
2007-05-14 First contact with the responsible contact person, gets the
           advisory
2007-05-23 Vulnerability gets confirmed by field support
2007-05-31 On request by RedTeam Pentesting, a test system is kindly
           provided by Fujitsu-Siemens for some further tests
2007-06-18 CVE number assigned
2007-07-03 Vendor tells RedTeam Pentesting about the decision not to fix
           the vulnerability
2007-07-04 Advisory released


RedTeam Pentesting GmbH
======================
RedTeam Pentesting is offering individual penetration tests, short
pentests, performed by a team of specialised IT-security experts.
Hereby, security weaknesses in company networks or products are
uncovered and can be fixed immediately.

As there are only few experts in this field, RedTeam Pentesting wants to
share its knowledge and enhance the public knowledge with research in
security related areas. The results are made available as public
security advisories.

More information about RedTeam Pentesting can be found at
http://www.redteam-pentesting.de. 

=2D- 
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH                    Tel.: +49 241 963-1300
Dennewartstr. 25-27                        Fax : +49 241 963-1304
52068 Aachen http://www.redteam-pentesting.de/ 
Germany                         Registergericht: Aachen HRB 14004
Gesch=E4ftsf=FChrer: Patrick Hof, Jens Liebchen, Claus R. F. Overbeck

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